

THE MERCERSBURG REVIEW.

OCTOBER, 1870.

ART. I.—ORGANIC REDEMPTION.

BY SAMUEL H. GIESY, D. D., PHILADELPHIA, PA.

II. SECOND ADAM—THE HISTORICAL CHRIST.

“As the antithesis between God and the world is not a mere semblance; and as there are created beings outside of God, which yearn for, and struggle backwards toward life in their Creator; the antithesis demands reconciliation—reconciliation too, not merely in thought and image, but in life and reality. As, further, the antagonism between the sinful world and the Holy God is not a mere pretence, but a solemn reality, not merely a hindrance and disturbance in thought, but a hindrance and disturbance in reality, the deliverance to be effected must be more than a deliverance of thought from semblance, it must lead back existing being to its true fundamental relations.”

This language of the great German theologian* indicates the order as well as the necessity of that answering reality. The case absolutely demands, as a Reconciler, an actual Personality, forming the meeting-point between the parties to be reconciled, the complex or personal unity of God and man—the God-man—as man is the complex of the sensuous and the spiritual world. In the discussion of what justly ranks as the

* Martensen's *Christian Dogmatics*; *Edinburg edition*, p. 245.

one question of the age, every view which conceives of the Person of Christ, either as a Gnostic abstraction, on the one hand, or, as is more commonly the case, on the other, as the highest reach merely of independent human struggle and development—the flower of humanity—clearly falls short of that one mystery—**GOD MANIFEST IN THE FLESH**—which forms the living centre and soul of the Gospel, the full realization of the Divine Ideal of man, the answering desire of human aspiration, the personal substance of salvation, and the one enduring principle of Christianity. Historically, this personal union of God and man began in the Incarnation of Jesus Christ.

The necessity of the Incarnation may be regarded from two points of view. It has cosmical significance as well as redemptive virtue; is world-completing and world-redeeming. Man is the voice of creation. All at length comes in him to its full sense and meaning; all its fragmentary and scattered sounds find in human speech intelligent and self-conscious utterance. Man is nature's self-interpreting end. Hence everything in the vast cosmical process is seen steadily aspiring man-ward; each lower order preparing the way for, and completing itself in, something greater and better than itself, until man comes, the echo and explanation of all below.

But it is only in a relative, and not in an ultimate and absolute, sense that man is the end of creation. He is not an end to himself. He needs and reaches out after self-explanation. Thus the last sense of all below him, yet, following the prophecy of his own erect form, with upward gaze resting on his native skies, he only finds beyond himself the full meaning of his own existence. The human spirit is a yearning spirit. It is stirred by the loftiest aspirations. No man, who has thoughtfully communed with himself, but is deeply conscious of yearnings he wants met and answered, yet has no sort of power in himself ever to reach and realize. Properly understood and worded, these aspirations are struggles after, as they also indicate a susceptibility for, the union of the human with the Divine nature. The crowning glory of the human, its goal and self-interpretation, is a divine-human Personality—God joining

Himself to His own work under its highest form. "The grand ideal of life in man is that it be divine and human; and, perhaps, the grand ideal of life in God is that it show itself in one who is divine and human."*

Thus, in the way of cosmical completion, Christ would have entered the sphere of the human even had man not sinned.† He is the Mediator—the meeting-point of the divine and human; the self-revelation of the creative principle; the Head of creation—"the First-born," as St. Paul says, "of all creatures," the One not only for whom all things were created, but in whom all things reach at length their crowning glory and pre-eminence (*πρωτόγονον*, Col. i. 18). The Incarnation was thus the end towards which the creation looked, and in which it found at last its proper completion. Sin being an incidental, and not an essential part of our original constitution, it was not dependent on that moral accident. It was no afterthought of God—an anticipative provision against a moral contingency.‡

* "Voices of the Soul," by Rev. John Reid, p. 29.

† Some Christian writers of the Mediæval ages, from Rupertus, in the 12th century, express themselves very decidedly on this point. Thus Wessel, quoted by Hagenbach, "Hist. of Doctrines," Vol. II. p. 34, denies that the human soul of Christ was a contingent creation. *Si incarnatio facta est principaliter propter peccati expiationem, sequeretur, quod anima Christi facta sit non principali intentione, sed quidam quasi occasione. Sed inconveniens est, nobilissimam creaturam occasionaliter esse introductam.* Calvin, with his usual vehemence, wrote against this supposition (Inst. B. II. chap. xii. 4). It is accepted by such German theologians as Martensen, Dorner and Lange. In his *Mystical Presence*, Dr. Nevin very strongly says, "Our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life. The *idea* which it embodies can never be fully actualized under any other form. The Incarnation then is the proper completion of humanity. Christ is the true ideal Man. Here is reached ultimately the highest summit of human life, which is at the same time of course the crowning sense of the world, or that in which it finds its last and full signification. . . . This forms accordingly, without figure, the inmost and last sense of all God's works. The world, from its extreme circumference, looks inward to this fact as its true and proper centre, and presses towards it continually, from every side, as the end of its entire constitution. All is one vast prophecy of the coming of Christ." pp. 206, 1.

‡ "Are we to suppose that that which is most glorious in the world could only be reached through the medium of sin? that there would have been no place in the human race for the glory of the Only Begotten One, but for sin?" Martensen's *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 250.

But sin having entered, the Advent of the God-man, besides being world-completing, acquires also, in its deepest moral sense and necessity, world-redeeming character. Suffering is not in itself meritorious. This assumption of humanity formed absolutely, as will further appear, the only sphere of that redemption needed to meet fully the exigencies of the case, itself involved in suffering because sin brought sorrow and shame, pain and death, following thus its bad fortunes in order for its completest deliverance. Sin is not a mere idea, something notional, but a fact, and, as we have seen already, a most terrific and potent, besides universal fact. The answer to sin must be, not an abstraction, but a fact of a like potency and universality. Here, too, there must be the power of one righteous and holy life moving on with perennial force through the ages, sweeping the remotest corners of the earth and touching with its redemptive virtue the consummation of all things.

Our study of the organic nature of the ruin affected by the fall necessitates, as it has already prepared us for, a like conception of redemption as alone adequate. Sin has been seen to be, in no sense, a merely arbitrary and individual imputation, but a generic evil. The law of sin and death being deeper and broader than the individual life of the first Adam, broader and deeper also must be the remedial work of the Second Adam; it must have the character of universality, comprehending both our nature and humanity in their entirety. The redemption must first be thus collective before it can be in any real way of individual advantage and effect. The race in its manifold diversities must come to unity again in a second Headship. Christ is the predestined Unifier of the divided races.

In the redemption of mankind, of absolute necessity is its *homogeneity*. The new Head of humanity must be a member of the race—an Adam, a *man*. What is demanded here is not a fresh creation, but a *re-creation*. A creation entirely *de novo* would, in no sense, be the redemption of the old, but its displacement *in toto*—the substitution not only of something

entirely new but altogether different. This new Stock of humanity must, therefore, be a new creation of the old; not new in the sense of having a wholly independent origin—"springing by a separate efflux out of the earth," but new only in being a fresh movement from the creative Centre in the very bosom of the old. The constitution of nature is in order to the constitution of grace. In this St. Paul expresses not only the true order of the resurrection, but that which underlies and goes before it, the true order of redemption itself, "Howbeit that was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterward that which is spiritual" (1 Cor. xv. 46). Answering to this necessity, Christ enters into the very bosom of the race by a true human birth. The Incarnation is a sublime reality. Christ stands in real connection with the whole order of human life going before. He is a man; not an idea; not an historical myth; not a Gnostic abstraction, but a veritable man.

Besides consubstantiality in both directions, the redemption of mankind requires also generic comprehension and real dynamic force, the power of a universal and not a merely individual life. Like the first, the Second Adam must be *the* man—incorporating in Himself humanity, as miscarried and ruined in the fall, and, in His own actual conflict with and victory over sin, and Satan, and death, lifting it out of its ruin, sanctifying, saving, and, in the end, glorifying it by carrying it thus successfully through temptation and the gate of death to a blessed and eternal life.

St. John expresses this sense of collective humanity, or a common nature, when he says *ὁ Λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο*,* and

* This view of the case is thus clearly expressed in the *Heidelberg Catechism*, when in answer to the 16th question, it says, "The justice of God requires that the same human nature which has sinned should make satisfaction for sin." *Ter. Ed.* How full and forcible is Dr. Nevin's comment here! "To be valid at all, the redemption must go as deep as the curse. But this last attaches to our nature as such. Men are sinners. Their nature then must be restored, as the only ground on which it is possible for them to be saved individually. This is done in Christ." *Mystical Presence*, p. 210.

not ἀνθρώπος ἐγένετο. This would have been not the common nature of us all, but merely a particular individual—the one man Jesus—assumed into union with the Divine nature, and a necessary limitation of redemption to this one of the myriad units composing the race, leaving human nature as such, in unrelieved corruption.* In this trenchant passage (1 John v. 11), “This is the record, that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son,” St. John declares that every human being has a personal interest in the results of this new Headship—the life of “the true God”† to all men. St. Paul, too, over and over again gives utterance to this generic character of Christ. He sees all ethnic differences and national barriers

* The Cerinthian heresy, appearing before the close of the first century, asserted that the *Adversus* entered into the man Jesus at His Baptism and separated from Him at the beginning of His Passion, thus making the human merely the outward appendage or temporary vesture of the divine. It was the opinion of Michaelis and others, that St. John wrote his Epistle to confute this first of the Heresies in regard to the Person of Christ. At all events, in direct opposition to any such statement, he asserts, (1) “that Jesus and the Christ are one and the same Person, (2) that the one Lord Jesus Christ came in not into flesh, He did not descend into an already existing man, but He appeared clothed in human nature.” “Deus Verbum non accepit personam, sed naturam; et in eternam personam divinitatis accepit temporalem substantiam carnis.” *St. Ful. de Fide*, quoted by Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, p. 259. The “judicious Hooker,” as he has well been styled, thus writes, “It pleased not the Word, or wisdom of God, to take to itself some one person amongst men, for then should that one have been advanced, which was assumed, and no more; but wisdom, to the end she might save many, built her house of that nature which is common unto all; she made not this or that man her habitation, but dwelt in us. The seeds of herbs and plants at the first, are not in act, but in possibility, that which they afterwards grow to be. If the Son of God had taken to Himself a man new made and perfected, it would of necessity follow, that there are in Christ two persons, the one assuming and the other assumed; whereas the Son of God did not assume a man’s person to His own, but a man’s nature to His own Person; and therefore took *Semen*, the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of our nature, before it was come to have any personal human subsistence. . . . By taking only the nature of man He still continueth one person and changeth but the manner of His subsisting, which was before in the glory of the Son of God, and is now in the habit of our flesh.” *Hooker’s Eccl. Polity*, B. V. § 52.

† St. John elenches this assertion, first, (as in the passage above cited,) by distinguishing God from His Son, and then, by the quick turn so frequently met with in his Gospel and Epistles, by fully identifying the Son with the ἀληθινός Θεός—distinct in Person, one in Divine essence. Οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθινός Θεός, καὶ ὁ συν αἰώνιος. 1 John v. 20.

broken down in this "one new man" (Eph. ii. 15; Rom. v. 15-18, ix. 12; Gal. iii. 28, v. 6; Col. iii. 11). All peoples meet in Bethlehem's Wonder. Hence, too, the corresponding title, *ὁ ἔσχατος Ἀδάμ* (1 Cor. xv. 45), *ὁ δευτέρος ἀνθρώπος* (1 Cor. xv. 47), the parent of a new humanity; in a word, the archetypal idea of humanity in the Divine mind realized.

The best theologians, German, Anglican and American, take this view of the universal character of Christ's human nature. To the foregoing extract from Hooker may be added this one from Olshausen. "If Christ were only a man, as one along with and among many others, it would be indeed incomprehensible, how what He has suffered and done could be of any essential weight for mankind in general; He could only exert an influence by His doctrine and example. But He is to be viewed in fact, apart from His divine nature, as *the* man, that is, as realizing the absolute idea of humanity, and thus carrying it in Himself potentially in the way of the *spirit*, as truly as Adam did in a *corporeal* way. This character of Christ's human nature is designated in divinity by the term *impersonalitas*; and we find even Philo, with an inward feeling of the deep truth, describing the *Λόγος* as τὸν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἄνθρωπον, that is the idea of man, the human Ideal." Quoting again from his *Mystical Presence*, Dr. Nevin says, "The Word became flesh; not a single man only, as one among many; but *flesh*, or humanity in its universal conception. How else could He be the principle of a general life, the origin of a new order of existence, for the human world as such? How else could the value of His mediatorial work be made over to us in a real way, by a true imputation, and not a legal fiction only? The entire scheme of the Christian salvation requires and assumes throughout, this view of the Incarnation and no other. To make it a merely individual case, a fact of no wider force than the abstract person of Jesus Himself, thus resolving His relationship to His people into the common relationship to Adam, is to turn all at last into an unreal theophany, and thus to overthrow the doctrine altogether. Christ gathered humanity into Himself as a whole, and was constituted thus its head

and sum, in a more full and comprehensive sense than this could ever be said of Adam."

In tracing the genealogy of Christ, St. Luke, the Evangelist for the Gentile world, and aiming, therefore, to make especially prominent the universality of redemption, carries the line of His descent back of Abraham, where St. Matthew, the Evangelist of the Fulfilment, stops, to Adam, the common centre of humanity. Like his teacher, the great Apostle to the outlying world, overleaping the narrowness of any national election and Divine preference, the author of the third Gospel connects Him with man as man. With him, He is not *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀβραάμ* (St. Matt. i. 1)—the great boast of the Jew—linked to the *founder* merely of a specific kingdom, but *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀδάμ*—בן אדם—a true shoot from the original stock, linked to all the sons of Adam, and also *ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ*—the Son of God in eternity, the Son of Man in time—answering in this mysterious complex of the Infinite with the finite, to Eden's Serpent-Bruiser—the *Promised Seed of the woman*.* In this Evangelist's *Son of Adam*, "there was already in its germ the idea of a universal family, of a kingdom in which there was no respect of persons, and all distinctions of race and descent were broken down."†

* "St. Luke intends to show that Jesus is the Promised Seed of the woman (Gen. iii. 15; Gal. iv. 4), that He is the Second Adam—the Father of the new Race of regenerate humanity—in whom all the nations of the earth are blessed. . . . Christ as our Divine Head is here presented to us as the Author of the new Race which He carries up, as it were, by the retroverted stream of sanctification, turning back the channels of hereditary corruption and original sin, through every successive generation in an ascending series, and leading it through Adam to God He cleanses it by the divine effluence and effusion of the Holy Ghost." Wadsworth's *Greek Test. in loc.*

† Already in the second century this sense of St. Luke's genealogy—Christ, in linking Himself to Adam, heading up afresh all the families of men sprung from that original root—was observed. Thus Irenæus (B. III. chap. 22, § 3), says: "Wherefore St. Luke points out that the pedigree which traces the generation of our Lord back to Adam contains seventy-two generations, connecting the end with the beginning, and implying that it is He who has summed up in Himself all nations dispersed from Adam downwards, and all languages and generations of men, together with Adam himself." *Clark's Trans. p. 360.*

St. Luke's genealogical table is of service in another particular. In tracing alone the maternal line of this sacred ancestry, he brings out this unique and fundamental fact, that Christ was the "Son of Adam," but not after the ordinary manner of human generation. The parenthetical clause, *ὁ ἐκ τοῦ ἄδου* (iii. 22), is at once significant of that deeper necessity actually holding in the profound mystery itself. The Evangelist would say: 'Men, in their ignorance of His true origin, supposed Him to be the son of Joseph, but He was in fact without earthly paternity—Virgin born.' Therefore, the first link in ordinary generation is here wanting. He is not the son of Joseph, but boasts an exclusively Divine Paternity. God is His Father. The Creating Spirit, who first moved upon the formless waste, ordaining a world of living things, and afterwards was the efficient cause of the personal unity of spirit and nature in man, was again the "plastic principle"* in this mystery of mysteries. Hence the language of the annunciation, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that Holy Thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God" (St. Luke i. 35). Here, in their deepest sense, was the meaning of these words of St. John reached and realized: "born not of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God" (St. John i. 13)—the central activity being the holy will of the Creator, and, in no sense and to no extent,

* "The Second Adam, who sets forth the type of a new humanity, and is the starting-point of a new human creation, cannot be supposed to have come into existence according to the old Adamitic type. According to that type arise only beings who bear but in a restricted sense the image of God, all who are thus born after Adam's type are concluded under sin: and yet, nevertheless, the birth of Christ must have been a truly human birth. It would not do for Him to belong to the race merely as a stranger; without father, and without mother, and without generation (Heb. vii. 3). He must at the same time be born as a Son of David. This requirement, that the new Adam be born in the midst of the race, without the sinful race having any sort of self-determining and independent part in His birth; that He should be conceived and born of a woman without being linked by the fact of His conception into the connex of sinful human nature—is met by the Creed of the Gospel, and of the Church, which says, 'conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary.' Martensen's *Dogmatics*, p. 275.

the human. Thus, the mystery which met in His Person was the actual unity of essential Divinity and essential humanity: by supernatural conception the SON OF GOD, and by a true human birth the child of the Virgin Mother, and, as such, the SON OF MAN.

These titles, "Son of Man" and "Son of God," applied equally to one and the same Person, assert positively the realization of these two vast conceptions: the unity of mankind in Christ, and the union in Him of the nature of God and the nature of man, without the slightest confusion of attributes, or the destruction of both in a *tertium quid*. In the mind of Christ Himself, the first, His self-chosen name,* implied more than a community of nature and feeling simply with the lot of human kind. It carried along with it the full sense of that generic comprehension above referred to, and, besides, the remedial force of this theanthropic Headship. This self-sense of the title comes out in this all-embracing conception of His own mission: "The Son of Man is come to seek and save that which was *lost*" (St. Luke xix. 10). Thus, while He is, by the title, self-included with the race—one with other men—He does, at the same time, consciously stand immeasurably above any such separate individuality; in a word, comprises in Himself the whole race—the One Man forming the convergent-point of all precedent, and the starting-point of all subsequent, history.†

* Of the 88 times where the title occurs in the Gospels, it is used by our Lord of Himself in all with only three exceptions.

† "As man is, on the one hand, a single member of the great whole of nature, while He is, on the other hand, not merely a microcosmic representation, but stands *above* all nature, being the Mediator between the sensuous and the invisible holy order of the world; so also Christ. On the one hand, He is an individual member of the human race, not merely setting forth microcosmically, but also standing above the entire race, as the Mediator between the race and God. His individuality stands in the relation to all other human individualities in which the centre of a circle stands to all the single points of the circle." Martensen, *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 262. "The title Son of Man," says Liddon, "means more, in its application to our Lord, than His real incorporation with our kind. It exalts Him indefinitely above us all as the representative, the ideal, the pattern Man. He is, in a special sense, the Son of Mankind, the genuine offspring of the race. His is the Human

But in our Lord's own mind, the title, Son of Man, also went beyond even this evident sense—the truth of His humanity and the unity of humanity in Him. Taken in its far deeper import—its remedial virtue for ruined humanity, the Second Adam undoing what the first had done—it was itself an aspiration to, as, indeed, it only completed itself in that reciprocal title, Son of God, bringing prominently to view and fullest recognition at the same time His Higher Nature. How clearly this appears in that remarkable conjunction of the two titles, in that ever memorable passage (St. Matt. xvi. 13–17), where, boldly importing something beyond mere manhood, the inquiry is directly made, “Whom do men say that I the Son of Man am?” As much as to say, ‘That I am; but am I that only?’ “The point of His question,” says Liddon, “is *this*:—what is He besides being the Son of Man? What is He in the seat and root of His being? Is His manhood a robe which He has thrown around a Higher form of pre-existent Life, or is it His all? Has He been in existence some thirty years at most, or are the august proportions of His life only to be meted out by the days of eternity? In marked contrast to the popular hesitation which refused to recognize explicitly the justice of the claim so plainly put forward by the assumption of the title ‘Son of Man,’ the Apostle confesses, ‘Thou art the Christ,’ and, advancing a step beyond this confession, quickly supplements the whole by adding, ‘The Son of the Living God.’”

Life that does justice to humanity. All human history tends to Him or radiates from Him. He is the point in which humanity finds its unity; as St. Irenæus says, He ‘recapitulates it.’ He closes the earlier history of our race; He inaugurates its future. Nothing local, transient, individualizing, national, sectarian, dwarfs the proportions of His world-embracing Character; He rises above the parentage, the blood, the narrow horizon which bounded, as it seemed, His human life; He is the Archetypal man in whose presence distinctions of race, intervals of ages, types of civilization, degrees of mental culture, are as nothing.” *Bampton Lectures, Second Ed. p. 8.* Baur also, quoted by this same writer, sees in this title, the clear assertion of His Messiahship, “Den Namen des *videtur* *Christus* gebraucht Jesus Selbst auf eine so eigenthümliche Weise von Sich, dass man nur annehmen kann, Er habe mit jenem Namen, wie man auch seine Bedeutung genauer bestimmen mag, irgend eine Beziehung auf die Messiasidee ausdrücken wollen.”

We have here in germinal utterance what alone can claim to be sound Christology. It is the prototypal confession—the parent of all that, in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, took more specific, and in the Athanasian metaphysical and dogmatic, shape. The central and determining principle here, as it must be in all safe and truly *Christian* theology, is the Person of our Lord Jesus Christ.

In His self-application of these two names, there is a direct claim on His part to actual participation in the incommunicable nature of the Absolute Unity no less than in our common nature. Together they set forth this great reality—the one absolute need of humanity in its complete ruin—a theanthropic Personality and Life—*ὁ Θεάνθρωπος* (the God-man): the old humanity receiving into its bosom, in a truly supernatural way, the personal presence of the power alone adequate to its redemption, constituting the One, in whom this mysterious union finds place, the New Stock of humanity—the Second Adam, the Father of a new race, the New Creation emphatically: “The Word made flesh.” The first and fundamental fact of the Gospel, therefore, is the reality of the Incarnation. Here all starts anew.

Two things are determined in the presence of this great fact: the fitness of the human for union with the Divine nature, and its entire helplessness apart from the Divine. Man must be man's Redeemer; but the One, “mighty to save,” must necessarily be mightier than poor man needing to be saved.

On the anthropological side, the true humanity of Christ was fiercely assailed by two ancient heresies: the one contending that human nature was so utterly fallen that there was no possibility of its redemption, because affording no ground for the actual union of the Higher with it; the other, an error at the opposite pole, contending that human nature was not so utterly fallen but that it could readily help itself. Manichæism held man to be irredeemable; Pelagianism self-redeemable. The one saw Him fast-bound in sin. Here no redemption is possible on the base of the old. The old must be wholly done away in the substitution of something entirely new and alto-

gether different—a creation *de novo* and *in toto*. Thus the Manichean heresy was found to fall in quite naturally with a corresponding error on the Christological side—the Gnostic reduction of the true humanity of Christ to a mere abstraction; something unreal; a transient wonder; a mere theophany; and not a real Incarnation. Pelagianism, denying the fact of organic depravity, and contending that every man stands where Adam did originally, boldly asserted that all man needed to rise to fellowship with God was self-stimulation and culture. This heresy, too, very naturally fell in with a corresponding error on the Christological side—the Ebionitic leveling of the true Divinity of Christ, assigning Him a place no higher than that of a noble exemplar and teacher of superior rank. Thus denying the actual need of the presence of the Divine, Pelagianism made the human nature its own sufficient help. It formed in this way the forerunner and baneful root of the prevailing Humanitarianism of the present day—the terrific curse of so much of our theological thinking and current literature—which sees in Christ nothing more than the Pattern Man, and wants no Saviour besides a Leader simply in the proprieties of human life.

Neither hesitatingly nor doubtfully was the real mind of the Church expressed. Both were pronounced fundamental errors, alike subversive of the Gospel and destructive of the necessarily real union of God and man in the Person of Christ. In the most positive way, the human nature was declared to be so far fallen that it could only be redeemed by the actual coming in of help from above; and not so utterly fallen as to be an unfit medium for, and so past all, redemption. Over against Pelagianism, the ground was decidedly taken that to whatever brilliant and complacent results the work of self-culture might be carried, man's redemption could not thus come from below, nor merely from within, but must proceed from above; over against Manicheism, it was just as decidedly asserted, that the human was not only the fit vehicle for, but the necessary base and sphere of, that transcendent help.

Just here the actual necessities of the case are made to appear: not a mere personification of God—the human for a time, invested with and acting out the attributes of the Divine. We dare not conceive of the Incarnation as being one with the occasional and transient foreshadowings of it, related in the earlier Scriptures, when, in “the Angel of the Lord” (Gen. xvi. 7, 13; xxii. 11; xxxviii. 13; xxxi. 11, 13; xlviii. 15; Ex. iii. 2, 6, 14; Num. xxii. 32, 35), there was a manifestation of the Divine presence for a definite end. And much less dare we conceive of it as of a piece simply with the empty parade of a stage-performance. A mere theophany—impersonal Divinity taking the outward appearance only of personal existence in Christ—like all scenic representations, an illusive and shadowy resemblance would be nothing other than a sad travesty of the great need itself and what must be its answering reality. Not a mere conjunction either of the Divine with the human. What is outwardly and artificially conjoined may be readily disjoined. In the nature of the case, an inhabitation could only have been a temporary relation. What was demanded, was not a shrine or temple for Deity, like the gorgeous cathedral, but Deity and temple in the living unity of a single Person. Not a heteroclite, a being, partly human and partly Divine—half man, half God. This would be the Monophysite monstrosity of a *middle* being—a compound, neither one thing nor the other, neither human nor yet Divine. But the need, and answering to this, the sublime reality was a veritable Incarnation—the essentially Divine and the essentially human in the unmixed and abiding union of one Personal Life; a Being wholly God and wholly man, both at once, and each wholly.

On both sides, the Incarnation is of necessity a reality. Mere abstraction, empty notion or show on either side, would have vitiated effectually the whole purpose and scheme of supernatural grace. The Divinity engaged must be no less *real* than the humanity; the humanity assumed no less real than the Divinity. In this Incarnate One must “dwell the *fulness* of the Godhead *bodily*” (Col. ii. 9). He must be “The Mighty God” (Isa. ix. 9)—not a divine attribute, nor a divine afflatus,

nor yet a divine messenger, an angel direct from the courts of the Most High—but the very God: in the language of the Athanasian Creed, “of the substance of the Father, co-eternal and co-equal.” As we have seen already, no Oriental avatar, no impersonal theophany—neither abstract, nor yet representative Deity—would answer. There must be the great Incomprehensible Reality—the wholeness of the Divine essence. In the long and bitter controversy on the subject, the Church, over against Arianism, and with it sweeping modern Unitarianism and all shades of Humanitarianism, came, at the Council of Nice, A.D. 325, to the emphatic declaration of the case in the adoption of that full word—marking in the vastness of the interest at stake,* for all ages, the grandeur of her victory—*ὁμοούσιος*, the consubstantiality of the *Λόγος* with the Father.

But the humanity must be equally real with the Divinity. Anthropological similitude merely is out of the question. Christ's humanity must be man's own. No transitory and shadowy appearance simply would serve the end. Again, He

* “How much it meant was proved by the subsequent efforts which have been made to destroy or to evade it. The sneer of Gibbon about the iota which separates the semi-Arian from the Catholic symbol (*ὁμοιούσιον* from *ὁμοούσιον*) is naturally repeated by those who believe that nothing was really at stake beyond the emptiest of abstractions, and who can speak of the fourth century as an age of meaningless logomachies. But to men who are concerned, not with words, but with the truths which they enshrine, not with the mere historic setting of a great struggle, but with the vital question at issue in it, the full importance of the Nicene symbol will be sufficiently obvious. The difference between *ὁμοιούσιον* and *ὁμοούσιον* convulsed the world for the simple reason, that in that difference lay the whole question of the real truth or falsehood of our Lord's actual Divinity. If in His essence He was only *like* God, He was a distinct Being from God, and therefore either created, or (*per impossibile*) a second God. In a great engagement, when man after man is laid low in defence of the colors of his regiment, it might seem to a bystander, unacquainted with the forms of war, a prodigious absurdity that so great a sacrifice of life should be incurred for a piece of silk or cotton of a particular hue; and he might make many caustic epigrams at the expense of the struggling and suffering combatants. But a soldier would tell him that the flag is a symbol of the honor and prowess of his country; and that he is not dying for a few yards of colored material, but for the moral and patriotic idea which the material represents. If ever there was a man who was not the slave of language, who had his eye upon ideas, truths, facts, and who made language submissively do their work, that man was the great St. Athanasius.” *Liddon's Bampton Lectures*, 1866, Second London Ed. pp. 437-8.

must be, not *ὁμοίουσις* but *ὁμοούσιος*—not merely like, but really man. Consubstantiality is equally necessary on the human, as we have already found it was on the Divine, side. The Church felt that the interest at stake here was no less vital than in the former issue, and the danger arising from Gnostic abstractions no less serious and, in the end, destructive also to the whole scheme of human redemption than the Ebionitic vagaries were sure to prove. And hence at the Council of Ephesus, A. D. 430, the real manhood of Christ, with equal care and directness, was guarded and defined, in applying to the Blessed Virgin the term, *θεοτόκος*; in His indisputable birth of a human mother assigning to Him sameness of nature with her. Thus the Creeds: "Conceived by the Holy Ghost, *born* of the Virgin Mary" (Apostles); "was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary, and was made *man*" (Nicene); "perfect God and perfect man, of a reasonable soul and body subsisting; of the same essence with the Father as to His Godhead, and of the same substance with us as to His manhood" (Ephesian); "man, of the *substance* of His mother, born in the world" (Athanasian). And in full accord here with the Creeds is that grandest of all Christian Hymns (*Te Deum Laudamus*), coming down from the fourth century, sounding along the vast corridor of the ages, and taken up by generation after generation:

"When Thou tookest upon Thee to deliver man,
Thou didst humble Thyself to be born of a Virgin."

And to all this may yet be added this language of St. Ignatius, *ad Eph.* 18: 'Ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστὸς ἐκνοσφορήθη ὑπὸ Μαρίας.

This Mystery: *θεὸς ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί*—the Divine actually and abidingly entering into the bosom of the human—constitutes the Second Adam, the new Headship of the race. It is a New Creation in that it is the introduction of powers which up to this time had personally never found their way into the order of human existence. It marked consequently a new era for the race—the personal presence of the Higher life in the

flesh. A new Pulse starts, and new Blood courses through the veins of our dead humanity. Our old Adamic nature is recapitulated—crowned and comprehended in its New Head. Hence St. Paul's full and grand conception: *ὁ ἰσχυρὸς Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιεῖ* (1 Cor. xv. 45). The same thought finds this fuller statement in Eph. i. 10: *ἀνακεφαλαιώσασθαι τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ*—marred and broken humanity regathered under a Head, which, though tempted as the first, failed not. What is this but the inspired utterance of a generic redemption in the Second, paralleling and remedying the generic ruin brought in in the failure and sin of the first, Adam? Evidently the thought here is, that Christ is the Personal Substance and Perpetual Presence in our fallen world of that world's actual redemption. The possibility and power of it were alike immanent in His Person.

Irenæus gives expression to this same thought, standing as the caption of this Review, thus exhumed from the low burial which has overtaken so much of the Patristic theology, and given a new lease of life and as well working force in the thinking of the present day: "Unus Christus Jesus dominus noster, veniens per universam dispositionem, et omnia in Semet Ipsum recapitulans." Again, "Longam hominum expositionem in Se Ipso recapitulavit, in compendio nobis salutem præstans."* This re-heading of humanity in Christ, and the actual redemption of our *entire nature* and our *entire race* in the results of

* *Adv. Her. B. III.* 16, 6; 18, 1. Dr. Dörner's note on Irenæus' frequent use of the word 'recapitulare' is of great value in a right understanding of his Christological views. "It signifies in general 'to return with anything to the beginning,' i. e. 'to repeat,' 'sum up.' To sum up is a repetition in the form of a collection of the moments previously distributed. But because such a summing up in one, more fully exhibits a sphere, than would the exhibition of its scattered moments, such a collection is more than a mere repetition, it is also a consummation of all that had gone before. It is a return to the idea of the thing; it is a fuller, a complete representation of it. Derivatively, it denotes when after a normal commencement an abnormal state has been introduced, 'to restore'—i. e. not to bring back to the former condition, but to set aside that which contradicts the idea;—a work which Christ could not accomplish unless He recapitulated humanity in Himself in another sense also: not merely summing up in Himself the 'longa hominum expositio' laden with sin, but also completing and setting forth humanity in its purity." *Doctrines of the Person of Christ; Div. 1, Vol. 1, pp. 465-6. Clark's trans.*

this recapitulation are statements frequently occurring in the writings of this and other prominent ante-Nicene Fathers.

Strangely enough, modern theology breaks with the ancient Church in its outspoken estimate of the Incarnation as the one fact necessarily of primal importance. It affects to see little or no atoning virtue in the wondrous event itself. It only comes, in its view, as forming the necessary *occasion* for all that was to come, in the way of penal satisfaction, at the sanguinary close of our Lord's life. In full keeping with this style of thought, the atonement is localized and centered in His death on the cross, while all going before and following after Calvary is set down as something of secondary importance altogether. The Incarnation thus comes to be viewed and apprehended as an incidental matter—a divine contrivance to meet an in-coming emergency—a means only to a suffering end, blunderingly failing to perceive that all that course of suffering was itself involved in the very *character* of the humanity assumed.

Sin being an incidental, and not, as we have already seen, the essential element of our nature, its consequences, suffering and death, are alike incidental. What was in itself thus purely incidental cannot be constituted the fundamental principle of the atonement. The fact of sin does but rule the form and conditions of that work. Proceeding upon the one-sided assumption that it was a work alone *for* humanity—the remedy of God for the penal consequences of sin—all such theories of the atonement leave out of view altogether that it was to be achieved *in* humanity, and thus, in following out the order of our fallen life, bringing the whole problem of humanity, in spite of all the hindrances foisted in by sin, to its actual consummation in the full realization of the Divine Ideal of man. Hence the early Church was occupied, not so much with the Atonement strictly, as such, as the Incarnation, well convinced that all redemptive merit attaching to the one must fall back upon the reality of the other. The central interest of Patristic theology thus is seen to have been the Person of Christ; not so much what He did and suffered, and

not that in any isolated way, but Christ Himself through His *achieved* sinlessness and victory over death, lifting up, sanctifying, and, in the end, transfiguring and glorifying, in His own exaltation, that *fallen* nature assumed into living oneness with His Divine nature.

As *fallen* nature determines the sphere of redemption, so it defines its whole scope and conditions. Recalling this, that the human will moving, consciously and freely, in harmony with the Divine will was man's high vocation, it follows that the atonement made necessary must hold in the surrender, free and full, of the very principle which disturbed and sundered man's relations to God above him, and nature below him. But with human freedom, broken away from the grace which constituted it and necessary to its right action, how is this atonement, in the full realization of that very vocation, at all possible? Every one born after the type alone of the old Adamic nature is touched by the force of a will sundered from its true centre and right relations, ever falling back under its destructive tyranny in every attempt to get beyond it, like the maimed eagle impatiently and despairingly flapping the earth with its broken wing in its vain endeavors to rise to its native Alpine elevation and freedom. "To bring in a perfect sacrifice," says Martensen, "two requirements must be complied with, which our sinful race was unable perfectly to accomplish: namely, man must *himself*, by an act of the purest free will, retrace and retract his sinful life, and begin a new development in love, obedience, and in rectitude; and withal this act of human freedom must at the same time be the act of the purest grace, God's own act in sinful history."*

Hence, in this second generic Headship, the remedial power is seen to lay hold of our fallen life in its first stage—its embryonic depths. Elisha's act at Jericho—"he went forth unto the *spring* of the waters, and cast the *salt* in *there*" (2 Kings ii. 21)—prefigures, whether divinely intended so or not, the point where absolutely the life of the new Humanity must begin, and finds, in the profound and more significant act of the Greater

* *Christian Dogmatics*, p. 306.

than Elisha, its last and best fulfilment. All the turbid streams of sin, we have already seen, take their rise in that hidden spring-head of corruption—man's conception in sin. And since the power of sin touches our life *in utero*, the power of actual redemption in Christ must also start in the pre-natal period. Hence the significance and real grace of His supernatural conception. He began His time-life, not where Adam did, in mature and full-grown manhood, but precisely where we all take it—in the womb. The fabled origin of the classic goddess of wisdom in the full development of form and powers, found no such unnatural and abnormal counterpart in His Advent, who is the deepest reason of all things—"in Whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" (Col. ii. 3).

"Conceived by the Holy Ghost and born of the Virgin Mary" mean something already in the necessary order of redemption as well as for faith. No more painful evidence of the general falling away of one side of our Protestant thinking from all sense of the redemptive virtue of our Lord's supernatural conception and holy nativity is needed, than the neglect of, nay, the actual dishonor even which, in some quarters, is put on the Christmas festival. Claiming to be *evangelical* (*par excellence*) though scouting the Creed as the relic only of a fossilized theology, it has no words of ridicule, bitter enough and fierce enough, for those Churches whose custom, ruled by the moulding power of that same Creed, it still is to hold in special commemoration the day of our Saviour's birth. It is quite refreshing, as well as thoroughly instructive in the right direction, to know that the Heidelberg Catechism, ruling the faith and teaching of the Reformed Church, giving to that ancient *regula fidei* a central place and normative authority, sympathizes none whatever with that radically defective theology which sees no saving merit in the marvellous beginning of our Lord's time-life, postponing all that to and localizing it in His agonizing death, as though that, apart altogether from the prevenient mystery of the Incarnation was or could be even the whole of

the atonement.* On the other hand, in its deep and profound sense of the necessity of an organic redemption, the Catechism sees that work starting at that hidden point where Christ first comes to touch our fallen life. Hence the significance and force of the question, "What benefit dost thou receive from the *holy conception and birth of Christ*? That He is our Mediator, and with *His innocence and perfect holiness covers*, in the sight of God, *my sin wherein I was conceived*."† Thus, from the marvellous commencement already the objective historical order of redemption rules the Catechism, as it was felt and owned to have done so before in the very order observed in the Creed.

"Every human life is developed by contact with the world." By a real birth Christ is placed in the actual conditions of human life. His life looked forward to a real victory over sin, so the conflict, of course, must be real throughout. Breathing the impure atmosphere of a fallen world, touched by that mix-

* These vigorous sentences, from Dr. Nevins' "*Answer to Professor Dorner*," are right to the point. "The Incarnation is in itself of original and primary significance for the purposes of our salvation, in such sense, that the historical movement of the world's redemption must be regarded as starting in it, and having in it, its necessary organic principle and source. In other words it is not to be viewed as a mere outward device for making the Atonement possible. To this degrading conception of Christ, must come in the end all that way of magnifying His death, by which His life is made to be with regard to it of only secondary and more or less dependent account. The view is common among modern unchurchly and so-called evangelical sects; which indeed arrogate to themselves this title *evangelical*, for the most part, just because they lay all stress on the atonement taken in such miserable abstract sense. The whole Gospel is thus shorn of its proper historical force; and the result is, on all sides, a certain amount of unrealness and Gnostic spiritualism, which is sure to prove itself unfriendly always to true and vigorous faith." *Mer. Rev.* 1868, p. 601. Again, "Why should any one imagine that to magnify the Incarnation, is not to magnify, at the same time, the Atonement; or that the honor of the Atonement is prejudiced somehow, by the putting of honor on the Incarnation, through which only the Atonement is brought to pass? No such false abstraction finds any sort of countenance in the New Testament. We have reason to look upon it with distrust, therefore, whenever we meet it in actual ecclesiastical life. All that *Evangelicalism* (be it of the American or be it of the materially different German hue and shape), which affects to measure its seal for Christ, by making low account of His life in order to make high account of His death, comes before us, to say the least, with questionable character; even if it should not be felt to carry on its front at once, by this very fact, the broad seal of its own condemnation." *Ib.* p. 316.

† *Heidelberg Catechism*, Quest. 26, Tercen. Ed.

ture of truth and error which prevails in every age, He was to repel, from childhood upwards, the impure and false as foreign to His being, and appropriate only such elements as would serve to advance His true, normal development.

Sin is the dark reality of our life. From birth to death it holds its course through ever recurring temptations and mournful failures. We are tempted but only to sin, over and over again. About these everyday temptations, there is nothing pantomimic, or scenic. He does but mock us who barely suggests the thought. We know them to be terrific realities, involving us, well nigh at every step, in shame and sorrow. They were no less such to our Lord Himself. Here was no fictitious danger, on the one side, and no empty parade of resistive powers, on the other. With our human life He assumed all the solemn responsibilities and tremendous risks of a true human probation—the experiment having against it all the disadvantages of a harder condition of things in the moral world than actually prevailed when the first fair trial came to such a sad and ruinous failure. For the problem which Christ, in the assumption of *fallen* human nature, proposed and accepted for Himself, was none other than this,—*viz.*, by personally identifying Himself fully with all its ill-fortunes, and sharing the very lameness superinduced by sin, to master, *in* it and *for* it, the infernal power which had wrought all the mischief and woe.

Of course, a condition precedent here was full moral freedom, which necessarily means freedom of action, again, either in the right or wrong direction. This implies in the Second, as in the first, Adam, the actual possibility of evil. Not at all uncommon are mistaken conceptions as to the sinlessness of Christ. To intimate the possibility of sin and failure in His case is to shock rudely the sensibilities of some persons. And yet under any other view, it is hard to see how our Lord's earnest and incessant conflict with the head-power of evil becomes anything more than a mere sham, taking from Him all proper credit for firmness and moral resolve, and from the work, as actually achieved through manifold hindrances, all real merit. But this height of moral sublimity, whereon He stands

in peerless and majestic solitariness, essential to His mission as Redeemer, "*without sin*" (Heb. iv. 15), does not mean a mere negative relation to sin—the absence of all opposition to the Divine will, child-like innocence—but a positive attribute unquestionably, *acquired* sinlessness; an attitude of deadly conflict with sin, and, the mastery of it always by the energetic exercise of His whole powers—something, therefore, achieved, maintained, and defended in spite of all the restless malignancy of hell, and under all the liabilities and felt solicitations to sin ever besetting human life. His immunity from sin comes before us, not as the overpowering necessity of His Divinity, nor the easy thing it is commonly supposed to have been by reason of that Higher nature, but the demonstrated element of His very being—fallen humanity in Him carried, by a crossed and hindered pathway, up to complete impeccability. This is particularly the case in those significant passages (Heb. ii. 10; v. 8, 9), where Christ's perfection, by which He made Himself the Author of Salvation to us, is represented as a real *attainment*—obedience learned by counter personal experiences of the sternest kind. It is this that gives the active obedience of Christ all its profound significance and real atoning virtue. Under any other supposition we must in fact give up the realness of the conflict, and as well the moral grandeur and redemptive merit of the victory itself.

The first Adam was not positively, but potentially, perfectly holy. The probation to which he was subjected was for the purpose, in the free and untrammelled exercise of his own powers, of developing this *posse non peccare*—the possibility of not sinning—into the higher stage of existence, the *non posse peccare*—the impossibility of sinning. Christ assumed, not the original unfallen, but our fallen humanity. In this second experiment, He stood not precisely where Adam had, but, as we have just seen, with immense odds against Him—evil, with all the prestige of victory in the sphere of the human world and its consequent enthronement in the very constitution of nature, armed with more terrific power against the possible realization of this Divine Ideal of man, perfect holiness. Thus, the dis-

advantages of the situation, the tremendous risks involved, and the fierceness of the opposition encountered, all this considered, we come to an appreciative sense both of the reality and greatness of His vast moral achievement—human nature, tempted, tried and miscarried in Adam, lifted up in Him to the sphere of actualized sinlessness. Meeting sin as we meet it, but ever thrusting it aside, He fully demonstrated Himself the Sinless One, the Captain of our Salvation.

German theologians especially are exceedingly rich in the development of this thought. "Although the idea of Christ as Redeemer implies that in Him the possibility of sinning was never realized, yet is He the Sinless One, only in so far as it was possible for Him to sin. He could not have been the Redeemer if He had sinned, and as Redeemer it is inconceivable that He should have sinned: but the idea of a Redeemer can only be realized by one who, though He might have sinned, did not sin. In a word, He is the Redeemer of men, not as QUI NON POTUIT PECCARE, but as QUI POTUIT NON PECCARE." *Steudel's Glaubenslehre*, quoted by Ullmann, who, in his masterly treatise on "The Sinlessness of Jesus," carries out, at still greater length, the same idea. "The possibility of sin did indeed exist in the case of Jesus, but this possibility never became actual fact; sin was ever foreign to Him and far from Him, outwardly as well as inwardly; was even absolutely excluded by virtue of the moral power He possessed in highest purity and fulness, which in all circumstances proved itself victorious. We are entitled to view the matter in this light by the consideration, that, in the doctrine of the Apostles, the perfect manhood of the Redeemer is affirmed. For, even in those passages in which the Godhead of Christ is most explicitly affirmed, there is no intention to detract anything from the perfection of His human nature. Now the possibility of sin can never be severed from human nature, created as it is and placed under the law of development. Nor will we be unwilling to admit the possibility of sin in the case of Jesus, if we only rightly understand what is meant by this admission, and are careful to distinguish the possibility of sinning from a

leaning or bent towards sin. The two things must certainly be distinguished: sin may be possible where it does not really exist, no, not in the faintest degree; but a *penchant* towards sin is inconsistent with sinlessness, for it involves a germ, a minimum of sin. This possibility of sin must, moreover, be presupposed ere we can conceive that Jesus could be tempted. The power of being tempted does not certainly in itself imply the existence of any evil; for even the purest virtue, if it dwell in a finite nature, is liable to be tempted. Now the fact that Christ could be tempted, is presented to us in the Scriptures as one of the most marked features of His history. Nay more, it is held up as the indispensable condition of His typical character. And, indeed, it is only on the supposition that He took part in our nature not merely apparently, or partially, but really and perfectly, that He can be our Pattern, Ideal, and Example. * * * For His nature was human—it developed and unfolded itself after a human fashion; it was not, like the nature of God, holy of absolute necessity. Moreover, the mission of His life was of such a character that, in order to fulfil it, He had to combat, through heaviest fights and sorest temptations, which at every movement summoned into activity His whole moral might. All that we then mean when we speak of the sinlessness of Jesus is, that the possibility of sinning which existed in Him never attained any actual reality, but was constantly nullified and abolished by His perfect surrender of Himself to God and His will.”*

His history shows how true is this judgment. Taking up human life at its earliest period, it involved Him in actual conflict with temptation and sin, peculiar to every successive age. The reigning characteristic of childhood is self-will. From this bitter root of hereditary evil springs downright disobedience—attempted self-direction, and consequent impatience of paternal authority and control. The child is not who makes no effort to break away from their exercise. Of necessity the elimination of sin began at that point of His life. Though we

* “Sinlessness of Jesus,” *Clark's Ed.* pp. 48, 49.

have no record of the fact, yet we cannot doubt that Christ met the temptation to self-will and disobedience peculiar to childhood. Thrice sorely tempted, on the threshold of His public ministry, to break away from the will of the Higher, we may well suppose, the temptation would not have been wanting to break away also from that of the lower, relationship. A hint, at all events, is given us into the respectful and submissive nature of His child-life (St. Luke ii. 52). We see Him honoring the parental relation, as an ordinance of God; bowing to the parent's right to command, and the child's duty to obey, and in doing so restoring this period of life to its normal character and touching it also with the real merit of His own holy obedience.

This victory over the lawless spirit of childhood was repeated in after years, when as a man He took His place among men. To one standing on the threshold of manhood and canvassing the grave question—*life's vocation*—the most potent temptation, then as now, was *self-seeking*—the open path of pleasure, gain, or ambition. Though standing on the ground precisely which man as man occupied, yet was Christ not caught even in the outer circlings of this fearful maelstrom of worldliness. All round Him, men were occupied with their own plans, living for themselves. His life was, by His own free choice and determination, steadily ruled by a different principle, and throughout moved towards its own highest end. He thus states what He proposed to Himself: "I came down from heaven, not to do My own will, but the will of Him that sent Me" (John vi. 38). This, indeed, was the primordial rule of human life. But, in the full maturity of his powers, under the instigation of the Devil, the first Adam broke away from it, and dragged the race after him in the same course of self-centricity. Come to manhood, the Second Adam, in the face of the accumulated force of centuries of false direction, must bring the race back to its right orbit and true centre—doing, and doing always, the will of God (John viii. 29).

Nor were temptations wanting to induce Him to make His own separate and independent will the rule of His activity (St.

Matt. iv. 1-11). Hence again the profound significance and real merit of His holy obedience—maintaining in a protracted struggle His integrity, whereas the first Adam failed in the very first instance. Thus it is, that the righteousness of His tempted, but holy manhood covers, in the sight of God, the selfishness, sensuality and sin of ours, sanctifying and lifting it up by Himself passing sinlessly through it.*

The struggle closes not with this signal victory at the very outset of His public career. The Satanic assault in the wilderness upon His sacred purpose may be said, in fact, only fairly to have inaugurated the dark hostility arrayed from all quarters against this noble Champion of Humanity. We only come to some proper judgment of the terrific nature of the conflict and His just credit for unwavering steadfastness, when the forces are reviewed which were matched against Him. Even the brief form of its presentation of the facts, the record is of vast service in this regard. It shows that His life was not spent in a serenity of atmosphere disturbed by no secret intrigues, or dark conspiracies, or pursuing hate, or open hostility, or the treachery of professed friends. No life was so crossed and hindered. Of all persons He was the least appreciated and the most bitterly hated. The men in place and power, civil and ecclesiastic, were opposed to Him. The race, save a few uninfluential and uneducated persons, may be said to have been lifted up against Him. He encountered the most intolerant bigotry. Alike obnoxious to Pharisees and Sadducees, Ascetics and Mystics, the leaders of all the religious sects of the day united in their hatred and intrigues against Him, and at length, under the most violent and cruel circumstances, compassed His death.

Baffled and defeated in the desert, Gethsemane is made the scene of Satan's more confident approach. That hour of dark-

* This clearly was St. Paul's mind when, in that ever memorable parallel drawn between the natural and supernatural Headship, he says most definitely, 'Απα οὗ ὡς ὁ θεὸς πατέρα ἡμῶν, οὕτως καὶ ὡς θεὸς ἀνθρώπων, οὕτως καὶ ὡς θεὸς δικαστῆς, οὕτως καὶ ὡς ἀνθρώπων, οὕτως καὶ ὡς δικαστῆς (Rom. v. 12).

ness was to the Prince of darkness his season of greatest power, as it was our Lord's season of greatest fear and weakness. Here by the avenue of pain that is attempted which, in the first instance, by the avenue of pleasure and personal glory, had signally failed. The shadow of the Cross darkens now the way of holy obedience. Before a bowed soul stands in appalling proximity this extremest test of self-surrender to the perfect will of the just God. The end necessary to crown a whole life of filial submission and self-sacrifice is obedience unto death— "*even the death of the Cross.*" "Even" is intensive, indicating the bitter extremity of the test to which His holy obedience was subjected.

Now by that allotment of appalling severity shall He be turned aside from fulfilling His purpose of grace? At the dire end, shall submission fail Him and, in the failure again of its Head, every hope of the recovery of the race perish for ever? There was a fearful possibility of this. If the record be not mere fiction, it details a crisis in the mind of the Second Adam, when all was made to tremble again upon the decision of one man's will. It was a moment awful in its sublimity. Above that midnight Suppliant the very heavens bend with breathless anxiety. All alone is He left, in that hour of agony, to decide a world's destiny. For, the record tells us, it was not until after this expression of full submission, "Nevertheless not My will, but Thine, be done," that a messenger was sent from the Father on his *strengthening* mission (St. Luke xxii. 43). "What, in this way, the Cross sums up, it also helps to interpret; setting before us as it were, in one view, all the features of that sustained struggle of which it was itself the last and fiercest strife, all the depths of that atoning love of which it was itself the full and effectual outpouring. Not that His last suffering is in any way to be arbitrarily separated from the rest; but that it was the coming to a head of all that had gone before, and thus drew together in one scene of unsurpassed solemnity and of deepest reality what had scarred, in sundry forms and in various degrees of intensity, all the previous period of His earthly travail."

In tracing thus the course of this successful probation, the whole life of Christ is seen to be redemptive. Touching every period with the fact of an assailed but maintained sinlessness, He touched it with the virtue of an effective atonement. Patristic theology is especially refreshing on this renewal of human nature by its new Head actually passing through its several stages. None speaks out here more definitely and beautifully than Irenæus: "He did not set aside or pass beyond the human, nor annul the law of the human race in Himself, but He took up into Himself, and sanctified every age of human life through which He passed, through that likeness which it bore to Himself. For He came to save all—all, I say, who through Him are born again into God—infants, children, boys, youths, and men. Therefore, He passed through every age, and was made an infant for infants, sanctifying infants; and a child for children, sanctifying those being of this age, and at the same time being an example to them of the efficacy of piety, and of righteousness, and of subjection. He was made a youth for youths, being an example to the youth, and sanctifying them to the Lord. And in like manner, He became a man for men, that He might be a perfect Leader to all, not only in the way of setting forth the truth, *but in the way of actual being*, sanctifying, at the same time, the men, and being also an example to them."*

* *Irenæus Adv. Hær.* II. 22. De Pressensé, in his recent work, gives clear expression to this same thought: "The holy life of Jesus bears, from its commencement to its close, a redemptive character, because it is one long sacrifice of obedience and love. Human life is thus restored to its normal condition; thenceforward the bitter consequences of the fall freely accepted, are transformed in acts of reparation; wherever the first Adam introduced rebellion, the Son of Man, the Head of the new race, substitutes entire submission and perfect holiness: He brings reconciliation out of the punishment itself; for, while we who have merited it must needs endure it, He voluntarily accepts it, and submits Himself to it, thus raising it to the height of a holy sacrifice. He restores the harmony between God and man, and re-unites the moral link which was broken at the fall. Therefore, that which is of highest import in the ministry of Jesus, is neither the contest with His enemies nor even the education of His Apostles, but His life itself—that human life, like that of other men, save for the defilement of sin, but transformed into one continual sacrifice. 'My meat and My drink,' He said, 'is to do the will of Him that sent Me.' This is the motto and the epitome of His whole career." *Jesus Christ, His Times, Life, and Work*; London, 1866, pp. 319-320.

The Heidelberg Catechism joins in ascribing to the whole life of Christ this perpetual, redemptive character. This cannot be doubted when the answer to *Quest. 37* is carefully considered. "What dost thou understand by the word *suffered*? That *all the time He lived on earth*, but especially at the end of His life He bore in body and soul, the wrath of God against the sin of the whole human race; in order that by His passion, as the only atoning sacrifice, He might redeem our body and soul from everlasting damnation and obtain for us the grace of God, righteousness and eternal life." It is quite easily seen, that there is here no arbitrary and abrupt sundering of the later from the earlier sufferings, but all are alike included in the work of redemption—in the phrase, "*all the time He lived on earth*," sweeping from the Cross itself back to the rude and lowly manger.* Although rightly special prominence is given to Gethsemane's conflict, the night of agony, the judicial procedure, the binding and scourging, the royal mockery with its crown of thorns, Calvary's darkness and tragic end, yet the anterior humiliation and sufferings are properly taken to be a part of the "*atoning sacrifice*," having a like meritorious virtue with what is more definitely spoken of as the Passion. And this clearly is the sense also of Ursinus, the principal author of the Catechism. By the term Passion, he tells us, "*we are to understand the whole humiliation*, all the miseries, infirmities, griefs, torments, and ignominy to which He was subject, for our sakes, *from the moment of His birth* even to the hour of His death, as well in soul as in body."† Again, in answer to the question, "*What is our righteousness before God?*" he tells us: "*The entire humiliation of Christ*, from the moment of His conception to His glorification, including His assumption

* In support of this inclusive character of the atonement, Monsell, quoting this question of the Catechism, makes the pertinent remark: "The Incarnation itself was a sacrifice of which the strong crying and tears of Gethsemane, and the agony of Golgotha, were the highest term. His passion and His death began with His life in a world where sin and its consequences reign." *The Religion of Redemption*. London, 1867, p. 67.

† Dr. Williard's Ursinus, p. 212.

of humanity," &c.* Following here the oldest and the best Patristic theology, the *whole life* of Christ, from its pre-natal beginning to its triumphant end in His glorious Ascension, is properly taken to be redemptive—our fallen life, in all its stages, lifted up, in His own holy life, to its true normal idea.

The Litany of the Ancient Church, recited on bended knees, under circumstances the most trying, by martyrs, confessors, and saints of all ages, "devoutly ascribes atoning merit to every act of our Lord's life, from the depths of the womb to the heights of the heavens,"—thus:

By the mystery of Thy holy Incarnation;

By Thy holy Nativity and Circumcision;

By Thy Baptism, Fasting, and Temptation;

By Thine Agony and Bloody Sweat;

By Thy Cross and Passion;

By Thy precious Death and Burial;

By Thy glorious Resurrection and Ascension;

And by the coming of the Holy Ghost.

In all time of our tribulation;

In all time of our wealth;

In the hour of death and in the day of judgment,

Good Lord, deliver us."

But sin was more than this principle of universal corruption. It was the principle also of physical disorder ending at last in death. The ruin went deeper than man's moral relations and time-life. The redemption must go deeper. Our Second Head must follow here the ill-fortunes of the bad leadership of the first. The Victor over sin in the wilderness, in the garden, and on Calvary's stained hill-top, must be the Vanquisher also of Hades. Besides the principle of Personal Sinlessness over against the principle of universal corruption, complete redemption is the "Power of an endless Life" over against the reigning law of death. As in the sphere of the moral, so in the

* Dr. Williard's *Ursinus*, p. 227.

sphere of the physical, life, there must be in Christ's own Person—a real conflict with and a real victory over the law of death, involving here germinally a like victory over it for the race.

The bitter sting must pierce His own soul in order to its being plucked out; the yoke be temporarily borne in order to its being effectually broken. No Elijah-like translation could meet the exigencies of the case. He must follow the dying race. Through the gates of the grave lies the pathway to glory for Himself, and for us through Him (St. Luke xxiv. 26). To carry us on high, His sacred head must lie as low as ours. To carry away, like another Samson, the gates of this vast Necropolis, He must Himself become a prisoner within its gloomy walls. The order of redemption here is the order which sin itself imposed, and hence, the Creed follows: "dead and buried; descended into hades." Not a Divine word of life spoken, as "Let there be light," would at all answer. As death itself came in, not in the form of an abstract principle, but the one deed of a generic Personality, so the gift of life to dead and dying humanity could come in, not in the form of an omnific word, but again only by the deed of a concrete Actor. "*Since* by man came death, by *man* came also the resurrection of the dead" (1 Cor. xv. 21). Death was not an accident, but an inexorable necessity, to Christ. He must be obedient unto death in order gloriously to realize His own Divine Name and Proclamation: "I AM THE RESURRECTION AND THE LIFE" (St. John xi. 25): "I AM ALIVE FOR EVERMORE, AND HAVE THE KEYS OF HADES AND OF DEATH" (Rev. i. 18). Plunging with the first into the dusty regions of the dead, our Second Head finds for us the lost path-way of Life.

Latin hymnology is especially full and rich in the expression of this thought. This is a characteristic specimen, taken from the Mediæval period, *Peter the Venerable*, † 1156.

"Mortis portis fractis, fortis
Fortior vim sustulit;
Et per crucem regem truce[m],
Infernorum percultit.

Lumen clarum tenebrarum
 Sedibus resplenduit;
 Dum salvare, recreare
 Quod creavit voluit.
 Hinc Creator, ne peccator,
 Moreretur, moritur;
 Cujus morte, nova sorte,
 Vita nobis oritur.
 Inde Sathan victus gemit,
 Unde Victor—nos redemit."

Everywhere, in gospels and epistles, to Churches and individuals, the New Testament is one and the same Gospel—THE GOSPEL OF THE RESURRECTION—a Reality for all alike in the Person of the one Risen Redeemer. It means much towards a true conception of the Gospel itself that such supreme account is made throughout of the *Risen Life* of the Victorious Saviour. Not alone with St. Paul, but continually, it is the one theme, "JESUS AND THE RESURRECTION"—the Personal Christ, who "suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried," but "declared to be the Son of God with power according to the Spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead" (Rom. i. 4). It would be an easy matter, by almost endless citations, to show that this is the true and only sense of the Gospel. "With great power," it is said, "gave the Apostles witness of the resurrection of the Lord Jesus;" and the result as announced, is heaven's own seal of approbation on this as the only true sense of the Gospel itself: "And the Lord added to the Church daily such as should be saved" (Acts ii. 47).

But the actual order of redemption stops not here. It could not stop here. To be a *complete* redemption and what is an incomplete redemption but a sad vitiation of the whole?—it must go farther for Himself and for us. The resurrection simply would give us no more than a mundane life under a higher form. Is the resurrected body still to remain apart from free and full fellowship with God? Are the children of the heavenly King to be left forever in the outer courts of His glory? The first consequence of sin was the banishment of the fallen Adam from the earthly Paradise

in which God had placed him. That expulsion went beyond that home of primitive innocence and happiness. The earthly was here but the type of the Heavenly; and bodily expulsion from the lower carried along with it a like exclusion from the higher. But now, thrust out by sin from the Eden below, where without fear he communed face to face with his Maker, shall this exiled and banished nature ever be admitted into the Eden above? Or shall man, even resurrected man, remain forever an exile from home, a stranger to his Father—an Ishmaelite, doomed to wander, with unresting foot, up and down the earth with not the most distant prospect of ever being admitted into the eternal dwelling-place of God? Evidently the work of redemption was not complete in the resurrection of our Lord separately taken.

From the first it looked to the full restoration of our exiled nature to God's eternal presence and favor. This end was reached in the bodily return to His native skies of the Second Adam, "the Lord from heaven." "Received up into glory," is the wondrous fact closing, for the time, the history of this One Wondrous Life. But His glorification was also far more than the completion and crown simply of His own work. Like all that went before, Incarnation, atoning Death and glorious Resurrection, His visible Ascension carries with it generic significance and effect—involving the full glorification, in the end, of all incorporated into this New Headship of redeemed Humanity. We looked forward, therefore, with joyful expectation to His second Advent, claiming the eternal abode in God's immediate presence and the perpetual admiration of all those who believe.

Thus an organic ruin has been met by an organic redemption. Humanity stands actually redeemed. The Christ of history, not the Christ of mere dogma, is, to the end of time, the very Substance and the perennial Presence of salvation to our ruined world. The Gospel lies in these primordial facts, and not in any doctrines about Christ, or systems and theories built upon them. Hence His relation to redemption is causative and dynamic, not incidental, or merely pedagogic, and our

relation to Him must be not imputative simply, but, in its deepest sense, truly participative.

Just here the Unitarian conception of Christ, *et id omne genus*, shows its radical defectiveness. On this view, He is simply a Teacher—partly by His beautiful example, and partly by ethical rules of a superior order, leads on to a life at once noble and sublime. His life, in this way, is only pedagogic; in its best sense, it is true, but He is still nothing more than the Pattern Man. Commonly placed at the head of the list of men wonderfully gifted, He is still on a level merely with Moses, Plato, Aristotle, Confucius—a Master in Israel, and no more. But does Christ stand, in fact, above Mohammed or Moses, for instance, only in being somewhat nearer the truth, and therefore, more reliable? Is His relation to humanity nothing more than the pedagogic work of a schoolmaster? The law was, we are told, a schoolmaster to Christ. But does the grace in Christ Jesus go no deeper, and His mission reach no farther? The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews forever sets aside any such supposition. With him, Christ is not on the same line with the chief of the Jewish prophets, but immeasurably his superior, nay, superior even to the angels—the One perfect, because Personal Revealer of God, “Hath in these last days spoken unto us by *His Son*.” If Christianity be no more than a system of truth—its highest reach *as yet*—and Christ no more than its best representative and exponent, then humanity, in its first frail and fallen head, “*dead in trespasses and sins*,” is still in a most forlorn condition.

In humanity's actual *deadness*, the need is redemption—life, not doctrine; the incorporated Word, not abstract truth: the *LIFE* of doctrine, not bare and bald intellectualism. The imperative call was not for more doctrine, nor better doctrine, but a *regenerative Life* in and for humanity; not a better Teacher simply, but a Saviour. Christianity holds not in the letter of the Divine word. It is more than any mere doctrinal statement for the mind; more than a code of morals, or religious maxims for practical life. It is more even than the written word of Revelation. The Bible is not the base, it is simply the

product of Christianity, and entitled to no more regard than the Koran, but for the actual Life of the Incarnate Word back of it. The principle of a thing is necessarily deeper than the thing itself. Back of the verbal Revelation is the essential Principle of Christianity. It was in the world long before the first line of the Gospel was penned. It came into the world with Christ. Christ Himself is the Personal Principle and Very Substance of Christianity; and in its organized form, the Church, the community of regenerate humanity, His life flows down in unbroken continuity, making good through the roll of the centuries. His own divine word, "Lo, I AM with you alway, even unto the end of the world."

Over against Humanitarianism, under every form, is this eminent PERSONALNESS of Christ throughout the entire Gospel. Here we have no mere abstractions; but I AMs in marked abundance. It is the unique manner in which Christ is ever heard speaking of Himself. In this, He stands before the world in an attitude at once solitary and sublime. Here, for instance, the truth is seen to be not something abstract—naked maxims, axiomatic principles, systems of philosophy, even the Bible as the revealed word, or what this or that mind makes it. Asked by Pilate, "What is truth?" He expends no time upon its definition. Nor was the royal inquirer, on whose decision the life of the questioned hung, directed to the long line of classic, or yet prophetic sages who had graced the world with their oracular wisdom, but to Himself, and to Himself, not as the medium of the truth—a better Teacher than all besides—but the Truth itself: "Every one that is of the truth heareth MY voice" (St. John xviii. 37). And with this corresponds in full this direct claim of being what no man had ever before pretended to be—*The Personal Truth*: "I AM THE TRUTH."

So in the season of adversity, sorrowing man is not directed for comfort and help to a fellow-mortal. We mock not grief in that rude style. But to the burdened of all ages, Christ is ever saying, "Come unto ME, and I will give you rest." How pretentious and, at the same time, idle for a mere man to use such language! How inevitably would it expose him to ridicule

and contempt! Yet Christ does this, and, so far from shocking men's feelings and provoking mockery with disgust, He strongly draws to Himself their warmest confidence and deepest love.

This Personalness marks yet more strongly what He says about the Resurrection. Like Plato, He does not enter into any proofs in regard of the immortality of the soul. He makes no argument, and gives no doctrine about the resurrection of the dead. He does not more clearly and satisfactorily teach the resurrection, but He goes far enough beyond all this. He claims to be the "Power of an endless life" (*ἀλλὰ κατὰ δύναμιν ζωῆς ἀκατάλυστου*, (Heb. vii. 16). It is broadly claimed to inhere in His Person: "*I am the Resurrection and the Life.*" "It is in Him personally, as the bearer of our fallen humanity, that death is swallowed up in victory, by the power of that divine life of which He was the Incarnation." Here then, in its deepest sense, Christ's relation to our dead and dying humanity is made to be causative and communicative; and our relation to Him really participative. "*Because I live,*" is His own sublime word, "*ye shall live also.*"

From all this, it is clear that the principle of salvation is not resident in the words of Christ. It is immanent in His Person. Our Saviour is a Divine-human Person—Christ Himself, not a doctrine about Christ. The grand announcement is not, Who-soever believeth My words; but "believeth in Me shall never die" (St. John xi. 26). Hence He showed no anxiety to preserve in a permanent form what He had spoken, thus indicating Himself personally and substantially, and not the truth abstractly taken, to be the world's New Life.

Nor can any single act in the life of Christ separately taken, however central, be particularized as gathering up in itself all the merit of the great atonement. It is common, we have seen, to single out in this way the Cross, and centre in that the whole of the Christian salvation. Doubtless, in type and figure, and at last in sanguinary reality, the Passion and Death of the Saviour are made specially prominent, but not in the way of disparaging and slurring over all that preceded and succeeded that tragic event. The prevenient mystery of the Manger ruled

and determined the significance and merit of the whole. That was in order to all atoning efficacy in His Death, as that itself in turn made way for the crowning event of all—His glorious Resurrection and Ascension.

Thus has the New Head of humanity undone the sad work of the first and fallen. Under the successful probation of this Second Adam, ὁ Κύριος ἐξ ὀφθαλμοῦ (1 Cor. xv. 47), our ruined race has been redeemed; not merely lifted up to a salvable position, but actually redeemed. He made all things "new." In its profoundest and most real sense, He is the "NEW CREATION," Humanity's Regeneration. Thus, besides being all-comprehensive in its character, redemption in Him, comes to have perennial force; "ONCE FOR ALL" (Heb. x. 10), not in the sense of something exclusively of the distant past—"once and no more," a by-gone event, something, therefore, only for memory—but abiding until the last note of time shall sound, "ONCE AND ALWAYS;" "able to save to the uttermost" (Heb. vii. 25, εἰς τὸ παντελές—πᾶς and τελέω, *the whole cycle of time, the consummation of all things*), His saving efficacy sweeping through the ages.

But though all are redeemed, all are not saved. Universal redemption is by no means universal salvation. Redemption is the one work of Christ, complete in itself and all-comprehensive; salvation is the individual free and believing appropriation of that great deliverance: "receiving the abundance of the grace and of the gift of righteousness" (Rom. v. 17). Organic union with this Headship of regenerate humanity is necessary to a personal participation in the benefits of His one great work. But what is the medium of such a personal participative interest?

Here we close, for the present, with this single anticipative remark, that he who has little or no faith in the Church, the Mystical Body of Christ, the supernatural constitution and order of grace, the only form of organic Christianity in the world, can have just as little faith really in Christ Himself, the Personal reheading and summing up, for its redemption, of our ruined Humanity.

ART. II.—THE GERMANS IN THE UNITED STATES.

BY REV. F. K. LEVAN, A.M.

PERHAPS the most suitable introduction we can give our subject will be a sketch, so far as the means for it are at command, of the general immigration—of which the Germans form a very large part—to the United States.

Few persons, it may be presumed, have any definite idea of the extent of the emigration from Europe to this country,—few, compared with the mass of our intelligent citizens. Fragmental statistics met here and there, general references made in the public prints of the day, notices of the number of persons arriving at some port, say New York, during a particular week, month or year, and the coming across foreigners wherever one goes throughout the length and breadth of the land; these facts furnish, in the main, what knowledge is commonly at command, and beget the vague notion current among us of the growth and greatness of our foreign element. All this, however, involves much less than the case merits. It is a mere skimming the surface of a sea of deep waters; a mere coasting along the shore of a vast continent. When we cast our eye over the whole scope of this immigration; when we call to mind what a stupendous phenomenon it is; how in extent it compares favorably with, and in character it exceeds, by mankind's advance of a thousand years of Christian civilization, any other on record in the history of the world; that it concerns, intensely and for all time, every civil, social, and religious interest among us: we are astounded at the indefiniteness of our own former views with regard to it, and feel justly surprised that it receives no more intelligent popular attention. Take it in itself and in its manifold bearings on the nation and its future, and on society, literature and the Church, it must be owned a noble study, worthy, in an eminent degree, of the attention of the political economist, the statesman, the philanthropist, the Christian. It is well for

an American to know the history of the founding and growth of ancient states and modern nations. It is better for him to have at his tongue's end the knowledge of the history, growth and composition of his own people, to whom the destiny of a more than imperial domain and its relatively great influence upon mankind have been entrusted. The former he needs not neglect; of the latter he should make himself master.

A subject like this must become intelligible to us through its own facts. Some of them are easy of access and in scientific order; others, scattered, dust-covered, their parts disconnected and valuable portions thereof lost; others, again, simply surviving in the memory of the aged or in the traditions of particular localities. Gathering these together, so far as one may, and bringing them within our ken; arranging them in proper order, and studying their various bearings and relations to the different interests they affect; this will be considering the subject to some purpose, and make our views fruitful for good, while random opinions and venerable prejudices go for little or nothing.

When the country was first colonized it took a century to furnish a population which would now come in three or four years. From 1607, when Virginia was first settled by the English, on through the settlement of the rest of the original colonies; New York and New Jersey in 1614 by the Dutch, New England in 1620 by the Puritans, Delaware in 1627 by the Swedes, Maryland in 1634 by Lord Baltimore, Carolina in 1680 by French Huguenots, Scotch and Germans, Pennsylvania in 1682 by William Penn, and Georgia in 1733 by Gen. Oglethorpe; the growth was slow in the extreme when compared with the present rate, though for the ideas of that period, and under the adverse circumstances, it was rapid withal. The next half century did better in proportion. Increased facilities for transportation, and an improved state of things here, combined to invite those abroad who longed to escape pressing hardships or desired to advance their fortune. The outbreak of the American revolution found a population of 3,000,000. During the 30 years following the establishment of our consti-

tutional government, the influx of immigrants gained considerable in numbers and steadiness. Careful statisticians* estimate—for absolute figures are out of the question at a time when no systematic records were kept—the average annual increase at from 4,000 to 6,000. Some years it was as high as 10,000: during others it sank to from 2,000 to 3,000. The French revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic wars acted as a check.

Much of our earlier history is as little known, and now as hard to get at, as the beginning of the old nations of Europe, which started in barbarism. Perhaps the very diversity of people, who came hither from the first, augmented the indifference, both with respect to the coming of others, and to the written preservation of their own doings. For many a decade the statistics of immigration are not only incomplete, but so fragmental that one feels at great loss what approximate data to assume. Philadelphia, long the chief seaport of the Union and the head rendezvous for immigrants, began the laudable work of recording the names of all passengers who arrived in its harbor. Other ports followed the example. But only since 1819 are we able to furnish the correct number of foreigners who have arrived annually in this country.

For the last few years the immigration has been very great. The close of our civil war, and the opening of rail-road facilities to the Pacific Ocean, have made the United States the country sought above all others; while dislike of the Prussian military system has led the Germans, and hatred of English rule the Irish, to come in unwonted masses. Noteworthy also, as unusual in

* Samuel Blodget wrote in 1806, that from the best records and estimates then attainable, the number of immigrants arriving between 1784 and 1794 did not average more than 4,000 per annum.

Dr. Adam Seybert in 1818 wrote in his *Statistical Annals of the United States*, "Though we admit that 10,000 foreigners may have arrived in the United States in 1794, we cannot allow that an equal number arrived in any preceding or subsequent year until 1817." pp. 28 and 29. He also assumes that 6,000 persons arrived in the United States from foreign countries, in each year from 1790 to 1810.

Kapp makes his estimate from 1784 to 1810 full one-fourth lower than Blodget and Seybert.

former years, is the hegira of the Scandinavians, who exchange the poor, worn-out mountain regions of northern Europe for the fertile plains of our primeval north-west. The present annual immigration to the United States reaches the enormous number of 300,000 souls. The time was when the arrival of two ship loads in New York during the same week created public sensation both on account of the number of the strangers and of the influence it was feared they would exert in their new home. But what were they, compared with the arrivals nowadays?

The immigration from 1819 to 1860 as per census statement was—

5,459,421

From 1860 until now, say—

2,040,579

Or a total of

7,500,000

Estimating the entire population of the United States at present at 41,500,000 the number of immigrants since 1819 would bear to it the ratio of 2 to 11.

The yearly increase of births over deaths appears per statistical tables to be 1.38 per cent. in this country. Mr. C. Schade of Washington has shown that if we take our population at any given date, and increase the number by this per cent. annually to any other date subsequent, and then subtract the result from the actual population at the last date, we obtain the net gain from immigration. In other words, we ascertain what the immigrants and their children have added to what would without them be the sum of the population. We know scarcely a single fact in the whole range of our national statistics of more interest than this. Taking the census of 1790 we have the number of 3,231,930, excluding slaves. Compounding annually by 1.38 per cent., we would have in 1800, a population of 3,706,674, whereas the census actually figures up 4,412,896, affording a difference of 706,222 as the net gain in consequence of the continued immigration. Applying the same principle we obtain the following table, the first column representing the years in which the census was taken, the second what would be the population compounding it annually at 1.38 per cent., and third, what the census actually makes it to be. To thoughtful

men the figures given will furnish abundant food for reflection.

1800	3,706,674	4,412,896
1810	4,251,143	6,048,450
1820	4,875,600	8,100,056
1830	5,591,775	10,796,077
1840	6,413,161	14,582,008
1850	7,855,423	19,987,563
1860	8,485,882	27,489,662
1865	9,034,245	(Estimated) 31,500,000
1870	9,675,052	" 38,000,000

It appears, hence, that this country owes to immigration since 1790 full 28,000,000 of its present population, or three-fourths of the whole number, excluding the late slave element.

There is a philosophy of emigration as there is a philosophy of history. People leave their native country reluctantly. Kindred, early associations, the fields, hills, valleys, woods and skies, all tend to hold them as with a strong cord. Add to these religion, language, the habits and institutions of the fatherland. When large masses emigrate we may, therefore, feel sure there are pressing causes for it. What are they? We let another answer.

"From the remotest ages down to the present day, from the first Phœnician and Greek colonies, down to the settlement of the North Pacific coast, two principal causes have always induced emigration, and led to the establishment of new states and empires, viz: political or religious oppression and persecution, and social evils, such as want of prosperity, or insecurity, lack of employment, famine and high prices of living in general. In modern times either of these causes has proved powerful enough to produce emigration on a large scale from certain countries. People who are happy and comfortable at home do not emigrate: the poor and oppressed only, who cannot find a fair reward for their labor in the land of their birth, or who feel themselves obstructed or thwarted in their religious or

political aspirations, seek to better their condition by a change of country."*

The statistics with reference to the ebb and flow of the tide of emigration are most curious. For example, one would at first sight expect the emigration to be large right after the Napoleonic wars, and the re-establishment of the old order of things. Europe impoverished and distracted, was bound to the car wheels of absolute government. Surely a time for the masses to leave! But then we must remember that the class of men who emigrate had been thinned, almost beyond precedent, by the ruthless hand of continuous war. The poor had become too poor to go, and those possessed of some means found difficulty in disposing of their property. Then came the great famine of 1816 and 1817, making a bad state of things still worse. And on this side of the Atlantic we had also just passed through a war with Great Britain, which owing to opposition to it in New England and lukewarmness toward it elsewhere, brought the nation little credit, save the lustre reflected from the career of Scott in Canada, Perry on Lake Erie and Jackson at New Orleans. A general financial disarrangement followed. The prospect was uninviting. During this period only a comparatively few thousand immigrants came each year.

Sometimes the very same cause effects a contrary result; in which case we may be sure that strong modifying influences are at work. "While in 1826 of 10,837 immigrants 7,709 came from the United Kingdom, in 1827 their number increased to 11,952 out of 18,875, and in 1828 to 17,840 out of a total of 27,283; but in 1829 their number fell to 10,594 out of 22,530 and in 1830 to 3874 out of 23,322 souls. These fluctuations were due to the great commercial panic of 1826, and the distress in the manufacturing districts of England, as well as the famine in Ireland, which drove thousands from their homes, who, under ordinary circumstances, would never have thought of emigration.

* Kapp's *Immigration to New York*, pp. 5 and 6. This is a valuable work on the subject of which it treats.

"Again in Germany, where the abortive revolutionary movement of 1830 to 1833, the brutal political persecutions by the several state governments, and the reactionary policy of the federal diet, as well as a general distrust of the future, produced an unusually large emigration; in 1831 only 2,395 Germans had arrived in the United States; in 1832, 10,168; in 1833, 6,823; and in 1834 to 1837, the years of the greatest political depression, 17,654, 8,245, 20,139, and 23,036 respectively. The emigration from Ireland, which from 1844 rose much beyond its former proportions, reached its culminating point after the great famine of 1846. During the decade of 1845 to 1854, inclusive, in which period the highest figures ever known in the history of emigration to the United States were reached 1,512,100 Irish left the United Kingdom. . . .

. With this unprecedentedly large emigration Ireland had exhausted herself. Since 1855 her quota has fallen off to less than one half of the average of the preceding ten years." *Kapp's Immigration*, p. 13.

"Almost coincident in point of time with this mighty exodus from Ireland, was the colossal emigration from Germany, which followed the failure of the political revolutions attempted in 1848 and 1849. Already in 1845 and the following years the German contingent of emigrants to the United States showed an average twice as large as in the same space of time previous to the year named. But a voluntary expatriation on a much larger scale resulted from the final triumph of the political reaction. The *coup d'etat* of Louis Napoleon closed for all Europe the revolutionary era opened in 1848. In the three years preceding that event, the issue of the struggle of the people against political oppression had remained doubtful. But the 21 of December, 1851, having decided the success of the oppressors for a long time to come, the majority of those who felt dissatisfied with the reactionary *regime*, left their homes. The fact that the largest number of Germans ever landed in one year in the United States, came in 1854, showed the complete darkening of the political horizon at the time. The apprehension of a new continental war, which actually broke out a year later in the Crimea, also hastened the steps

of those who sought refuge in this country. People of [the well-to-do classes, who had property helped to swell the tide to its extraordinary proportions. From January 1st, 1845, till December 31st, 1854, there arrived 1,226,392 Germans in the United States, 452,943 of whom came in the first five years of this period, and 773,449 in the last five." *Ibid.* p. 14.

By implication we have already intimated that the changing circumstances of this country have also their influence upon the stream of immigration, tending by turns to swell or diminish its volume. Notice by way of illustration the powerful effect on this interest of the commercial panic of 1837. "In 1838 the total immigration decreased to 38,914, while in the previous year it had amounted to 79,340, and in 1839 and 1840 it increased to 68,069 and 84,066 respectively."

So, likewise, the commercial panic of 1857. "In 1858 and 1859 only 78,589 and 79,322 emigrants respectively, arrived in New York; while in 1856 their number amounted to 142,342, and in 1857 to 186,733. In 1860 it rose to 105,162, but in consequence of the breaking out of the civil war, it fell again in 1861 to 65,539, and in 1862 to 76,306. In 1867 the German immigration in New York increased over that of 1866 by more than 10,000, in which last mentioned year it had already reached the large number of 106,716 souls." *Ibid.* p. 15.

It is strange how little influence the Know Nothing madness of 1854-6 exerted upon the immigration. In 1854, 319,223 alien emigrants arrived at the port of New York; among them 176,986 Germans. In 1855 and 1856, the arrivals at the same port were 136,233 and 142,342, respectively. Though these numbers show a large decrease they are still higher than those from 1858 to 1862, during which period the Know Nothing organization had entirely ceased to exist. The decrease had mainly other causes. Looking at the matter in the light of these figures it seems as if the people of Europe had put a truer estimate upon that singular so-called American movement than was generally found here. They kept up *their American movement* in goodly numbers, and, with common sense as an ally in this country, triumphed by their perseverance.

These preliminary observations bring us now naturally to our subject proper, viz: *The Germans in the United States.*

The Teutons are fond of emigration. The earliest notices we have of them show them as given to it. They came into contact with ancient Rome full as soon as Rome came into contact with them. In their own way they pressed forward as much as that proud mistress of the world did. At first the latter checked them; at last they checked it. In their continuous, restless motion we find the chief external cause of the downfall of the Western Empire. Tacitus speaks of them as indigenous* to the soil which was in his day, as it is now, known as their central place of abode. Modern philology has taught us better. We now know them as emigrants themselves from Central Asia; being a branch of what the genius of Frederick Schlegel denominated the Indo-Germanic family, and which Max Müller and other late philologists call the Aryan race. During the Middle Ages they resemble in some respects the great, unquiet sea; on the surface, a heaving mass, and interlining this, and crossing each other, tides and streams in full flow. Thus, nigh half the blood of the neighboring nations became one with their own. For a long time they could be distinguished from those among whom these currents had borne them, as one may betimes the water of one stream flowing into that of another, until by the rise of the separate, definite written languages of these nations, they were permanently cut off from their own parent stem. The same cause, however, gave the German nation also a more fixed character, for the development of its own language was coeval with that of its neighbors. Language and literature make a people homogeneous, and so consolidate it in the only way in which consolidation is compatible with a free normal development. Hence, from the time of which we speak, the German emigration becomes, in many of its characteristics, different from what it had been before. It carries with it more self-possession and

* Ipsos Germanos indigenas crediderim, minimeque aliarum gentium adventibus et hospitibus mixtos. De Germania.

individuality, more contents in proportion to numbers, and the varied elements ready at command, for securing the happiness of their bearers and aiding in the advancement of the world, than in former days. This general fact enters into the account with growing influence in forming an estimate of the Germans in the United States.

Among the races, comparatively pure and unmixed, the Germans and Slavonic are by far the most numerous in Europe. The Romanic or Latin race, likewise numerous, embracing the Italians, the French, the Spaniards and the Portuguese may be called a composite of many constituents, with parts thereof also widely differing among themselves. We are here immediately concerned, however, with the numerical strength of the strictly Teutonic element, from which our German immigration has come and will come. A recent statistical work on the German populations of Europe, fixes the entire number of souls at 54,000,000, including German speaking Jews. Forty-nine millions inhabit a compact territory, so that not more than one tenth part of the whole are scattered through non-German states. Foreign races in German-speaking countries number only about 1,240,000, and of these about one-half are in Prussia, where of all sections, they will be the most rapidly absorbed. Considering what the Irish, with an original population of 8,000,000, could do in the way of emigration, how great numbers may not be spared, without even diminishing the home elements, from a people which counts 54,000,000?

Since the modern emigration of individuals and families has taken the place of the old, which went in masses, the Germans may be found almost wherever Europeans go. Open a country for settlement or trade, and they will be among the first to report themselves. They are found in the leading commercial towns of the African coast. The same is the case in Asia. In Palestine* they are becoming so numerous and are gaining in such a rapid ratio as to give rise to the report that their's will eventually

* The statement of the text made the round in our daily papers a few weeks ago. Different German associations are systematically making settlements in the Holy Land. Prominent among these are the "Reichsbrüder," headed by Hoffman.

become the language of the country. Australia counts many thousands of them. Into South America they have flocked in such numbers as to make them a telling element of the population,—especially, too, in view of their superior intelligence and acquired wealth—in all the leading states. Some have gone to Central America and Mexico; very many to British America. But the German emigrant's earthly paradise is the United States. He came early; has continued to come with growing love; and promises to abide by the habit for an indefinite time. He has become nearly everywhere a great factor of our population, and in many places has put himself at the head of it. Do we look for the reason of this preference? We shall find it in the freedom from undue restraint, the absence of governmental interference, which this country has ever offered alike to the colonist and the emigrant. In soil and commercial advantages other countries, as, for instance, Mexico and Brazil, might compete with this, but none has held out the same desirable kind of liberty. On page 16 of his work already quoted, Kapp makes the following just remark. "It is the condition of the success of a colony or settlement that the immigrant relies on his own strength, acts on his own responsibility, and seeks by his own efforts the prosperity which he is sure to find, if undisturbed. All mistakes which he may make, all errors of judgment which he may commit, are of no consequence, if his self-relying spirit is not interfered with. In spite of obstacles and disappointments he will make his way, and ultimately attain his object. . . . He will willingly undergo all the hardships and dangers incidental to a new country, provided he finds a free government and no improper interference with his self-adopted mode of life." To afford these the Latin race seems disinclined, while the Saxon stock glories in it. Hence, also, the different success of the colonies of the two.

The emigration of Germans into the United States may be divided chronologically into two periods, viz: that which took place before 1820, and was confined to the original thirteen states; and that which has taken place since, and has spread over the entire land. The first general formed settlements,

properly so called, the people locating in sections by themselves, composing committees of their own nationality, and preserving in many instances permanently, in others for a long time, their own language, habits, type of religion, and whatever marks them as Germans. The latter includes also similar settlements in nearly every state and territory, but has this distinguishing characteristic, that, on account of its great numbers, it has penetrated all communities, and made its own life largely one in common with that of the mass of our people everywhere.

New York has the honor of having the first German colonists settle on its soil. They came with the Dutch, and were almost equally numerous. At that time there was yet much more similarity between the language of the Low-Germans and that of the Dutch than there is now. They had in common the famous dialect known as *Platt-Deutsch*, which Holland has raised into its national language. The most of the German emigrants were from the countries in the neighborhood of Holland; hence having many characteristics in common with its citizens. The assimilation in the new world was, therefore, very easy, and as the Dutch was the language of the government and the Germans then, as ever, readily adapted their names to current pronunciations, it is difficult to get at the correct proportions of population the two nations respectively contributed to the primitive New Amsterdam. The process of the mutual, peaceful, fraternal absorption of the people of different nationalities by each other, now going on all over the land, was inaugurated by the Dutch and the Germans in the early history of New York. The first prominent Director of the colony whom Holland sent over, was Peter Minnewit from Wesel on the Rhine. His history is eventful, and stamps him as a man of character and ability. In 1626 he bought from the Indians the island of Manhattan, on which now stands the great city of New York, for 60 guilders, or 24 dollars in gold. Under his care the colony prospered and the natives were peaceful. He also took a warm interest in the social and religious condition of the people, and was himself an active member and deacon of the Reformed Church.

Another German, Jacob Leissler, from Frankfort on the Main, rose to the position of Governor of the province in 1689. He was a prominent citizen, and public necessity selected him in a stormy period, as the only man from whose authority safety might be expected. Subsequently he fell a victim to unscrupulous political cabals; not, however, until he had done essential service to the community.

The Germans were in large measure the early pioneers of the Empire state. In 1709 a colony of Palatines, under the care of their minister Kocherthal, settled at Neuburg (Newburgh) on the right bank of the Hudson. Higher up the river, and on both sides of it, another colony, consisting of Palatines and Swabians, whose country had been devastated, and who had fled for succor via Holland to England, where the warmest interest was taken in them by queen Anne, her nobility and people, located themselves in 1710. From a list of their settlements, made out in 1718 by the pastors Hæger and Kocherthal, and still preserved, we learn that then already Rheinbeck (Rhinebeck) Esopus and Kingston had been founded. Germantown was one of the first places they settled; so New Paltz. In 1712 and 1713 the first settlement along the Schoharie was made. Here the elder Weiser figured prominently, both in the founding and the establishment of the new colony. In 1722 the Germans bought land along the Mohawk, 24 miles in length, from Little Falls up. As in Schoharie so here, some were from the older settlements, and some new comers. With the increase of their numbers other land was purchased and brought under culture, the outposts were pushed further into the wilderness and on to the heels of the reluctantly retreating red men. About 100 emigrants from Baden came in 1753 to Albany and located the following year at what they called New Durlach, but is now called Sharon Springs.

These primitive Teutonic settlements, which we have hastily outlined, did well their duty in their day and watered with the sweat and blood of their inhabitants the seed of untold blessings for posterity. They did not simply live, grow rich and

die, but met the demands of their situation in the way an heroic people meets them.

On the occasion of laying the corner-stone for the Baron von Steuben monument at Utica lately, Ex-Governor Horatio Seymour expressed himself in the following eloquent language touching this part of our subject.

"In truth, this, the greatest state of our Union, is based upon a population drawn from the countries bordering upon the Rhine. Those of Holland and German descent made up the majority of its population before the revolution. The Mohawk, amid whose tributaries we now meet, is a *German river*.

"Its valley was first settled and cleared by those who spoke the German tongue. From its borders, and those of its confluent, the Schoharie, they went forth to fight the battles of the French and revolutionary wars. No other people upon our continent suffered so much in proportion to their numbers during the revolutionary struggle. Exposed to all the horrors of Indian warfare, it was found when peace was restored, that there was not a home in the Valley of the Mohawk, which had not suffered from the torch of the enemy, or which did not mourn for the dead slain in battle or killed by the ruthless savage, led by Brant or others still more blood-thirsty.

"The most carefully prepared and most formidable attempt to crush American independence was made by the British government in the campaign directed by General Burgoyne. The world looked on and felt that the result would test our ability to uphold our cause. The victory at Saratoga settled the question, and blotted out British rule. It gained us the alliance of France and Spain. By the plan of the campaign, the disciplined armies of England were to march down the Valley of the Upper Hudson. The ships of war were to push their way up the waters of the river above Red Point. The savage allies were to ravage the course of the Mohawk with the torch and tomahawk. All these forces were to meet at Albany, and the control of the state of New York was to shatter the Confederacy by breaking up all intercourse between the northern and southern colonies. Thus divided, we should have been an easy prey to the united forces of Britain. It was

in a dark hour—when the loss of Ticonderoga had cast a deep gloom over the patriot cause—that the battle of Oriskany was fought in the valley beneath us. Disordered at first by the ambush of the enemy, our forces fought with a desperation, which wrung out victory in the end, and forced the enemy to raise the siege of Fort Stanwix and withdraw its forces in confusion and with heavy loss. Thus one part of the combined movement was defeated. The battle of Oriskany was the most fiercely fought, and, in proportion to the numbers engaged, the most bloody and life-destroying of any contest during the Revolution.

“The men who struggled there for our liberties were of German lineage. The orders given by the stern old warrior,* who directed the fight, despite his mortal wounds, were issued in the German language. The war cries were shouted out in the German tongue, and the dying men uttered their last prayer in the words and accents which have so often gone up from the battle fields of their Fatherland.”

The German settlements in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and the old states south, next claim our attention.

* General Nicholas Herkheimer. In honor of him both the county and town of Herkimer have since been named.

ART. IV.—ORGANIC THINKING.*

BY REV. D. GANE, D. D.

YOUNG GENTLEMEN:

I am here, at the instance of your call, to deliver what is to pass as an address to literary societies. I trust it is unnecessary for me to say, here at the threshold, that I am not ambitious in regard to the inference which this state of facts might seem to involve, namely, that I am a literary man, and so adapted to the position which I occupy. I make no pretension to such character, nor do I bring any such pretension to the task which has been imposed upon me. Literary societies are always broader and freer than their mere technical name would imply; and it is in the spirit of this broader and this freer idea that I would be regarded as speaking in the bosom of this occasion, on the subject of *Organic Thinking*.

The theme is certainly not one that is uncongenial to the literary atmosphere of this community. It involves perhaps one of the deepest elements, if not *the* deepest, in the College of which you are members. It is the informing soul of your noble philosophy, which has arrested the attention and commanded the profoundest regard of the whole literary world; and your philosophy lies, as it should, in the form of an efficient and plastically moulding power, at the root of all the departments in which the mental energy of the College is expended. Meeting you at your initiation into the Freshman Class, it becomes your guiding-star through all your course, until, placing you upon the very highest summit of the Senior-year, it enables you to survey the whole world of being in the clear light and per-

* Address delivered before the Literary Societies of Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Pa., June 28th, 1870.

fect harmony of this one great principle. I am not speaking to you, therefore, in an unknown tongue, nor bringing to your ears foreign and strange sounds, when I speak of the word *organic* in its connection with that of *thinking*. It is, in fact, only seeking to reflect your own familiar image.

Nor are the central and ruling ideas which the subject comprehends limited now, in this country, as they were several decades ago. True philosophic thought has asserted its right and opened its own way. Other literary centres have been feeling the quickening presence of these leading principles, and are waking by the power of them to new worlds of thought and being. The principle of organic thinking carries in it, wherever it spreads, the latent seeds of revolution, which need only the proper mental soil and favorable outward conditions to produce intellectual transformations. No schemes of thought, however old and apparently perfect, if their parts are knit together simply by an arbitrary will, never so ingeniously done, are able to stand before it. In all the changes of systems, from the time that the mind first entered upon its Divine mission of thinking from its own proper nature, has this principle been, without question, the leading and efficient power. The principle itself cannot rest in any scheme of thought that fails to realize its own organic demand, or that does not prove itself to be in full harmony, at every point, with the innate law of thought, in its relation to truth in its own proper objective nature.

Why this constant dissatisfaction with the products of the mind, even the grandest and most beautiful? Why this incessant rising and falling of systems, like the rising and falling of empires and kingdoms, of which they are the bases? We modestly venture what we believe to be the true answer, at least in great part, in these words: because the thinking mind subjectively, has measurably lost its proper relation to the truth objectively, in view of which, however grand and for the time being, attractive and even charming its creations, it requires nevertheless but a brief test in the way of subsequent actual experiment to discover a real want of harmony between them.

History, in this view, becomes a grand and ever augmenting testimony of man's fall, and yet of his remaining spiritual being; of the fact, that notwithstanding his lapsed condition and carnalized nature, he still lives not by bread alone, but that truth—an eternal and changeless element arising in God, centres also in him, and forms, in fact, the deepest and most essential law of his life. Whence the grating sounds that are heard through all the ages, but from this central and sad disruption of the single and the general, the subjective and the objective? And what is the deeper meaning of all the fierce struggles which have created and rounded the grand epochs of history, but the instinctive and often unconscious yearnings of man's inner nature after the truth?

Here then are two facts, connected with an inference, which we dare not at any point lose sight of, if we would fully see the entire internal as well as outward structure of the question which is before us. The first fact is, that man is a fallen and to that extent a perverted being: the second is, that, notwithstanding this, he nevertheless retains, amid whatever moral ruins, his spiritual being, and is essentially bound to the truth; and the inference is, that, in consequence, the harmony which originally existed and freely reigned between his subjective thinking and the truth objectively has become greatly marred. Thinking, therefore, to be strictly organic, in our present condition, can arise only, under its true form, in the great remedial system of grace, with power to restore this lost harmony; and even then can it attain its own inward accuracy and real perfection, only in proportion as this restoration of harmony becomes historically actual and complete in the general on-going of the world's life.

Organic thinking! What is this as to its nature, conditions and results? This is the question which the subject, ill, or happily chosen, forces upon our attention. Let it not here be thought that we are about falling into the folly of carrying coal to Newcastle. We propose the working-out of no system of mental, moral or natural philosophy. Our purpose is much less complicated and more simple.

The chief glory of man is to think, and the chief glory of thinking is to be obedient to the laws of thought; whilst truth, in its own pure and simple nature, thus reached, is the only satisfactory crowning of the struggle. Man, as the thinking being, stands forth at once in a threefold form, as natural, moral and spiritual; as body, involving the region of sensation, as soul, comprehending the entire department of conscience and ethics, and as spirit, embracing the whole sphere of reason in its own full character, bearing in it the image of the infinite. These arise, not from different centres, as the race, by certain infidel philosophers is supposed to have done, but from one common centre, are pervaded by a common consciousness, and are related to each other in a purely organic way in the bosom of one personality. Organic thinking involves the joint action of these three divisions or parts of our being, each, however, on the ground of its own life and according to its own peculiar law. Each faculty of the mind, such as reason, judgment, memory, imagination and will, considered as a separate power, has its own inherent subordinate law, by which it is, and must be, immediately governed. The mind as such is, however, no more dualistic on this account than is man under the broader view in which we have now presented him. It is a complex whole, and, as such, not many, in the sense of outward mechanical isolation, but one—a real organic unity, involving diversified powers in the bosom of a single life; and in this character, it also has an inherent law. The law here, being more general in its nature and range, is, by necessity, also higher than those which belong simply to individual faculties, and presides over them, giving to each, in the internal genesis of thought, its due influence and force.

This being the character of the mind in itself, we can find no difficulty in perceiving the first necessary condition of what we term organic thinking, thinking, namely, which involves all the intellectual and also moral and natural faculties, but under the law of a common unity. The mind thus thinking, thinks organically. The proper development of this the highest of all organisms, according to the nature of its own laws, superior

and subordinate, so as to open the way for the true, harmonious and free general action of the mind, is the only proper end of education. Even to think of anything beyond this; under the form of profession or business of any kind, is, in the deepest sense, to degrade the mind itself, and the surest way also to disappoint in the end even the partial object which may thus be had in view. Man, as such, is always higher and of more account than any outward calling or uses simply, of a worldly or partial character, to which for the time being he may lend himself; and the best qualification for any separate form of business arises only in the mind developed as a whole, according to its own laws, primarily and prevaiingly for its own sake. In this view, the declaration is most emphatically true: "He that seeketh his own life shall lose it."

But the problem of organic thinking is much broader than this. The mind, itself being organic, both in its nature and proper action, must be related in a just way to its object. Here opens the entire world of objective being. What part of this vast domain does not the mind, by an inward necessity, claim as its own? The objective world, furnishing the mind with its necessary outward material of thought, is found to be in strict general harmony with the wonderful constitution of man. It meets him, agreeably to his own nature, first in the form of the physical, second in the form of the moral, and third in the form of the spiritual; although from much of the thinking which now passes current, you might imagine that the last two portions of being had in some way altogether disappeared or become annihilated. Each of these great sides of objective being, as in the case of man, is pervaded by its own laws, which make them separately unique. They do not, however, on this account, constitute three worlds, but only one. Beyond all that appears in the way of difference, whether inward or outward, there is a point of common unity from which all grows forth, which gives the strict nature of organic oneness to the whole. The higher forces in this vast organism are found freely to pervade the lower at every point, imparting to it a richness of intellectual significance, and an æsthetical and

moral beauty which everywhere impress and captivate the mind. Between the physical, moral and spiritual, there is, on this account, no real antagonism. On the other hand, the lower actually demands the pervasive presence of the higher, and neither could at all be what it is, in fact, without such presence. The objective world as a whole, fully harmonious in all its parts, is, therefore, only a fair reflection, the echoing image, of the still more wonderful constitution of man, composed of body, soul and spirit, as this again finds its last ground in the God-head, in the form of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Man is in this way the microcosm, embodying in the form of condensed essence, all that is comprehended in the vast macrocosm which reigns above and around him.

The relation of the thinking mind to its object as now presented, is not one primarily of clear logical knowledge. This relation holds, in the way of fact, always prior to any such process of the understanding, and constitutes the only condition on which such knowledge becomes a possibility. All reasoning, as such, implies premises or principles already at hand. How are the primary premises or principles obtained? Certainly not by any logical process which might be supposed to precede them, for without them reasoning in the form of logical process is, in the nature of the case, an utter impossibility. Proof or demonstration, in such circumstances, is wholly inconceivable. The relation of the thinking mind with its object, either as a whole or in its parts, is, primarily, not nominal, but real, and consists in the immediate presence to each other of the intelligible object and the intelligent subject, the first, by a similar constitution, authenticating itself to the last, which thus carries in it the exposition of its deepest sense and most hidden mysteries. In this relation lies the ground of natural faith, the prophecy of that which we find in the higher bosom of Christianity; which becomes in turn the primary foundation of all knowledge or science, even the most exact, not only in the order of the natural world, but also in that of the moral and spiritual. It is only as the premises are thus found in the real relation of the mind to its object, prior alto-

gether to any process of the logical understanding, that the reason can be in condition to enter upon its proper work in rearing what is called the grand temple of knowledge, showing in what a general and fundamental sense the formula is true: "I believe in order that I may understand."

It is not meant, by the order in which we have stated the objects of thought, any more than by the order in which we have presented man, namely, the physical, the moral and the spiritual, that this is the true order in which the mind moves organically, in penetrating and acquiring a scientific knowledge of them. Man does not rise up from below, out of the bosom of nonentity, and, beginning with the senses in their relation to the physical world, rise to the moral, and from thence into the spiritual, so as at last, in the way of logical process from beneath, to reach the conception of the infinite—God. Just the opposite order is, without doubt, the true one, in the actual process of organic thinking. Generalization, which is the very nature of thinking itself, is possible only in the *idea* of the infinite, which is comprehended already in the relation which the mind sustains to its object prior to all logical thought of any kind. Whatever illumination subsequent thinking may give to this idea, one thing is clear, that it itself is no product of any such thought. Instead of its being the last result of any such supposed infinite logical process, starting from below, (which is a pure impossibility), it is, in the way of fact, the first premise with which the mind starts from above; and it is only in the general light streaming from this idea, as from a central sun, that the mind is at all able properly to enter the various strata of being downwards, and finally to behold all in its organic harmony with God, its original and essential ground.

Here now the way becomes fully open for organic thinking, but not for its full harmony or scientific accuracy. The premises being given, the mind in its unity, governed by laws inhering in its own nature, enters its complex objection, in its unity, and finds in it laws no less peculiar and essential to its nature, by which the mind is led, step by step, often through the most abstruse labyrinths, until it is brought finally to its ulti-

mate conclusion. When the conditions are all at hand, and the subjective is raised to full harmony with the objective, upon which it is always dependent, you have in the process the grandest movements of which the mind of man is capable, the only true but inferior type of which you find in the precise and accurate, but on their part, blind movements of the heavenly bodies. Truth thus intelligently evolves itself, just as in the case of the bud, from its own secret life, and by means of its own efficient laws. Every step of advance on the part of the mind, strictly along these objective currents of thought, even though the advance appear in the form of bare affirmation or sheer assertion, carries in it the force of the highest mathematical demonstration, for it is the voice of truth itself speaking from its own bosom. It involves the only true principle of argumentation, although it may be entirely free from all the outward machinery of mere syllogistic formulas in their ordinary and secondary uses. As organic, the movement is not in the reflected shadow of the truth simply, but in the truth itself under its original and objective form, which it authenticates immediately, as such, through its own inherent laws. The results of this the highest form of thinking, meet those of the lowest (as the highest and lowest always do—*les extrêmes se touchent*, namely, the intuitive and instinctive, and carry in them the same irresistible force; and the only difference is, that in the one the truth is fully penetrated by the intelligence and thus fairly evolved for the understanding, whilst in the other, though accurate as the voice of God, it is seized and rested in blindly. Here only is the point at which we reach the true conception of the *scientific*. Everything short of this real organic movement of the mind on the basis of its own nature, in actual harmony with the objective world, whatever may be its pretension in this view, must be regarded rather as a caricature of science than as science in its own high and true nature.

From the vantage ground thus gained, it is not difficult to see how thinking, under this its only true form, may be disturbed, in such way as greatly to vitiate its process, and weak-

en and even entirely invalidate its conclusions. These disturbing forces arise first from the thinking mind itself, and second, from the objective world in which it moves and upon which it rests. When any one faculty of the mind is allowed to break away from its harmonious relation to the other faculties, or to obtain, in any form, an undue preponderating power over them, the consequence is a marring of the mind's harmony as a whole. Confusion is thus brought into the mental constitution, and to the extent in which this is done, will the mind experience an incapacity to follow accurately its own organic laws. The whole action of the mind is, in this way rendered exceedingly narrow and uncertain. It becomes lopsided in its general tone; and thus conditioned, it can only flounder for the most part, where otherwise it might move grandly as a queen amid the rich realm of being. This breaking of the mind's organic equilibrium follows to some extent whatever faculty may thus transcend its proper orbit, and in so doing play the tyrant over the rest, giving as the result, now transcendentalism, then rationalism, and mysticism, and fatalism, and every other ism, on to the end of the chapter on philosophical heresies. But when this disobedience is led by the will, denying its normal relation to the other faculties, and submitting to the control of the feelings and passions, then the case reaches, of course, its most hopeless character. Thinking, in this case, becomes wholly willful, which is the farthest remove from the organic, and can, in the nature of the case, be only in the service of error. Such a mind may indeed be grand in its original gifts and separate faculties, but, like some magnificent works of art in the distant past, it is now grand only in its ruins.

Systems of mere partial or business education, in so far as they develop only some of the faculties to the neglect, if not at the expense, of the rest, carry in them the same confusing and weakening forces. They tend to destroy the organic wholeness and roundness of the mind; to limit its power; to start partial currents at haphazard, which are sure to run into error, and in the end lose themselves, like water poured upon the thirsty earth, and finally bury the man himself beneath the

fragments he has forcibly split from the great trunk of being, with which he had hoped, in this more direct way, to construct a palace wherein he might pass his days in elevated and refined enjoyment. To tear asunder a flower, with the view to make one portion of it to give greater brilliancy and beauty to another portion, is simply to destroy the flower itself. It is to break the law of its organic unity; and the consequence is, that all its parts wilt and fade together. The mind is no less an organic whole than the flower; and just to the extent that its common law of unity is broken, whether directly, by the disturbing power of the will, or indirectly, by a vicious education, which saps the vitality of some, to give greater practicalness of power to other faculties, will the same withering result follow. The thing to be educated is not this or that faculty, but mind—mind in its totality; and not even this in any narrow or exclusive sense, but mind as it involves and means the whole man, body, soul and spirit; and all this on the basis of its own organic unity.

Closely allied with this disturbing force to organic thinking arising from the mind itself, is that coming from the outward objects of thought. Let the objective world be set aside altogether, as the external type and rule of thought, which in many departments is not unfrequently done, and at once the whole principle of organic thinking is entirely abandoned. The mind in this case is left wholly to its own subjective fancies and dreams, which, however, elevated and beautiful in their own nature, are nevertheless, as they must always prove themselves to be in the end, only so many rising vapors, which, after some brief phenomenal changes, speedily vanish away. Here the organic relation between the mind and its proper object is cut; and the consequence is, that the mind, like the ship upon the waves, without pilot or compass, has lost its latitude, and is tending intelligently towards no definite end. But the consequences are hardly less fatal when the objects of thought relatively to themselves are severed and confused, and when only some are sought to be studied and understood, whilst the rest are neglected or treated as though they did not exist. This

is to break for the mind the organic wholeness of the world of being; to imprison it within the limits of a single star, and lose sight of the whole heavens besides; to prevent the possibility of perceiving how one part is conditioned by another; and so to distort and hopelessly to confuse the whole. This is not to educate, but to pervert man. A partial rent in the veil of darkness may at times make apparent things hitherto unseen; and closing again upon the mysteries within, it may leave the mind with a narrow, vague vision; and such vision may occasionally have the power of effecting a transformation in those who are visited by it. It once converted a poor camel-driver into a Mohammed, and a peasant girl tending her goats into a Joan of Arc. So it also made a grand inorganic dreamer of a Swedenborg, and many others, who have found worlds more than God ever framed, and very different. No such partial opening, however, of the veil of darkness, and no such fragmentary conception of the vast complex field of objective being, can suffice to meet the demand of true thinking. It would not do to cut up the sun into as many parts as there are sentient beings that need its light and heat, and assign to each separately its own particular share. No such separate part would meet the want of any such being, nor would all the parts mechanically collected and bound together, do this any more effectually. Each man needs the *whole* sun, that is, its *all* in its *unity*. What is the world of physical nature, the sphere of natural science, separated from the moral world; and what is the moral, the sphere of ethics, severed in like manner from the spiritual; and what is the spiritual, with its richest supernatural glories, in its abstract isolation from the other two spheres? In either case, you would have at best but a sudden rent in the veil of darkness, leaving the mind with fantastic visions. True organic thinking requires the *whole* object of thought, as the only competent guide in each detailed process of the mind.

Still higher must we rise, however, in the way of cautious mental balancing, if we would have all the necessities of organic thinking in full view, and be in condition to actualize it

truly in our own persons. Room must be made, in nature, for that which is not nature on the one hand, and for that which is nature, but rises above it in its common character, on the other. Sin, eventuating in the Fall, with all its consequences, cannot, without essential damage to the true process of thinking itself, be ignored. It is *in* nature, but not *of* nature. It meets us as a fact no less clearly authenticated than any other fact in experimental science. Entering as a foreign power, it has become incorporated with the courses of thought, has modified the whole structure of mind, deeply affected its relation to its proper object, and in a way no less radically has it marred also the harmony that reigned originally in the bosom of the objective world itself. The Apostle's inspiration accords naturally with the deepest philosophy, where, in depicting this general fact, he says: "For we know that the whole creation groaneth, and travaileth in pain together until now: and not only they, but ourselves also, which have the first fruits of the Spirit, even we ourselves groan within ourselves, waiting for the adoption—the redemption of our bodies." Physical, moral and spiritual nature, comprising in its totality the whole world of thought, as in the case of the mind itself, carries in it no longer the pure hand-writing of God. An enemy's hand has evidently passed over it, rendering exceedingly obscure what was once distinct, and superscribing on rocks, rights and letters many hieroglyphic symbols that did not originally belong to them. Lines of organic thought, which at first involved the only true laws of logic, have now become so faint, that it is only with the most cautious study and greatest labor they can be traced at all. Take the first condition of objective being, and contrast with the same being as now modified by the power of sin, and you have the conditions clearly of two generically different lines of reasoning. Manifestly enough to the most of close students, it is not possible now, at least not to the extent it once was, to conclude, in a strictly *a priori* way, what will be the precise result for the future from any organic laws at present in operation, on the general presumption that these, working organically, must produce in time to come pre-

cisely what they have produced in the past, or that which it was in their nature originally and in a perfectly uniform way, to accomplish. These organic objects, thus entered and materially modified by this great foreign power, must now be examined in detail and concretely, step by step, and in the full, conscious light of the nature of sin in its own character; and even then, no conclusions of the mind can be regarded as certainly scientific, until they are fully sustained by a large number of others of like character produced by the same laws amid the same conditions. It can be very easily seen, in view of facts like these, how the absence of a moral power in the mind capable of properly appreciating the presence and balancing the power of this abnormal force, may serve to vitiate the scientific accuracy of the grandest processes and destroy utterly the ground of confidence in their conclusions.

Besides this, and no less fully authenticated by inductive science, we have the fact, that Nature, even in its normal condition, is always more than Nature simply. This, although science as such may not be able to compass it in such a way as fully to reduce it to the regular laws of natural being, dare yet by science not be ignored. Already on the side of the thinking subject we find faculties, both in the form of reason and will, which, alike in their nature and action, manifestly rise above and transcend the mere finite boundaries of our being in other respects. Reason, as consciousness itself directly proclaims, is the bearer of innate convictions and general principles, which it can find no logical process sufficiently extended to measure; and is, therefore, by its own nature, compelled to receive and believe what it cannot logically understand. Here is clearly an element of the divine in the human, of the supernatural in the natural, which mocks every pretension of mere Rationalism, however imposing it may be in its own nature. So also the will, while it forms a vital part of the general mental and moral organism, is, nevertheless, by its own nature, as will, above and beyond all mere organic laws as such. It is purely autonomic, and is made thus to move grandly from itself above the whole order of nature, presenting one of the severest

problems known to lodge in the entire sphere of philosophy. Here again is seen, in the clearest possible way, the presence of the supernatural in the normally natural, demanding new and increasingly severe conditions in the case of all who would be fully certified at every point, that their thinking is purely and strictly of an organic nature, and therefore, in condition at least to be truly scientific in its results.

But the supernatural which gleams thus manifestly from the mind itself, reigns with perhaps a still more imposing grandeur in the general world of Nature. Everywhere Nature, even by its own constitution, looks through and beyond itself. It enshrines in its deepest being the divine, not indeed as the Pantheist dreams, but still really and truly. It is more than itself merely in any view, in such form that Materialism simply, in its own nature, can never sound or understand it. Every object that primarily appeals to the senses, is found to adumbrate, when by the power of higher thought it is seen in its true organic connection with the whole, the presence of a soul, and in some true sense a conscious spirit also, that is as far above matter simply, as mind is above the material texture of the brain in which it lives. The natural order of being in which our physical life holds, constitutes, on this account, the real bosom of the Parable on the one hand, and of the Miracle on the other, which are the two outward signs of the supernatural, as it reigns invisibly throughout its whole wonderful being. The entire kingdom of Nature answers evidently, in its deepest life, to the higher and purely spiritual world, and demands, in order to the attainment of its own legitimate ends, both as it respects itself and man, its crowning head, to be inwardly apprehended and thoroughly penetrated by this spiritual world at every point of its great being.

With this point now end the leading and essential conditions of organic thinking. Viewed as a whole, with anything like an adequate sense of their full and broad demand, it must appear as sufficiently evident, that he who would aspire to this order of thinking, and be qualified to move freely and surely, amid all perturbations, upon the purely objective lines of truth,

so as to have the conclusions at which he arrives to bear the form of an authentic and authoritative gospel from the bosom of Nature, must himself rise to an exceedingly high position. He must entirely transcend all mere rationalistic limitations of the mind in every view. Reason must be allowed, without let or bar of any kind, to fill freely its broadest and highest sphere. And will it then be able to grasp objective being in its totality, in such a way as to be able to bring it fully within the mental laboratory, and so as to develop, amid all its distant and immediate, its latent and active conditioning forces, the great principles which permeate it? The question answers itself in the higher conscious being of each, with a decided negative. Mind rests not in itself; neither can its true action, in any form, find its satisfactory basis on any plane thus low and uncertain. The reason, even in its most perfect organization in the bosom of all the mental faculties, if it move simply in its own natural sphere, is, at best, in this view, like the eagle that would soar to the sun, but finds itself, when too high to descend gracefully, incompetent to continue its flight and thus consummate its purpose. Revelation becomes thus an absolute necessity to all true thought. Mind and its object meet organically, now, in their true form, only in the broad bosom of Christianity, which is a new creation in the heart of the old, meeting in a remedial way the perturbations of sin on the one side, and giving to the normally supernatural in its union with the natural its true scientific expression on the other. Beyond the physical centre of the natural order of being lying in the material sun, there is a still deeper, and broader, and higher centre of the whole of being, physical, moral and spiritual, in the Person of Christ. Here alone do the natural and the supernatural come to their true harmony. At no point lower than this can the mind be in true condition to enter organically the great lines of thought as these spread from their own common centre, as thus found; and by no inferior power to that which emanates from the mind of this great Prophet of Nature, can the human reason become qualified to travel on these lines, so as to arrive, in a sure way, at their own rich, high and full final results.

Organic thinking, moving thus in the broad bosom of Christianity and led by the Christian faith, as this completes the natural, which we have already seen to lie at the threshold of all knowledge, is, as we shall find no difficulty in perceiving, the essential demand of all departments of thought. What is Science in the order of physical nature, for instance, with all its pretensions, poised on any lower plane? What, for the most part, but Nature killed and eviscerated, in such form as to make it only a wretched caricature of its own proper and glorious self? The numerous variations and endless contradictions which it carries in its own bosom, are enough to show, beyond all question, that it is moving below its proper plane and outside of, its true orbit, and that it can never thus reach the whole truth, nor any part of it in its own full nature and truthful relations. Here lies the prolific womb of all those monstrous heresies, which often pass as great scientific truths, by which it is sought to rule God out of His own world and bury the hopes of men in a common materialistic grave. But nature thus inwardly dissevered and outwardly compressed and actually killed cannot be taken for the free and living work of God. Nature, evolved from its own full life, replete with its rich mystery commanding the reverence of faith, budding forth at every point the concentrated forces of its pure spiritual essence, and crowned with the ripened fruit of its own substantial life, nourishing the Divine in man, giving him aspirations to a kingdom beyond itself, is the only form of science that can meet the demand of organic thinking, or in any real way satisfy science itself in its own true form; and between such living science, or science fully corresponding with its living object, and the Bible, evolved in like manner from its own base, the living Person of Christ, there can never be found the presence of a real conflict.

In the sphere of Philosophy, mental and moral, what but strict organic thinking, as brought in the Person of Christ to its only true and adequate plane, can be of real service? The various systems, ancient and modern, starting on a lower ground, and following a different process, are all felt to have

measurably failed in their great work ; and as failures they have passed away. They all started at some point outside of the great centre of truth in its wholeness, and found it impossible, on this account, to complete themselves in true scientific form, or do full justice to truth in its manifoldness, or on all its sides. They are, in this view, necessarily fragmentary ; and so badly have some of them perverted these fragments of the truth, as to turn them almost wholly into the service of error. Many of them, indeed, carry in them splendid specimens of organic thinking on narrow principles in isolated detail ; but, failing to start in the proper centre, which alone can give the right character, tone and fulness to details, they fell below the true demand of thought under this form, and came radically short even where they were supposed to be most complete. Philosophy—than which there is no department more grand, and certainly none more far-reaching and general, starts in the organic centre of intellectual and moral being under its objective form ; and passing from thence upon its great currents of thought, it is governed throughout, and necessarily, by faith no less than by logic, both in its process and conclusions. The result is a system that has heart in it, as well as brain, life, as well as form, that which towers above the reason but yet belongs essentially to man, as well as that which may be compressed at all points within the contracted circle simply of the logical understanding.

And what, wholly on the outside of organic thinking, is History ? Just what we find much, perhaps the greater part of it, to be in fact, the external representation of the subjective fancy of the historian, ruled for the most part, either by his political prejudices or his personal passions, or at best, a system of dead facts, in no way inwardly related either to themselves or to the circumstances which occasioned them. In no sense can history, in this view, come to be anything like a real objective movement in the life of the world itself, organically united to its original scheme, intellectually, morally and politically, bearing in its bosom to each subsequent age the true significance of the past. It grows from no inward and necessary

unity; and much less is any real Divine factor allowed to pervade its parts, so as to secure to them an intelligent and consistent meaning. Without objective consistency, History becomes the merest play-ground of reckless forces, a chaos of confused powers, a dark void in human existence, or a tidal flow and ebb of dashing torrents, each independent of the other, the last never extending beyond the first, involving neither instruction for the single mind, nor advance for the general life of the world. Such conception of history lacks the genius of organic thinking, which has shed the beams of an entirely new light, in our own age, over this vast and interesting region. This has discovered a power behind the throne greater than the throne itself. It has seen in the movement of the ages the evolution of a grand scheme on the basis of its own objective laws, and in full harmony with itself and the great interests of humanity. It hears from its bosom more than the voice of the historian—more than the voice of the age—the voice of God as well. Through the wreck and ruin of old dynasties and systems, it mounts to higher planes, and carries the life of the world forward at every step with a steadiness of purpose, in the bosom of a concurrent unity of forces, and withal by an inward and free necessity, that commands at once the deepest and most devout reverence of the mind.

We need hardly say that organic thinking is no less vitally connected with all Theology that is really deserving of its name. What is the value of this, even in its best character, when it results simply from willful subjective notions, without regard to its own objective world? What is the truth in this form, at any point, and how shall it be surely ascertained and generally known? Why the endless contradictions which crowd this department? Is it not because its central objective fact is not perceived as such, or because no care is had to reason organically from this centre on its own lines? No mere *doctrine* as such, however significant and weighty it may be, can be sufficient to answer the demands of scientific theology. Schemes of this character, replete with the finest genius and most consummate learning, each discarded and abandoned in

its turn, are found scattered, like the sapless rubbish of the forest, through every part of this vast region. They answer as a whole neither to the true thinking of the mind nor the true believing of the heart; and for the reason prevaillingly, either that they have not embodied the true, central object of theological thinking, or have failed to follow this organically to its own legitimate ends. In this way, they have not only failed to bear the great central fact itself to the reflection and faith of the mind in its own living and wondrous character, but also even its correct image or truthful report. Theology, as a system, requires organic thinking no less really than science, history or philosophy. As well might we dream of constructing a system of Astronomy without regard to the objective heavens, or a scheme of Geology independently of the strata or rocks of the earth, as to form a Theology without regard to its own objective world. Organic thinking can alone dissipate the subjective fog which has condensed and obscured the theological firmament, and again bring forth its true central object, as this holds in the Sun of Righteousness. Here, in the brief formula—*θεος ἐστὶ ἐν Χριστῷ, κόσμον καταλλάσσων ἑαυτῷ*, is the only adequate ground for science in this view, involving not a doctrine merely, however, central even and true, but a living fact, a living personal fact, Christ Himself, comprehending, on His human side, the whole world of Nature, and on His Divine side, the whole world of Spirit, both uniting vitally in His one personality. From this common centre the way opens for the mind to move organically along the currents of the surest objective verity in both directions, upwards and downwards, and to fix the truth at every point in the most exact and certain form. All theology, to be truly scientific, and thus be able to authenticate itself to the intellectual nature of man, must, by its own necessities, begin with this objective Christological centre—this last source of all revelation, whether of the nature of God or of man, or whether of the revelation which holds between them. Theology, in this view, is not only a science strictly so called, standing on a level with many others around it, but it is the science of all sciences which are in any true

way deserving of the name. It involves the general necessity resting upon organic thought to trace all the sciences from one common centre of objective being, which is, therefore, the theanthropic or mediatorial Person of Christ, and to study and understand each as it is related to and modified by others, and thus rise to the conception of the whole in its true nature and perfect harmony. Destroy for the mind this Christological centre of unity, and with it the power of organic thinking, and it is not difficult to see that the whole world of thought is at once hopelessly disrupted; that each department is isolated and independent; that the necessities are at hand for endless confusion and contradiction; and that the result at last must be a general absence of faith everywhere and in regard to everything.

True Art, no less than true science or philosophy, is also dependent in the same absolute way, on organic thinking. The imagination is no reckless faculty floundering in the dark, without law or guide. It accomplishes its work properly only in organic harmony with the other powers of the mind. Even in its grandest ideal creations, whether in Poetry, Painting, Sculpture or Music, it moves strictly on the line of its own true organic law; and, therefore, it is that these grand creations, though purely ideal in their nature, meet and appeal nevertheless to our higher consciousness, as does our own well-known reflected image. Thus Architecture is made to take on, almost as by growth, its legitimate form, and to embody its distinctive living spirit. It becomes the organic body, in the sphere of Art, of the ideal soul. The world of Romance, including all its species, as bounded, furnished and peopled by such a mind, for instance, as that of Shakspeare's, moving all the while along the real currents of life and history, is never ideal in the sense of being unreal. Actual men meet their own image in every character that is brought upon the stage, while they realize themselves to be moving perpetually through all the complicated net-work which is so perfectly woven in his scenes. Outside of organic thinking, all this would be to the eye like the tawdry dress of the harlequin, or to the ear like the confused

medley of discordant sounds, which find their echo neither in the heavens above, nor in the earth beneath, nor yet in the waters under the earth.

It would be unnecessary, in view of the extent to which the subject of organic thinking has already been carried, to trace its relation, in any minute way, with society under its practical form. Here, whether it concern the problems arising from the Family, the State or the Church—whether it regard law, government, education, business, morality or religion, or whether it refer to the relation of these to each other in the bosom of a complex whole, organic thinking is, as all can readily see, of the most central and vital importance. Society itself can clearly no otherwise be understood. It is the bosom of all sound legislation and the true genius of all wise statesmanship. Whence for the most the vagaries, such as Fourierism and Libertinism, that have abounded in the bosom of practical society in the different periods of the world's life, but from the absence of this true law of thought, by which the mind becomes incompetent to trace out the several spheres in society under their own objective character, and to perceive clearly, beyond all phenomenal differences, a real and common unity of basis and life? Only as society comes to be seen in its own strictly organic character, can room be made properly for the legitimate function of each of its great factors, so as to secure a true united result. Thus it will be perceived, that the Family, the State and the Church, being each essential in the complex whole, that the legitimate rights of neither can be in the least degree invaded by the rest, without bringing moral confusion and material damage into the entire life of society; that the Church and State are not sundered in such form that there can be no mutual coöperation between them looking to a common end; that there is no reason why the State should assume the whole work of education, separating it thus necessarily from all religion and giving to it a wholly godless character; and also that there is, and can be no justification on the part of the State for forcibly and arbitrarily taking from the Church, and even from God Himself, the subject of Marriage in its true

spiritual and Divine character, and by granting divorces, affect to do what God alone can really do, thus disrupting society in its deepest life. Plainly the absence of organic thinking is the presence of all warring and destroying antagonisms; and its presence, moving from the true centre, is, as it must be, in like manner, the only adequate promise and pledge of actual harmony and certain prosperity.*

It is not difficult to see, at this stage of the general subject, that organic thinking, from this common Christological centre, comprehends in its own range all the essential spheres of thought. It demands the *whole* at every point, as the necessary condition of properly understanding the *all*, or any of the parts that enter into and fill out the all. The educational actualization of this system gives us the school in the form of the *University*, in which the same mind is educated from a common centre in all the necessary and legitimate departments of being. The University is the necessary culmination of organic thinking. No need for this country, with its interminable diversities of activity, can be well conceived of as being more vitally important. What else can elevate its general mind and give it a free inward correspondence with its vast geographical breadth; unite the varied interests of all its parts in one grand whole, and so equalize the centripetal and centrifugal forces, which by necessity are constantly active, each tending to overcome and enslave the other; and open the way, amid all the intellectual, moral and religious segments into which our life

* In all these respects, we may apply the words of Wordsworth:

Inquire of ancient wisdom; go, demand,
Of mighty Nature, if 't was ever meant
That we should pry far off, yet be unraised;
That we should pore, and dwindle as we pore,
Viewing all objects unremittingly
In disconnection, dead and spiritless;
And still dividing and dividing still,
Break down all grandeur, still unsatisfied
With the perverse attempt, while littleness
May yet become more little; waging thus
An impious warfare with the very life
Of our souls.

has been split, and by which it is now narrowly bounded, for the full reign of a common Catholic nationality?

This ground for the University in its true character has been laid and dug already by the philosophy of Franklin and Marshall College. Not only does this philosophy lay thus the foundation of the University, but necessitates also, in an inward way, its actual superstructure, as its only fitting outward body. We claim this honor for Lancaster. Nor will it, when it comes to take actual shape, pattern after anything of the same general character in Europe. The Christological centre of being which has become the soul of the philosophy that must necessarily mould its life and govern its form, will place it beyond anything that is yet known in the old world. Many of the universities of Europe are noble, but this will be more noble. The picture looks down upon us we hope not from afar. Youthful and beautiful and yet in her intellectual glory, as Franklin and Marshall College is, with her children grown into manhood, power and distinction around her, what shall hinder the consummation of a purpose which arises so necessarily from her own mental and moral being, and which is so essentially connected with our common life in all its forms? As Alumni of the College, we are waiting with restive patience, this grand enlargement of our intellectual home; and you, Young Gentlemen, after you shall have passed from under the parental roof, and mingled with the narrow sectarianisms, or mental bigotries of the day, will be delighted to return and find your *Alma Mater* in a condition to mitigate all asperities and lead the mind of future generations to truth under its whole, broad, high and harmonious character. Organic thinking, in this view, can be satisfied only as it actualizes itself in a living educational or institutional system, with full facilities to give it real working effect, or in our case, as it sees the goodly City of Lancaster passing under the bright shadow of Franklin and Marshall University.

ANNO DOMINI, 79.

BY JAMES L. FERRIERE, M. A., PHILADELPHIA.

WHEN during our school and college days we conned the pages of the old Roman historians, poets, and philosophers, did we ever truly realize, that they, whose immortal writings we were studying, had once really lived and died, had experienced the tender emotions of love and friendship, and endured human pains, sorrows, and disappointments? When in those writings we studied their religion, with its airy and fantastic legends of naiad and nymph, of god, hero and demi-god, in which the mortal and the immortal, the human and the divine, seemed to meet and to blend into one, did we ever realize how that religion, far from being the mere creation of poetic fancy, had once been the faith of millions of our fellow-men? To realize such thoughts is indeed difficult for us who are living in this seeming noonday of civilization, and in a land as yet in the first flush of youthful vigor, still such a realization is not impossible. Across the wide Atlantic lies the land where those millions once lived, and in that land is to be found one of their cities so marvelously preserved with all the traces of their public and private life so fresh upon it, that we are at once carried back, and placed in the midst of the old Roman life, just as it existed eighteen-hundred years ago.

Leaving behind Naples, with its mingling modern and mediæval life and population, a three hours' drive brings you to the entrance of Pompeii; a few steps down an inclined plane and the Nineteenth Century is shut out—eighteen hundred years are wiped away and you are in the midst of the 79th year of the Christian Era. The city it is true is in ruins, but the ruins are not such as are wrought by the hands of time.

Vesuvius in burying Pompeii has but preserved it, its temples still stand dedicated to the worship of the old gods; the streets still retain the footprints of the crowds that once thronged them, and at every step is revealed some secret of the public and private life of its inhabitants. It is the greatest victory ever gained over time—it is as though the vast chasm of eighteen centuries were bridged and the old world and its civilization brought face to face with the new.

Evidently you are in its business centre. Here is the Forum, the pillars that supported the gallery that surrounded three sides of its open square are still standing and its pavement still shows the wear and tear of the sandals of the citizens who in those old days congregated within its inclosure. At yonder end opens the temple of Venus with her altar still standing before the shrine; on the right is the Commercial Exchange, where the merchants came to bargain with each other, and where you notice their calculations, scratched on the frescoed walls, looking as though only done yesterday; and on the left is the Market House whose walls are beautifully frescoed with representations of birds, fruits and flowers. Crossing the street that runs along the southern side of the Forum you enter the Hall of Justice—a large room, whose walls are covered with those scribblings by which in all ages and among all nations “the people” assert their title to public buildings. Here some one proclaims that “Oppius the porter is a thief and a liar,” and the scratches that nearly deface the libel show how poor Oppius resented the slanderous charge, and, here some impatient petitioner for justice satirizes the law’s delays. With what freshness does the fragrance of the “old, old story” come wafted through the distance of eighteen centuries as you read.

“Scribenti mi dietat Amor monstratque Cupido
Ah! porcam sine te si Deus esse velim.”

How you thrill as you recognize passages from Virgil and Ovid among these rude scrawls, sometimes used with a personal or political application, and how near are brought the days

when their writings were part of a household literature, just as those of Tennyson and Longfellow are of ours. With such revelations concerning the old inhabitants of the city, it is not difficult to re-people that hall of justice—between those two Corinthian pillars, sit the *Duumviri* in their stone chairs, before them stands the accused, anxiously watching whether any impression in his favor is being made by the eloquence of his advocate, whose voice still seems to linger around those old walls. Here crowd the spectators, and there is the lover confiding his tender secret to the wall, little dreaming how, centuries after that secret will be read and understood by wanderers from lands to him unknown. You pass out into the narrow street and the phantom throng is there also. The merchant brushes by you as he hurries to the Exchange, behind you resounds the stately tread of a Senator wending his way to the forum, through the busy hum of life ever sounds in your ears the sonorous music of the old Latin tongue and all around this group of public buildings there seems to linger a breath of the Eternal City and a golden shadow of Roman splendor.

The streets, few of which are twenty-five feet wide, are paved with irregular squares of lava, in which you notice the deep ruts worn by the cart wheels that rolled over them eighteen centuries ago. The high narrow sidewalks are of slabs of the same material, and at the crossings huge blocks form convenient stepping-stones across the water that during the rainy months swept in torrents through them. The houses that line the two sides of these streets are mostly of two stories; and the lower stories are generally occupied by shops whose counters open right on the street, and behind which the owners would stand loudly proclaiming the excellence of their wares. Over some of the shops are sculptured signs, and in some even relics of the stock in trade. This one is a barber's, whose master may have shaved the chin of Cicero. This carved serpent the emblem of *Æsculapius* announces the chemist's, and a step or two further is the surgeon's, where were found some three hundred surgical instruments, some of which show how many an invention of modern science was anticipated by the

ancients. This is the studio of a sculptor, with the unfinished statue bearing the trace of the last touch of the artist's chisel, and here is a wine merchant, among whose big-bellied Amphoræ there seems to linger the fragrance of Falernian and Calabrian vintage, and whose marble counter still bears the wine stains left by the tipplers of other days. This is the bakery—the dough-troughs and grinding mills stand just as the owner left them, and in the oven are the loaves of bread, baked to cinder by the baking of eighteen centuries. At the street corners, marble slabs let into the walls, bear painted in long narrow letters the advertisements of the day. How strange to see it announced that “to-morrow thirty pairs of gladiators will fight in the arena,” or to read of a lost jar of old wine for the recovery of which Varius offers a reward and promises a double reward for the capture of the thief. From the number of “political posters,” it would seem that Pompeii was buried on the eve of an election. Here a trades union “unanimously nominate Pausa for the office of *Ædile*,” and here “Valentinus and his pupils nominate Rufus.” Sometimes a candidate is recommended as a “good man,” or an “excellent citizen” or a “very moral young man;” and even our politicians may learn a lesson from the delicate force of one that promises the electors that if they elect Sabinus, he will appoint them to office. How all this brings back the teeming life of other days, making the past live again in all its active reality! The shops again throng with customers. You hear as you pass along the witty-tongued barber pouring his little fund of anecdote and gossip into his patron's ears. From the windows and overhanging balconies peep dark eyes, and you catch a glimpse of flowing tresses, or of taper fingers that touched red lips in response to the kiss thrown to them by the gallant half hid in the angle of yonder wall.

Passing through a gate whose inscription announces that the road beyond leads to *Herculaneum*, you find that this is part of the famous *Appian Road* that traverses the empire from north to south, and as you stroll along it, you discover that you are in the cemetery of the city. The ancients did

not love death, and avoiding even the mention of the word were constantly endeavoring to deprive it of its terrors. The bodies of the dead were burned with ceremonious pomp and magnificence, and their ashes were collected in graceful urns, which were placed in the niches of fantastic little temples reared along the roadsides, among which the good citizens would stroll in the quiet summer evenings, and the children join in their merry games of romping sport. On these temples are inscribed the names and virtues of those in whose honor they were erected, and many of them richly decorated with sculpture, fresco and mosaic, are perfect gems of Roman art. But what a sad feeling comes over your Christian heart, as you notice among these monuments and mortuary inscriptions, the total absence of any token of a knowledge of that life that lies beyond the grave, and that for you has so much of comfort and of meaning. To the pagan Roman death was the end of existence, the Elysian fields of his spirit land were at best but the abodes of a dreamy, unconscious and self-forgotten state—his belief is embodied in yonder sculptured representation of a weeping woman holding an inverted and extinguished torch—in vain you seek among those gay little temples for some of those holy and loving words that have brought calm and comfort to many a bereaved and aching heart, and you turn sadly away, but with an humble gratitude for the priceless hope that has been given to you in Christ and His holy religion.

You now re-enter the city, whose whole life lies spread out before you. Would you see the vices of its inhabitants? here they are in all their devilish hideousness. Yonder is the brothel, flaunting its indecent sign in the broad glare of day, and on its unhallowed walls you find depicted the disgusting scenes of a sensual mythology, in which the divine nature is lowered to the level of the human, and both are dragged through the filth and mire of licentious immorality—but *de mortuis nil nisi bonum*—let us turn away from these sad scenes of human frailty, which however are not without their lessons, for in them you will find ample proof that Christianity has purified the world and elevated the standard of human morality,

and that men, aye and women too, are nobler and purer to-day than they were eighteen centuries ago—but when you have learned this lesson, turn aside in charity from this ghastly revelation of the vices of the old Roman world.

The scenes of domestic life lie open before you. You enter the deserted houses and gaze undisturbed on their frescoed walls and mosaic floors. They all seem to be built on a similar plan, and only to differ in size and magnificence of decoration. Through a gate over which is the owner's name, and a vestibule on whose pavement is inscribed the word *Salve*, you enter an open square court yard. Around its four sides is a shed roof of tiles supported by columns; it is paved with flag stones, marble or mosaic according to the means of the owner, and in the centre is a well or perhaps a fountain. This is called the *Atrium*, and around it are arranged the more public rooms of the house. A sort of antechamber leads you into another similar though smaller court. This is the *peristylum*. It is more richly decorated than the *Atrium*, the pillars are more slender and graceful; finer frescoes adorn the walls and more delicate mosaics cover the floor; a gay little flower bed and a tiny fountain whose spray sparkles in the sun-light occupy the centre, and here and there are scattered bronze and marble statues. This is the domestic portion of the house, and into this *peristylum* open its private rooms, whose entrances instead of doors had simply curtains. The little rooms on the right and left are the *cubiculae* or bed chambers; at the further end is the *tablinum*, a sort of a reception room, decorated with wax effigies of the ancestors; on one side of this is the *larium*, or family chapel, and on the other side is the library, in some of which you find the rolls of papyrus which though burnt to charcoal still retain their form, and on some of which can still be traced the letters with which they were inscribed; in yonder angle is the *triclinium*, or banquet room, with its three-sided table around which the host and his guests reclined on couches during the repast, and through this you pass out into the little garden in the rear of the house, which was always filled with gay and fragrant flowers. The frescoes and mosaics on the

walls and floors of these houses represent the scenes of history or the stories of Religion, and that Religion meets you on these walls and floors as it never did in the books you have studied. Jove, Venus and Pluto are there depicted in all the radiance of the days when men knelt before their shrines and feared their power, and the scenes of mythology and of history live on these walls in beauty unfaded by the lapse of centuries. In one house you find the whole story of the Iliad depicted in frescoes, whose colors seem as though they had but just left the artist's pallet, and in another is a mosaic representing the battle of Issus—Alexander galloping at the head of his Macedonian phalanx has just struck down the Persian general; Darius seems to forget his danger in the anguish of defeat, and stretches his hands towards his fallen commander, while his fleeing army leave him to the mercy of the conqueror. The whole scene—the victorious onslaught of the Macedonians—the mad confusion of the routed Persians, the flush of pride on the face of Alexander and the anguish and shame on that of Darius leave on you that vivid and lasting impression that a true masterpiece in art must leave—and all this wondrous work of art is but the mosaic pavement of a room!

Here comes out to view the æsthetic difference between the ancients and ourselves. With us Art is almost always the superfluous, something cast upon us from without, and rarely entering more than skin deep into our life, but with the people in the midst of whose life you are standing, art and æsthetic culture seem to have been one of the conditions upon which their intellectual life depended. Penetrating deep down to the very fountains of their being and blending harmoniously with their religion, æsthetic culture was a constituent part of every phase and feature of their life. To them the real and the ideal seems to have had no separate existence—art entered everywhere, brightening, vivifying and perfuming everything.

In all these houses still seems to linger the presence of those who once inhabited them, and so real and vivid is the sense of that presence that sometimes you even feel as though the owners were only temporarily absent, and you almost fear

to linger lest they should return and resent your intrusion into their privacy.

In continuing your wanderings through the city, you pause to examine its two theaters, but the drama was no Roman institution, and was almost unknown in Roman literature—the amphitheater extinguishes the theater. The amphitheater stands in the eastern angle of the city's walls. A long vaulted passage brings you to the arena, which is dug down deep in the heart of the hill in which the amphitheater rests. From the arena, in ever-winding elliptic circles rise tier above tier the seats of twenty thousand spectators; these seats are divided into three sets; the first and lowest is the *podium*, reserved for the senators, priests and aristocracy of the city; the second is for the citizens, and the third and uppermost is for the plebeians, while yonder corner is set apart for strangers. In some of the houses you have visited are frescoes representing this amphitheater when filled with the crowds of festival days, and as you seat yourself in the stranger's corner, in imagination you see the vast structure beginning to fill up as it did on the morning of that 23d day of November at whose close the city entered upon its long sleep.

The morning sun has just tinged with gold the cloud that hangs over the summit of distant Vesuvius. The crowd is fast assembling, and now the Quæstor gives the signal for the opening of the games. First are combats between wild beasts, succeeded by combats between men and beasts, but eager for a deeper excitement the crowd is already calling for the gladiators, who now make their appearance. First a single pair step into the ring—their scanty clothing reveals the swelling muscles of leg, breast and arm; loud applause greet them as they make their salute to the spectators, personal friends, addressing them by name, call out encouragement, and wagers are offered and accepted. Now crossing their short swords they begin the combat. Standing knee to knee they hew and hack at each other, while the spectators watch in breathless expectation and greet with murmurs of applause each skillful blow; suddenly the red life-stream gushes from a deep gash in the side of one

of the combatants, and loud cries of "*habet, habet,*" break from the spectators. The wounded gladiator endeavouring to staunch his wound with one hand extends the other with the thumb pointing downwards, towards the spectators, as a token that he begs for mercy at their hands, but, his appeal is unanswered, and with stoical resignation he submits to the death blow. Another, and another combat follows in quick succession. Sometimes one of the strong-minded women of the day, eager, like some of her modern sisters, to unsex herself, may be seen entering the arena and contending for the bloody prize. Now whole bands of gladiators mingle in headlong strife, until but one mangled and bleeding survivor remains to receive the admiring plaudits of the crowd, among which, are matrons and young maidens looking with unblanched faces upon the scene of carnage. Ah the Roman nature had no need of the drama's mimicry of passion and of death so long as it possessed such gross realities in their cruel and bloody games.

But a sulphurous cloud, growing darker and heavier each moment, is covering the face of heaven; through it the beams of the noonday sun, falling in lurid splendor, illumine the upturned faces of the astonished spectators. All eyes turn in terror to the distant mountain whose summit is hid beneath a dark cloud of smoke—now comes a crash and a red glare as the mountain begins to vomit forth its red waves of melted lava. "*Vesuvius is on fire!*" rings from twenty thousand blanched lips, and the whole of that vast multitude join in mad flight. Ah what scenes must have then transpired. As you sit in that desolate amphitheater, imagination may perhaps recall the scene, but pen and tongue must ever fail in the attempt to describe it.

A few years ago those engaged in excavating the ruins came upon a spot where the ashes in hardening seemed to have retained the impression of the human form, and in the cavities thus formed skeletons were noticed. Liquid plaster was poured into these strange moulds, and thus were obtained casts of four of the citizens who perished in that awful catastrophe. These casts are still to be seen, and they tell the story of that 23d of November in all its awful reality. The plaster had replaced

the flesh on the skeleton, and, to a certain extent, has even reproduced the garments worn during life. There exists nowhere anything similar to these relics of mortality. Egyptian mummies, black and hideous, have nothing about them that is common to humanity, but these Pompeians are our fellow-men, struggling in their death throes before our very eyes. You see them in that supreme moment of existence when the last wave of the tide of life had ebbed, and they lie before you with every mark of the great agony of death stamped upon them.

The first is a young woman; her hands are so convulsively clenched that the nails seem to pierce into the flesh; over the whole body can be traced the muscular contortions of agony, and you realize how terrible her sufferings must have been—the whole attitude is not that of death but of agony. Next to her lies an old woman—she also has suffered terribly, as the contorted limbs and clenched teeth and hands show. Beside her lies a young girl, who could hardly have been fifteen years old; how accurately even the texture of her garments and all their pleats and folds are reproduced in the plaster, while here and there a rent leaves bare the smooth skin of shoulders and arm; one little hand presses her vail over her face to shut out the hot ashes that are stifling her, and the other supports her head—she has fallen on her face, and does not seem to have suffered much, but it makes your heart bleed to look at her. The last lies by himself—a man of colossal frame, and in all the vigor of manhood; he has stretched himself on his back and composed his limbs to die bravely, and there is a noble and soldierly resolution about him as he thus fearlessly faces death. There is about these plaster casts something that the sculptor's chisel has never produced—place beside them the *Laocoon*, with all its marvellous mimicry of human agony, and it sinks into insignificance before their awful reality.

Let us pause here—Pompeii has naught within its walls that would not jar on us and appear weak and trifling after this exhibition of death in all its horrors, revealed to our eyes after the lapse of eighteen centuries

ART. V.—THE TRUE DOCTRINE OF REALISM IN ITS BEARING ON THEOLOGY.*

THE religions of the ancient world, says Dr. Cocker, in his recent work on Christianity and Greek Philosophy, were the painful effort of the human spirit to return to its true rest and center—to find Him who is so intimately near to every human heart, and who has never ceased to be the want of the human race. The philosophies of the ancient world, says the same author, were the earnest effort of human reason to reconcile the finite and the infinite, the human and the divine, the subject and God.

This unquestionably was the problem at which the divine Plato wrought. He struggled with his mighty intellect to peer through the clouds and shadows that environ us, and fix his steady gaze upon the world of spiritual realities beyond. Things which are seen are but the shrine of things which are not seen, the temporal is the shrine of the eternal. The outward phenomena of the world are only passing pictures of invisible realities. The true object of thought must be homogeneous with thought itself. Hence thought must seek communion with being, and only as it does so can it perform its true mission. The *idea* of Plato is not a subjective activity of the mind, not a thought. The Platonic way of thinking was almost the reverse of the psychologic method of our day. "There not thought, but being, was the conditioning principle. Being did not then possess an existence, produced and adjudged to it by thought, but an existence obtruding itself and making

*An Essay in aid of a Grammar of Assent. By John Henry Newman, D. D., of the Oratory. New York: The Catholic Publication Society, 9 Warren Street, 1870.

Princeton Review, April, 1870. Art. The Relation of Adam's First Sin to the Fall of the Race.

itself felt in thought: the ideas were not dependent on thinking, but thinking was dependent on the ideas; because in Plato's belief, without the previous existence of the ideas, without and above the self-developing thought of the individual, there would be no true thinking and perception at all.*

In Plato's system ideas are in the deepest sense *realities*; hence, although he was an idealist over against the materialistic tendency in ancient philosophy, yet as against the modern distinction of *Nominalism*, he may properly be called the father of *Realism* for all ages. The question of Realism and Nominalism in the middle ages was considered so highly important, not merely as a speculative question of philosophy, but as having an important bearing on theology. On this account it is important still. We do not indeed now conceive the relation between philosophy and religion to be the same as in the Socratic system. With Socrates, to know aright was to be virtuous. We distinguish between religion and theology, and so again between theology and philosophy, but the relation here is most intimate and important. Theology is the science of revelation,—its data are contained in that supernatural revelation which God has made to the world in His Son, Jesus Christ. As a science, however, it must take form according to the laws of human thinking, and hence it will necessarily be modified by our method or system of thinking, which again is determined by our philosophy. Hence while the data, the dogmas, will remain always essentially the same, yet the form in which they are apprehended by thought will be different according to the changing systems of thinking.

Any one who has observed the history of theology must at the same time have noticed how much it is ruled and modified by different systems of philosophy. In the very beginning "the human mind was already in a philosophic condition before it received Christianity, and even before Christianity was offered to it by the divine mind. In the history of man, that which is human precedes, chronologically, that which is divine. "That

*Ackerman. *The Christian Element in Plato*. Edinburg Edition, pp. 185, 186. |

was not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural, and afterwards that which is spiritual" (1 Cor. xv. 46). Men are sinners before they are made saints; and they are philosophers before they become theologians. When Christianity was revealed in its last and fullest form, by the incarnation of the Eternal Word, it found the human mind already occupied with a human philosophy. Educated men were Platonists, or Stoics, or Epicureans." *

In the first period of Christianity Platonism ruled the theological thinking of the Christian world, as this came to expression in their schools, as for instance in the school at Alexandria. Subsequently during the middle ages Aristotle became the master as to the method of Dialectics, and then arose the long strife between Realism and Nominalism, which connected itself directly with the interpretation of the dogma. In the Reformation period again a new system of philosophy as well as of theology arose,—a philosophy which was more subjective, psychological, in its method, as well as more independent of theology for the time, and strongly impregnated with rationalism and unbelief. Though starting entirely from the stand-point of mere reason and experience in Descartes and Bacon, it was soon discovered that it could not be divorced from the study of theology. The materialism of England and France, and the idealism of Germany, exerted an immense power in theological science, so much so indeed that the history of the latter cannot be properly understood without the study of the former. Where Locke has been studied and followed in the college, the theology of the seminary has been brought down to the same rationalistic level, and the very confessions themselves are interpreted in a sense very different from that intended by their authors. It is clear, then, that a sound theology is conditioned by a sound philosophy, just as truly as it is necessary to learn to think correctly before we can understand theological science.

One of the most important doctrines of philosophy in its

* *History of Christian Doctrine*, by Dr. William G. T. Shedd.

bearing on the study of theology is the theory or doctrine of Realism. This doctrine is, that what are called generals or universals are, not mere arbitrary empty names, names without corresponding objects or contents, nor yet mere subjective conceptions of the mind, but, spiritual, real entities. The conception of the general as related to the particular and single is as old as thinking itself, for generalization is the very first step in pure thinking. We are confronted by single things in the world through the senses. We see a tree, we smell a delicious odor, we hear a piece of music. To the senses these are merely isolated single objects. These single objects can be retained in the mind through our representative or reproductive faculties as images. By means of fancy and memory we can call up in the mind a countenance that no longer confronts our senses, or an event long since passed away.

The mind is so constructed, however, that we do not remain satisfied with merely knowing single objects. These are grasped in their resemblances and relations, and are thus generalized in that substance in which they stand related as parts of a whole. Thus we see and know a number of individuals, as John, Peter, James, etc., and grasping the inner substance of their being, which is the same in all, we call it *man*. The term man comprehends what is common to all men, and yet is not limited to any particular one. Thus we have a general conception which subsumes all that is comprehended in particular individuals, so that what is predicated of the whole can be predicated of all the parts or individuals comprehended under it. This is the only form in which single things or individuals can be known in thought. We can know the single or individual by perception, but we can know only the general by thought, and the individuals only through the general. Man, as a generality, cannot be seen, we cannot form an image of it, but it can be known only in thought. It is a generality, moreover, which is not reached by abstraction and comparison, or by any empirical process. No concrete generality can be reached in that way; for in order to reach it by that method it would be necessary to have before us all possible

men in order to make the comparison, which is impossible. It is only as we have such universals that we can proceed at all in Logic. It is a futile attempt, therefore, which Dr. Newman makes to overthrow the validity of the syllogism by adducing the following example. * "Each thing has its own nature and its own history. When the nature and the history of many things are similar, we say they have the same nature; but there is no such thing as one and the same nature; they are each of them itself, not identical, but like. A law is not a fact, but a notion. 'All men die; therefore Elias has died;' but he has not died, and did not die. He was an exception to the general law of humanity; so far, he did not come under that law, but under the law (so to say) of Elias. It was the law of his individuality, that he left the world without dying; what right have we to subject the person of Elias to the scientific notion of an abstract humanity, which we have formed, without asking his leave? Why must the tyrant majority find a rule for his history? 'All men are mortal;' no; what is really meant is, that man, as such, is mortal, or the abstract, typical *auto-anthropos*; therefore the minor premises ought to be, 'Elias was the *auto-anthropos* or abstract man;' but he was not, and could not, be the abstract man, nor could any one else, any more than the average man of an Insurance Company is every individual man who insures his life with it. Such a syllogism proves nothing about the veritable Elias, except in the way of the antecedent probability. If it be said Elias was exempted from death, not by nature, but by miracle, what is this to the purpose, undeniable as it is; still to have this miraculous exemption was the personal prerogative of Elias. We call it miracle, because God ordinarily acts otherwise. He who causes men in general to die, gave it to Elias not to die. This miraculous gift comes into the individuality of Elias. On this individuality we must fix our thoughts, and not begin our notion by ignoring it."

Although it is a digression at this point, we have given this

* *Grammar of Assent*, p. 267.

quotation from Dr. Newman's book to show his idea of the general or universal, or rather to show that he denies it altogether. When we say *man* is mortal, the generality, *man*, necessarily comprehends all individual men. If then we can predicate mortality of the generality *man*, we must predicate it of all individual men. The law of mortality is *not* a notion, but a fact. The moment you say *Elias* is a man, that moment you say he is mortal also. *Elias* was mortal,—he was no exception to the law, but he was taken under a new and higher law in another economy, by which he was translated without the ordinary form of death. The miracle here, instead of overthrowing the universality of the law, only establishes it. Allow Dr. Newman's view of the relation of the particular to the general, and you at once overthrow all science. But this is a digression. The question now is, whether this term *man* is a mere empty, arbitrary name, used for the sake of convenience, representing no real object or entity, as the nominalist contends, or a mere notion or conception of the mind without a corresponding objective entity, as the conceptualist holds, or designates a real spiritual existence, just as real as John, or Peter, or James, according to the doctrine of Realism.

The nominalist asserts that the only ideas which we can frame, or mental objects which we can think of, are individual. Bishop Berkley insists: "The idea of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a black tawny, a straight or a crooked, a tall or a low or a middle-sized man;" plainly implying that we can form no other thought of man, and can by no means go beyond such an idea of an individual. But this is to deny the necessary relation between thought and language, and at the same time it involves the fallacy of using the word *idea* or thought with a double meaning. If in saying we can form no *idea* of man as a generality, is meant that we can form no *image* corresponding to the word, then we grant it; but this after all is only saying that thought-knowledge is not sense-knowledge. It is of the very nature of thinking that its contents are not, single things, or images of single things, but the general and universal. If therefore it is asked whether

we can form a *thought* of man, or humanity, we reply yes, because it is only through thought that the word has been generated.

Does the word *humanity* then designate only a notion, a conception, or thought of the mind? This is asserted by the conceptualist. That the mind can form such notions we think is clear from the fact that it has originated names for them. When we say man, humanity, we express in the form of language, what exists in thought. Humanity, therefore, is a thought, that is, we can think it; but is it merely a thought? As our world-consciousness testifies to us of the objective reality of objects which address the senses, so that it is a violence done to the common sense of men to say that these external objects are only pictures in us, in the same way our consciousness testifies that the objects of thought are objective realities, and not merely notions. And we maintain further that it is only in the light of these general ideas of the reason that either the understanding or the senses can lay hold of the true nature of individual facts or things.

Here it is that we cannot agree with the doctrine of Dr. Newman's book. We allow some force to what he says as to the difference between *inference* and *assent*, the one being a logical conclusion and the other being direct and immediate. Logic can assure us only of the certainty of a conclusion, and not of the premise, whereas assent has to do with the truth of the premise. But we cannot agree with him in the kind of distinction he seeks to draw between what he calls *notional* assent and *real* assent. On page 9 he says, "Of the two modes of apprehending propositions, notional and real, real is the stronger; I mean by stronger the more vivid and forcible. It is so to be accounted for the very reason that it is concerned with what is real or taken for real; for intellectual ideas cannot compete in effectiveness with concrete facts. Various proverbs and maxims sanction me in so speaking, such as 'Facts are stubborn things.' 'Experientia docet,' 'Seeing is believing.'" Again on page 20 he says, "Such are the two modes of apprehension. The terms of a proposition do or do not stand for things. If they do, then they are singular terms,

for all things that are, are units. But if they do not stand for things they must stand for notions, and are common terms. Singular nouns come from experience, common from abstraction. The apprehension of the former I call real, and of the latter notional." "And then it comes to pass that individual propositions about the concrete almost cease to be, and are *diluted or starved into abstract notions.*" By individual propositions about the concrete here he means facts or things, as for instance, Cain killed Abel, of which we can form an *image*, if the fact has not been witnessed directly; and by diluted or starved abstract notions he means that which can be known only to thought, as, man is depraved and carries murder in his heart. Now what we maintain is, that the real power of a fact or a thing to affect us lies, not in itself as an isolated fact or thing, but just in this "diluted and starved abstract notion" as he calls it. The fact of a murder is horrifying just because we interpret it in the light of what is more awful, viz. the sinful, fallen state of man; it moves us so strongly not for what it is in itself—as such it is only a passing phenomenon, without any moral constitution or connection—but because it is a voice rising up from the depths of depraved human life. A beautiful work of art impresses, pleases us, but in order to do so we must be in communication, in harmony, with the idea of beauty in the light and power of which only it can be a living thing.

To our understanding Dr. Newman allows general terms to be expressive only of notions, and not of deeper realities than individual or single things. How can he maintain that "all things that are, are units, and all common names are merely notional?" Does he mean to say that U. S. Grant as president is a reality, but the term president expresses only a diluted and starved abstraction? If so, he uses the merest deception. Of the two we should say the office is more real, of greater significance, than the man. True the office separated from the man is an abstraction, but united, or concrete, in the man, it is that which constitutes him what he is. A beautiful painting is a real thing in Dr. Newman's opinion, and the idea of beauty

an abstraction; but the idea of beauty is more real than the painting, for it lives in all beautiful works of art, while this one painting may be destroyed. No; single things, units, are not the only things that are. The genus is more than the individual, the general than the particular. Law as a generality is more than any single statute. "Real apprehension, then, may be pronounced stronger than notional, because *things*, which are its objects, are confessedly more impressive and effective than *notions*, which are the objects of notional." Clearly in his view all generals are merely notions.

What he calls notions, or abstractions, are the data of reason. Reason is the faculty or department of our nature which apprehends necessary and universal ideas, in the light of which only the process of the discursive faculty, the understanding, can be of any meaning. The fact that the general can reach us only in the concrete does not justify by any means the expressions our author uses. He denies all existence to the general except as notion. This general false theory comes out, again, where he treats of what he calls presumption, which he classes under notional assent. "Sometimes we trust in our power of reasoning and memory, that is, our implicit assent to their telling truly, is treated as a first principle; but we cannot properly be said to have any trust in them as faculties. At most we trust in particular acts of memory and reasoning. We are sure there was a yesterday, and that we did this or that in it; we are sure that three times six is eighteen, and that the diagonal of a square is longer than the side. So far as this we may be said to trust the mental act, by which the object of our assent is verified; *but, in doing so, we imply no recognition of a general power or faculty, or of any capability or affection of our minds, over and above the particular act.* We know indeed that we have a faculty by which we remember, as we know that we have a faculty by which we breathe; but we gain this knowledge by abstraction or inference from its particular acts, not by direct experience."

Now we grant that our knowledge *by experience* is a knowledge only of the particular, but we deny that all

knowledge of what is general comes only by abstraction or inference. On the other hand we affirm that we assent to the general by the intuitions of reason, and this assent precedes the knowledge of experience, or at least is so in the knowledge of experience that without it experience would have no meaning. Our consciousness of an outward world lies at the basis of all our experience of that world in coming in contact with particular things through the senses. So, too, Descartes assented to his own existence before he said, I think. His *ergo sum*, which he regarded as an inference, lay already in the premise, *cogito*, for he could not say I think, without saying at the same time I *am* thinking, in which propositions he already asserts his existence.

Dr. Newman denies that the proposition, "things exist external to ourselves," is a first principle, and one of universal reception. He maintains that we come to it by an inductive process. Hence he calls it a notional proposition, and assent to it merely notional, whereas assent to the existence of a stick or a tree that confronts our sense is real assent. In the same way he makes the expressions "There is a right and a wrong," "a true and a false," "a just and an unjust," "a beautiful and a deformed," abstractions to which we give a notional assent *in consequence* of our particular experience of qualities in the concrete, to which we give a real assent. If he had said that our particular experiences are the *condition* of awakening our consciousness of right and wrong, or the sight of a beautiful object the condition of awakening the idea of the beautiful which we possess innately, we could agree with him. Or if he had said, the idea of the beautiful authenticates its presence and power in the concrete, we could adopt the statement. But he seems to us to deny the reality of any such objective ideas, except as notions of the mind formed empirically. To this we demur. So, too, he calls belief in causation a presumption, which he argues (pp. 63 and 64) comes by experience and is only notional. He denies the necessary uniformity in the action of the laws of nature. "Nor indeed, has it yet been proved, nor ought it to be assumed even, that the law of ve-

locity of falling bodies on the earth is invariable in its operation; for that again is only an instance of the general proposition, which is the very thesis in debate." Now it is true that by induction we can never establish the fact that all bodies, by the operation of the law of gravitation, will fall to the earth, for experience can never measure all possible facts in the case, but the idea of law does not come from induction or experience. Experience only leads to its discovery. Without an idea or sense of an economy of nature as under the control of universal and necessary laws, we can get no proper idea of a miracle; for a miracle is not merely an exception to the course of facts in nature, as though the same divine will which causes a stone to fall to the earth now exerts itself directly to make it fly upwards. The true idea of a miracle allows the full force of the laws or economy of nature, but sees the incoming of another and higher economy, which consists, not in single acts of the divine will, but in the operation of higher laws standing in that economy.

To our mind Dr. Newman's book seems to make a divorce between the world which is for thought and the world for sense, making the latter a real world and the former a notional world, so far at least as our assents are concerned. Individual things address the senses, they are real, and to propositions into which they enter a real assent is given; but when we come to deal with what is general we are out of the region of reality, and in the world of notions. But what he calls the world of notions and the world of single things are one and the same world, and not two. Ideas of design, general laws, genera and species, these are the real living powers of which the outward and the visible are the shrine, and our assent to the latter carries with it also an apprehension of the former. Not, it may be, with an intellectual comprehension. Many an uneducated man feels the presence and power of beauty in a beautiful object, even though he may never have learned to distinguish here between the idea and the visible presentation. But it is one world for him, and not two. The intuitions of the reason lie back both of the activities of the sense and of

the understanding, and in these intuitions they find their true unity.

This difficulty we feel as we read on through the beautiful and forcible chapters on Religious Assents, especially on the Belief in the Holy Trinity. He sums up thus: "Religion has to do with the real, and the real is the particular; theology has to do with what is notional, and the notional is the general and systematic. Hence theology has to do with the dogma of the Holy Trinity as a whole made up of many propositions; but religion has to do with each of those separate propositions which compose it, and lives and thrives in the contemplation of them. In them it finds the motives for devotion and faithful obedience; while theology on the other hand forms and protects them by virtue of its function of regarding them, not merely one by one, but as a system of truth."

With the distinction drawn between religion and theology in the main we can agree. Theology is to revelation what science is to the natural world. The supernatural world addresses our religious nature directly, as the natural world addresses us through the senses, and not as it reaches us in science. All this we can see. The Holy Trinity as a dogma for theology, is something different from the Holy Trinity as it confronts us for our reverence and worship. But must not the objective contents of the dogma of the Trinity for thought, be the same as the objective reality of the Trinity for faith? Must not our theology of the Holy Trinity agree with our faith in the same? For the purpose of religion, it is not indeed necessary that the individual should have in his mind the explanation or understanding of the dogma as contained in theology. But religion must find the same objective contents for faith that theology finds for thought. We are confronted in this Holy mystery with the Trinity of persons. The Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Ghost is God. But this is not the whole of the reality in the mystery of the Trinity. There is also the unity of essence, that in which they are one. This is the one nature of the Godhead, as humanity is the one nature in all

men.* I do not mean that this analogy explains the mystery of the unity in essence of the Godhead, but I introduce it because nominalism and conceptualism must deny the objective reality of the divine essence or nature, just as they deny the objective entity of human nature. Dr. Newman says that the mystery of the Trinity, as such, is not the direct object of real or religious apprehension, but only the separate propositions, each by itself, of which the dogma is composed. The particulars, that is the persons, are real, the general, that is the essence, is notional. So we understand him. But will not this land us in that tri-theism which was charged upon the nominalists in the middle ages? It was indeed charged upon realism that in holding to the objective entity of the general, the essence, we would have a fourth element, but this difficulty is avoided by holding that the same divine essence is not before, *universalis ante rem*, nor out of, the three persons, but in them according to the formula, *universalis in re*. Yet because the divine essence is only in three persons, it does not follow that it is only a notion, or a generalization of the mind.

"He" (God) "at once is Father, is Son, is Holy Ghost, each of whom is that One Personal God in the fulness of His being and attributes." So far we agree, but we are not so clear when he adds, "so that the Father is all that is meant by the word 'God,' as if we knew nothing of Son or of Spirit; and in like manner the Son and the Spirit are each by Himself all that is meant by the word, as if the Other and the Father were unknown." We cannot see how the Trinity of

* We anticipate here a patently weak objection of the Princeton Review where it argues, that to apply this analogy of the unity of the human race with a plurality of persons to the Trinity is to divest the Trinity of all mystery. It says, "The unity of essence and plurality of persons is precisely that which exists among men, and there is no more that is incomprehensible in it than in the plurality of human persons having a common humanity. Is this all the mystery of the Trinity?" We answer, no; this is not all. It is only an analogy. All organic unities are analogies, reflections of that highest of all unities, the unity of the Holy Trinity, but because we refer to them as analogies, does it follow that we allow no higher mystery in the one than in the other? Besides we think the author of the above quotation has not yet fathomed the meaning of the true unity of the race, if he imagines that it presents nothing mysterious for our apprehension.

persons can be any more separated from the unity of essence for faith than for knowledge. Our worship must be of the One in Three, and of the Three in One, and the One here, while it is not in any sense a fourth person, is yet as real as the Three. We may misunderstand Dr. Newman, but if he builds his explanation of the Trinity on either nominalism or conceptualism, as he seems to us to do, in our opinion he must become involved in error. One of the weaknesses, or faults, of much of the theology of our day, we may add while we are on this part of our subject, lies just in its departure from the logic of faith. Because theology is not religion, the knowledge of revelation not faith in what is revealed, it seems to be imagined that the two need not necessarily follow the same order. Hence our modern theologies make it a matter of small account that they depart from the order of the Creed, as though the revelation could properly be understood in a different order than that in which it is apprehended by faith. The Christological principle of the Creed must be also the principle for all true theology. So the older theologians proceeded. But now it is thought that the theology can commence with some merely theistic conception, and so arrange a new and different order from that laid down in the Creed. And the practical effect of all this is an undervaluing of theology, and then a senseless tirade against it, because it is not religion. And hence it comes, too, that theological or doctrinal preaching is decried, and the life of whole denominations becomes feeble and faltering because it has no earnest theology.

Leaving now any further notice of Dr. Newman's book, which we have referred to only in so far as it touches on our general subject, let us consider some other points in theology with which the doctrine of realism has to do.

The true nature and bearing of the fall, in its relation to the race, can be properly understood only as we attribute proper substantiality to that in which the unity of the race consists. According to the doctrine of realism, as already stated in this article, humanity is an entity, a generality which constitutes the *genus homo*, and not a mere notion, obtained from a process

of abstraction. The general life, and the individual, were united in Adam; he was in one sense a universal man, including in himself potentially all the individuals who were to descend from him; and he was also an individual like other members of the human family. When he fell, humanity fell, and human nature became corrupt in this its fountain head. When we say, therefore, man is fallen, the term man expresses not an abstract generality, not a generality obtained empirically, for it includes not only all men that have been and are, but all that are possible. It is only on this hypothesis that we can feel assured that all born from Adam are and will be sinful as he was sinful.

The *Princeton Review* for April, of the present year, contains an article in which an effort is made to controvert this doctrine of the derivation of the fall of the race from Adam's first sin. The article admits that there is an organic or vital connection of the race with Adam. "This all admit, who admit that the race is descended from him by ordinary generation." The federal school do not hold the race to be a "sand-heap," or embrace any "atomistic conception of its unity." And yet in a subsequent paragraph the article adopts the theory of nominalism, and rejects that of realism. It says, referring to Lange's Commentary on Romans, "Dr. Schaff speaks of denying the unity of the race in the realistic sense," "from nominalistic premises, according to which the general conceptions are mere names, not things—subjective abstractions, not objective realities. Such nominalism as this is not the only alternative to realism. The general conceptions which represent the resembling qualities of the race, represent real qualities which belong to man, and not mere names. They stand not for fictions, but realities; not however, the reality of philosophic realism, or the numerical oneness of substance of the descendants of Adam or of all the individuals of any class."

This sort of realistic nominalism leaves us, however, without any true unity of the race. If the general term humanity designates the resembling qualities of the race, we cannot stop here, but we must seek to know the cause of this similarity in different individuals, and we are thus led back to the common

source and the common life. These resemblances are not themselves the true unity of the organism, but by observing them we discover that unity in the generic law which holds all the parts or members of the organism in unity. This is the generality, and this is a real objective entity, existing, however, only in the parts or members.

The article then proceeds to give certain "insuperable objections," to the realistic view of the fall in its relation to the race, which we shall briefly notice. They are as follows:

1. "It directly contradicts the intuitive convictions and normal consciousness of the human mind."

What is meant here is that men do not feel that their acts of sin are identical with Adam's act, that the act of the parent is the act of his child. This is true, but the unity of the race lies not in an act, nor in personal, conscious existence, but in the nature or life which is deeper than these. Now we believe "the intuitive convictions and normal consciousness of the human mind" testify to this oneness of nature, as that in which the fall has reality for each person. Each one feels a personal responsibility for his own acts, but he feels also that these acts stand in a fallen nature which is one with that of Adam. This appeal, however, can decide neither one way nor the other, when once there is a difference as to what the intuitive convictions of the mind are. We leave it as deciding nothing for or against.

2. "As Turretin observes, on this theory all the acts of Adam are ours just as much as his first sin. They are the acts of the *genus homo*, a 'single and simple essence,' common to him and all his posterity. The 'one offence,' or first sin to which the Scriptures and the Church attribute the fall of the race, has no more to do with it than any other sin, except that it is chronologically first in the series of his transgressions. All his other sins are as much those of generic humanity, and as much corrupt it, as this. Not only so, but if all our race have in them a 'generic humanity' not merely of resembling qualities and a common origin, but which is one numerical substance pervading all, whereby the act of the first man is the

act of all, then not only are all his acts the acts of every other man, but the acts of each and every man are the acts of each and every other man. The merit and demerit of each belong to all. All personal identity and responsibility are utterly confounded and vacated."

We have given the whole paragraph containing this objection. It seems to us to be exceedingly weak. It does not seem to consider that the first act of disobedience on the part of our first parents was a determining act, and in this respect unlike all other acts. Did not the writer consider that the first act by which, even now, virtue falls, determines the character, and that subsequent commissions of sin are only the same act continued? All men are partakers in the first act of transgression, not consciously or directly, but mediately through that common nature in which they are one. Hence the act which determined the nature was unique. All subsequent acts are fruits of that first act, and hence cannot, in the nature of the case, be of equal significance.

But we are willing to concede that there is a deep sense in which the sin of each member of the human race even now is the sin of every other. There is a community of sin and guilt, because the root of all sin is in each one, and where a crime is committed every one feels that he has a share in it, because in his heart naturally the same sin exists in germ. All true penitence concedes that the repentance is not for individual acts of sin only, but for sin in its generic character as including all acts of transgression. Hence no one can say to his brother, I am naturally better than thou. Only in this view can we see how it was possible for Christ to take upon Himself the sins of the whole world. He did this by taking upon Him sin and guilt as a whole, not as separate acts of transgression. Now, as the first sin was thus generic in its character, it is clear that it included all that followed, and to partake in that included participation also in all that followed, but only mediately through that first transgression. This objection seems to us so weak, and the refutation so clear, that we deem it unnecessary to dwell upon it further.

3. "The (realistic) theory fails to furnish the relief in regard to the fall of the race in Adam's fall, for which it is adduced. For, as we have seen, they assert that there was no 'conscious' or 'personal' 'participation' of Adam's posterity in his sin. This would imply that they 'existed before they existed.' How a 'participation' which was neither conscious nor personal, and before actual existence infers blame or guilt in them for Adam's first sin, or accounts for its imputation to them as a ground of punishment, unless on account of some special constitution or covenant constituting him their representative, we cannot understand, nor do we believe the unsophisticated human intellect can understand it."

To which we reply, that men do exist as unconscious beings before they exist as conscious beings. Who will deny this? The actual sins of every individual are but the outgrowth of original sin, or of a sinful nature, which precedes conscious existence. *Persona corrumpit naturam, natura corrumpit personam*. There is no more contradiction in holding that personal sins grow out of a single nature in the same person, which we know to be a fact, than there is in holding that they grow out of the depraved nature of our first parents.

4. "The last objection which we shall now stop to specify, is that arising from the whole parallelism between the condemnation of the race through Adam's sin, and the justification of believers through the righteousness of Christ. The realistic scheme imputes the sin of Adam because of our literal and real participation in it. In like manner, then, we must be justified by Christ's righteousness, because it is literally ours—because we have such a oneness with Him that we really have performed those acts of obedience which He has performed."

We accept the inference, for we believe this is the only explanation of justification which relieves it of that fiction by which God is made to pronounce those justified who are not justified in fact. The outward imputation theory here is just as obnoxious as the outward imputation of sin. This brings us to another dogma of theology upon which the doctrine of realism has an important bearing.

In the relation of the believer to Christ there is also a generic and an individual, personal, life. The parallel with our relation to Adam is recognized by our Saviour, where He compares the second birth to the first. As in natural birth these two factors, the general or generic and the individual, are united, so also in the birth from above. The analogy of the vine and the branches, and of the head and the members, is used also, not surely to have us infer that the union of Christ and His people is less real, is less a life-union, than that which holds in these analogies from nature, but rather that it is more real, and that the union holds here in that life which is the basis and source of all other life.

The forms of expression employed by the Reformers seem to favor the forensic view of imputation, because they were opposing the error of the Romanists, who give to works a share in the justification of the sinner; but interpreted in the light of their other teachings these expressions clearly allow the vital union with Christ as included in the sinner's justification. Dr. Forbes, in his valuable commentary on Romans, quotes even from Owen on Justification to this effect: "When God doth justify the ungodly on account of the righteousness imputed unto him, he doth at the same instant, by the power of His grace, make him inherently and subjectively righteous or holy." And so very truly Dr. Forbes himself remarks: "Having been condemned by the one transgression of Adam, we are in like manner justified by the one righteousness of Christ. But this in no merely outward way, or by a legal figment, but involving the realities of 'Sin' and 'Righteousness,' as affecting inwardly those on whom the judicial sentences have passed."

The life of Christ, as including our redeemed and glorified humanity, is here the true font and germ of all true life in the believer. And upon the reality of this general life depends the reality of all individual Christian life in the believer.

It is a futile objection to this that the *Princeton Review*, and Dr. Hodge on the Atonement, urge, when they say that "thus we are justified by inherent righteousness, not solely by

another's righteousness, imputed to us and received by faith alone." The righteousness of the believer here is the righteousness of Christ. All allow that it has become the believer's in some sense; the only difference is whether we shall call it his by an imputation which implies a fiction in the divine mind, or by an imputation which makes the divine judgment at the same time an act in deed and in truth.

Passing on we refer yet briefly to the application of this same theory in its bearing on the doctrine of the Church. As an article of Faith the idea, or the ideal Church, must be felt to lie back of that which is visible in the particular members. No induction, or process of abstraction, can give us what is set forth in the Creed as the Holy Catholic Church. The Church is not a mere name, having no corresponding real contents; it is not merely a conception of the mind, but in its ideal character it is a most glorious reality, including divine and heavenly powers, revealing their presence in that which is visible and temporal. Only in this view is it the mystery for faith which is set before us in the New Testament. Ideally it is complete, carrying in it the powers of the world to come, the æon of æons, world without end. In its actual state, however, it never fully realizes the full measure of its life, until the final glorification takes place, when the earthly shall be fully transformed into the heavenly.

Now take the other view. Say that the only reality in the Church is the individual members in their separate capacity. Get the idea of their unity by their being associated in congregation or denomination, let "the general conception represent the resembling qualities of the members, call these qualities real qualities which belong to Christians, and not mere names," according to the *Princeton Review*, and how poor and lean the conception! how infinitely short it falls of the view of the Church, as the Lamb's Bride, the Body of Christ, presented in the New Testament and believed on in all ages as the *Holy Catholic Church*. Here we have no mystery for faith. There may be mystery in the character of the individual Christians

who compose it, but the communion as such is no mystery, but only an empirical abstraction.

We have referred thus briefly to these several points of Christian doctrine, because the whole subject is now being treated at length in a series of articles in this REVIEW on *Organic Redemption*, by Dr. S. H. Giesy.

Let us not be misunderstood now, as though we are making the interpretation of the glorious realities of faith depend upon a philosophical doctrine. Let no one say, your theology rests on your philosophy, your faith on the weak foundation of reason. Such an inference would be an entire misunderstanding of our whole article. Let all philosophical theories fall to the ground and perish, and the verities of faith still remain. Surely the Holy Trinity is believed in, and the Headship of Christ, and the Holy Catholic Church, and the fall is realized and felt as a terrible world-fact, by millions who have never heard of realism or nominalism, as philosophical doctrines or theories. All this may be in the sphere of religion. In the science of theology it is different. Here the very idea of science implies an order of thought. Our philosophy will necessarily give shape and coloring to our theology. The natural and the supernatural are related to each other in such way, that the one is the picture of the other. In the world of nature we have analogies of the supernatural world.

It is already something that confessedly the greatest philosophic mind of ancient times, and we are not sure but that we may say, of all times, the divine Plato, with only the light of nature, so interpreted the creation of God. And with him essentially agreed the greatest dialectician of ancient, if not of all times, Aristotle. Both were less than the least in Judaism, and, much more, in Christianity, where the true light after which they were seeking shines in its mid-day splendor. It is undeniable, however, that on the plane of mere reason, these ancient intellectual giants, the exponents of the highest natural civilization, attained a degree of intellectual culture, which, as to its form, has, perhaps, never been excelled. Apart from the new contents for thought which Christianity has brought into

the world, we are inclined to doubt whether anything new has been brought forward in logic or philosophy since Plato and Aristotle. Be this as it may, however, it is something, that a man like Plato looked at the world as the outward shrine of invisible patterns and powers, which constituted its true reality. And we may at least inquire whether it was not through the highest exercise, not merely of the understanding, but, of reason, which holds by intuition general and universal ideas, that Plato, the world's seer, beheld the corresponding objective realities of the creation. He could, indeed, go no further. He could not relegate these ideas to the Eternal Logos, by whom the worlds were made—for He had not yet come in His incarnation; but surely it was the glorious reflection of the coming heavenly kingdom which he beheld, by the light of reason, in the natural creation.

Why should not this natural creation, in the way he looked at it, be for us the analogy of the supernatural order to which we now direct the eye of faith? As by the intuitions of reason we grasp the universal and necessary ideas that are figured to us in the passing phenomena of the visible world, so by faith we lay hold of the glorious mysteries of the supernatural world, as they reach us in the visible forms of Christianity.

Philosophic thinking, as we have seen, is necessary to the study of theology. How important that it should be deeply spiritual, and not a mere flat and shallow empiricism. And when we consider, moreover, that a shallow or false theology reacts again on religion itself, we may be able to see how it is that philosophy becomes invested with such high importance.

ART. VI.—FAITH IN CREATION.

BY REV. S. N. CALLENDER, A. M., GREENCASTLE, PA.

THE capital error which has vitiated much of the thinking of philosophers on the doctrine of Creation, consists in taking a datum of Reason, instead of a postulate of Faith for its point of departure. For a synthetical view of this doctrine, pure reason can in no possibility furnish a sufficient base principle. And it is for precisely this reason, that the origin of the universe has in all ages, been a puzzle to speculative thinkers. The whole edifice of ancient philosophy is a sad monument of this fact. But in later modern times, one would suppose that Kant's definition of the powers and limits of pure reason, would have put his successors upon their guard upon this point, and saved them from falling, on the one hand, into the abyss of *nihilism*, or on the other, into the more specious, and so more dangerous error of *pantheism*. Besides these two forms of error upon this subject, we may mention the old Persian doctrine of *dualism*; affirming the duplex origin of the world, as the result of the good principle of light, and the evil principle of darkness. But never with truth, has speculation been able to say, by *reason*, we understand that the worlds were *created*.

We are well aware that the faith-principle has been by some, ruled out of the field of speculative philosophy as insufficient for cognitive certainty. But it ought to be seen by this time, that this is to deny to man, altogether the power of knowing the supernatural.

A cognition, is the comprehension of the content of an intuition, whether objective or subjective, in the innate idea of reason, which idea is drawn into the light of consciousness by this intuition as an occasion. Reason is not a perceptive faculty beyond

the sphere of its own principal or ideal contents. These it can cognize only however, as just said, upon occasion of the presentation of an object through the medium of the subordinate faculties, apprehended primarily by that one which is perceptive of the objective. But beyond its own principal contents, its knowledge cannot go. No intuition, without which, as occasion, the ideas of reason can never emerge into consciousness, can ever serve to *generate* an idea which is not creatively contained in reason. Locke's doctrine upon this subject has been sufficiently exploded, as well by criticism, as by the fearful results to which it has been developed. If then an object can be cognized, it is only as, *a priori*, contained in its principle in reason.

If then the doctrine of creation be a postulate of reason, it must lie embosomed in reason as a constructive principle, which will become patent to consciousness, upon occasion of the data of the intuition of sense. This, we take it, is the meaning of O. A. Brownson, when in his introduction to *Balmes' Fundamental Philosophy* he affirms that the *creative act* is intuitive. But do we find this to be empirically true? Is it the universal testimony of the human consciousness, that the world was created, that is *made*? Reason indeed teaches that there must be a *first cause*. But it does not, and cannot teach the *modus* of the relation of the effect to the cause.

The consciousness of dependence, the sense of moral obligation awakens man to the idea of God. Natural religion is able to postulate a God. But who or what that God is, is to the speculative reason, to this day a confounding riddle—an unknown God. But the idea of a God being given, have we any testimony of consciousness, or datum of reason, by which we can be assured that creation is a free act of the divine will, rather than the pantheistic notion of an emanation or procession? Can reason demonstrate that God is not *Absolute Subject*, or *Absolute Substance*, or *Absolute Mind*, and that nature is not the legitimate development of the one or the other? This it could unquestionably do, did the doctrine of creation exist as an idea in reason. But furthermore, the doctrine that God

created the universe, and that it did not emanate from or develop out of His being, is not in fact a principle or an idea at all. It is a question of fact. The principle involved in the fact is, a final cause—that God is the cause of all things. But how He as cause produced the effect, is not involved in the principle.

All this will be sufficiently plain, if we for a moment consider the relation of reason as a cognitive faculty, to the order of nature on the one hand, and to the supernatural on the other. Man is a microcosm; comprehending in himself the whole order of nature, in the form of idea. Were not this the case, it would even be impossible for him to know the world or any part of it. His reason as the ultimate cognitive faculty is the *locus principiorum*—the repository of ideas, in the light of which the objective world comes to its proper significance. It is not simply a mirror in which it is reflected, but the focus of intellectual light which illuminates the object, and apprehends it in its true meaning. Reason may be said then to be the comprehensive measure of nature; that is, for man there is nothing contained in nature, which is not equally contained in reason; the one in the form of objective reality, the other in the form of idea—the one complementary to the other. If then there are contents in objective nature, which are not ideally contained in reason, the human mind can never cognize them; and if on the other hand there is a given cognition in the mind, which is not contained validly in objective nature, we must necessarily conclude that it belongs to another sphere, viz. the supernatural.

The organ for the apprehension of the objective on the side of the natural, is sense; the contents of which are colligated by the understanding, into a conception or notion, and by it brought into the sphere of the containing idea of reason. The intuition of sense then furnishes the matter of cognition, while the understanding and reason furnish the form, and comprehending idea. Not however as mere empty forms. For form and principle are equally as essential to the reality of the objective, as they are to the subjective apprehension. The voice of

later criticism has pronounced very decisively against Kant, upon this point, who makes our subjective activities *purely* formal, and holds these quite as authoritative for objective validity in their sphere, as are the intuitions of sense, in its sphere. The cognitions of reason then are conditioned by the intuitions of sense as their occasion, as well as their matter, and without these they could never have emerged into consciousness. But on the other hand, these intuitions of sense can never furnish *form* for our cognitions, they can only serve to draw into the light of consciousness the complementary forms which are already ideally contained in reason. Unless then the doctrine of creation exists as a constructive principle or idea, creatively in the constitution of the human spirit, no intuition of sense could ever become the occasion of its evolution into the light of consciousness, and thus become a cognition. That such is not the case, we think is now sufficiently plain.

But the cognitions of reason are not confined to the sphere of the natural. This they would be, were its ideas limited by nature, and a knowledge of the supernatural would then be an absolute impossibility. But these ideas being in themselves necessary and universal, they transcend the sphere of the natural, and are capable of receiving contents from the sphere of the supernatural. But this only through the medium of a perceptive faculty. Such a faculty we find in faith. Faith is the sense for the supernatural, "the evidence of things not seen." Here we discern the possibility of a revelation,—the possibility for man to know the wondrous facts of creation and redemption. We must therefore hold it to be a mistake, when faith is ruled out of the domain of philosophy, on the ground of its not being sufficient for cognitive certainty.

But is it true that the intuition of sense is the only mean by which the objective is made the matter of cognition even in the natural order? Will it be affirmed that our knowledge of the universe is limited to that which we have seen and touched? Or in other words, that all of the objective which we have not intuited through sensation and perception, must be said to be unknown to us? Then indeed are our cognitions comprehended

within narrow limits. What relation, do all objects and things which lie outside of the range of our sense intuitions, and of which we have learned from the words and writings of others, sustain to our understanding and reason? Can we be said to be ignorant of them? Do we not *know* them? True not in the sense that we know through sense intuitions. But still have we not a cognition of them which is sufficient for rational certainty? It will not suffice to say that they are for us mere empty forms of thought without objective contents. How do I know that the city of St. Petersburg has an existence? I have never had a sense perception of it, and can it be said now that I have no knowledge of its existence, or that the knowledge I may have of it, is any less potent for certainty than if I had seen it? What I know of its existence may be denominated a faith-cognition. Not a mere supposition or persuasion which can furnish no solid ground for the conviction of certainty, but such a firm assurance, which could not be added to by a sense-perception. Sir Wm. Hamilton, following the lead of some of the old scholastics, has clearly pointed out the fact that there are two kinds of knowledge; the immediate and the mediate.* The first, sense cognition; the second, cognition through representation by memory or the imagination; and we may add without overreaching his conception, by faith. For by this last is the representation presented to the percipient mind, and equally furnishes the matter of thought.

As already intimated, a cognition consists of two elements, the form, and the contents or matter. If either element be wanting, it can never be sufficient for objective validity. Now if we have no other faculty to furnish matter for our cognitions than sense, then must sense furnish contents for all our knowledge of the supernatural; or, the alternative is, that this knowledge, if indeed it is entitled to be called knowledge at all, is merely formal. Take for instance the divine attribute of Omnipotence. Can we ever reach that conception by generalization? Let us see. Reason furnishes the idea of a final cause,

* *Lectures on Metaphysics*, pp. 313 and Seq.

which it denominates God. We now consider the fact of nature around and above us. We gather it all into our sense perception. We discern in each effect the monument of power as efficient in its cause, and thus we proceed inductively from effect to cause indefinitely, until arrested by reason's postulate of a final cause. In all this process we have the notion of power growing and enlarging at every step, until at last, it attains to indefinite proportions. But is this the conception of *infinite* power? Is this omnipotence? Far from it. This is but a datum of the *understanding*, and this faculty can never attain the infinite.* The most it can predicate of divine power is, that it is *indefinite*, but there is an immeasurable abyss between the *indefinite* and the *infinite*. So that so far as sense-perception is concerned, the conception of omnipotence is without contents, and cannot be sufficient for objective validity. But with faith-perception it is different. The *idea* is creatively lodged in reason; here we have the form, else could the human mind never cognize it, and for matter we have it in the sphere of the supernatural, presented by revelation and intuited by faith. And for faith it is as potent for rational certainty, as it could possibly be did it fall in the category of sense.

To make this sufficiently manifest, let any one appeal to the teaching of consciousness. Let him call to mind any fact or object of which he has but a faith-cognition. It was testimony which furnished him the material out of which the understanding constructed the conception or image. But how does he know that this is not empty—a pure fancy? If the testimony was of such a character as to work faith in him, then has he that which carries the conviction of objective validity. It is faith that does this, not the testimony, for testimony is wholly inefficient in this regard, up to the point of working faith. Faith then is the evidence of things not seen, as well in the na-

* Had Sir Wm. Hamilton and his disciple Mansell confined their doctrine to the powers of the understanding, they might with justice have denied the cogitability of the infinite, but not so as applied to the reason. Reason is the faculty for the infinite, and not subject to the conditions of time and space.

tural order as in the supernatural. And that such faith-cognition is as cogent for certainty as sense-cognition, let this person bring the object under the intuition of sense, and see whether certainty has become a particle more certain. For me to see the city of St. Petersburg, while it would change the kind of knowledge I have of its existence, it could not add aught to the weight of certainty.

Now the same holds true of the supernatural order. Reason comprehends within itself those necessary and universal ideas, which, transcending on all hands the sphere of the natural, reach out into the supernatural, make it possible for the human spirit to commune with and know it. All truth then beyond the limits of the natural order, can be presented to reason only in the form of revelation, and to the extent that revelation works faith and is apprehended by it, do its teachings become *for it* objective realities, and thus fully competent for certainty. If then we would not deny the possibility of knowing the supernatural, as well also as the natural itself, beyond the sphere of sense-perceptions, we must hold that it is an error to discard the faith-principle from philosophy as incompetent for certainty.

From this we are able to see why the author of the inspired cosmogony did not commence with the declarations, There is a God, or Every effect must have a cause, or Every phenomenon has an underlying substance. No, His commission was not to teach science, and therefore he assumed all these data of the natural reason. But it was His office to reveal truths which lay back of, and beyond the sphere of the natural. And therefore His first word was what natural reason could never have affirmed; "In the beginning God *created* the heavens and the earth."

The fullness of time has then certainly come, when philosophers should recognize the fact that no datum of reason can serve as a key to unlock the mystery of creation;—that whether grasping the emptiest *a priori* idea and proceeding synthetically and deductively, or commencing with the concrete particular, and proceeding analytically by induction and generaliza-

tion, logic is wholly impotent for the resolution of the question. The history of philosophy from the beginning articulates no lesson more distinctly than just this. The modus of the origin of the universe is a question of historical fact, and comes to no illustration in its projection. It lies back of the macrocosm, and must equally so lie back of the human microcosm. It lies embosomed in the mysteries of the supernatural order, and human reason can know it at all, only as it is revealed to faith. For as already said, reason can cognize only on occasion of the intuitions of the perceptive or matter-furnishing faculties. This is true in the order of nature, for if we had no perceptive faculties, we would forever be ignorant of the objective existence of nature. It is equally true in the order of the supernatural. Here faith is the perceptive, intuitive faculty, and it is in its own sphere, what sense is in its sphere. And in both cases must the intuition be in accord with, that is it dare never contradict the universal and necessary ideas of reason. Otherwise it cannot be truth for the human spirit.*

* It will be borne in mind that this is affirmed of *reason*, not of the *understanding*. The conclusions of the discursive faculty are not to be taken as the measure of truth, but the universal and necessary ideas of objective reason are.

ART. VII.—CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS IN LIFE.*

BY REV. J. H. DUBBS, A. M., POTTSTOWN, PA.

FELLOW ALUMNI!

Is it not delightful to meet again at the place where we once enjoyed so many pleasant hours? Scenes arise before our mind's eye so roseate and beautiful that it seems impossible that such a *fata morgana* should ever have been real. Do you, for instance, remember what vague anticipations we once entertained with reference to just such occasions as the one which brings us together to-night, and how heartily we sang:

"When we come again together
Vigintennial to pass,
Wives and children all included,
Won't we have an uproarious class?"

Well! here we are—wives and children all included—but, somehow or other, the classes do not seem to be so "*uproarious*" after all. Still, we feel to-night, as though we would gladly sing the good old song again, if we had companions of our own age to keep us in countenance. "Of our own age." There! The words have unwittingly escaped us. Is it possible that we are no longer boys? Can it be that we are growing old—that time is plowing furrows of care on our brows, and that strands of silver are finding their way over our temples? It is even so. The world no longer calls us boys. The golden time has passed, never to return; but when we visit Alma Mater we *will* be boys, whatever the wicked world may say!

Is it taking too great a liberty to remind the venerable President of this institution that, three years ago, he told us,

* An Address delivered before the Alumni Association of Franklin and Marshall College, on Wednesday Evening, June 29th, 1870. Published at the request of the Association.

that with him "it is an easy illusion to think of us still as boys, and thus almost to forget the present in the past?" We are glad to remember these words of affection, and are heartily willing to continue *boys* so long as he remains OUR FATHER.

When we meet again on Commencement Day after long years of absence, we sometimes imagine we hear our Alma Mater asking us: "Boys, what have you been doing all this time? Have you realized the dreams of your youth? What new libation do you offer at my shrine?"

"Alas! mother," we mournfully reply, "we have little or nothing to bring you. We have made no great discoveries; in fact, it does not seem as though there were a single Newton or Leibnitz among us. We had poets once—great men they seemed to us before their beards were grown—whose poetry appeared to be so full of genuine inspiration that we could not distinguish it from that of the greatest masters of verse. Somehow or other—it is a mystery which we cannot understand—they have become as mute as the harp of Tara. Their Pegasus must have been a lame jade after all. Our incipient statesmen too, have disappeared, and those of our band who are now climbing the ladder of political preferment are generally the quiet, hard-working fellows, of whom we had never expected that they would supplant our greatest orators. We cannot deny that there are *some* philosophers among us; but why should we always insist on bringing our peck of coals to New Castle?"

In short, we are fain to confess, that we have become plain, humdrum, practical men, trudging over the highways and by-ways of daily life in a way that to the ambitious undergraduate would appear insupportably monotonous. We have won no laurels; we are not famous; and the number even of those who have achieved eminence is small indeed. Perhaps fortunately for ourselves, we have settled down to the conclusion that these things, in themselves considered, are of very little account. We pray you do not remind us of the fox and the grapes. We are in earnest. It really matters very little whether or not our names be trumpeted by noisy fame—whether they be forgotten

when we are gone, or remembered to be the subject of continued eulogy or obloquy. No one, certainly, could be more capable of estimating popular praise at its true value than the great Dr. Chalmers, and yet he says: "The only popularity worth aspiring after is a peaceful popularity—the popularity that is won in the bosom of families and at the side of death-beds. There is another, a high and far-sounding popularity which is indeed a most worthless article—felt by all who have it most to be greatly more oppressive than gratifying—a popularity of stare, and pressure, and a whole tribe of other annoyances which it brings around the person of its unfortunate victim, a popularity which rifles home of its sweets, and by elevating a man above his fellows places him in a region of desolation, where the intimacies of human fellowship are unfelt, and where he stands a conspicuous mark for the shafts of malice, and envy, and detraction—a popularity which, with its head among storms and its feet on the treacherous quicksands, has nothing to lull the agonies of its tottering existence but the hosannas of a drivelling generation." Success in life, then, is not necessarily fame or greatness. A man's life may be a great success, though he be hardly known beyond the little circle of his immediate acquaintances; and on the other hand it may be an utter failure, though his name and fame should resound through all the earth. The faithful pastor, the conscientious physician and the careful teacher, are more truly successful than some men of genius whom we might name, who while they possessed immortal powers never used them for the benefit of their fellow-men.

We may therefore define success in life to be *the highest order of usefulness*, in whatever condition it may have pleased Providence to place us. This is an object worth striving for—an ambition that has the approval of God and of all good men. To study hard to become well acquainted with our profession, whatever it may be—to toil over rugged paths from year to year, with the sole object of becoming as useful as possible to our fellow-men—this is a passion that differs as widely as day from night from that ambition whose sole object is per-

sonal aggrandizement. You toil patiently, and though at times you feel as though you were accomplishing nothing, yet you are at all times sustained by the consciousness that you are doing your duty. "What matters it," says a recent writer, "if the footprints of each traveler cannot be distinctly traced. The path is hardened and perfected over which we tread, and generations yet unborn shall bless the workers who have gone before them and hardened the track for their feet. A single wave may blot out my memory and my foot-prints from the earth. Yet I toil on, for I know that my feet, now weary and travel-soiled on time's rough shore, shall be strengthened by their toilsome marching, and that one day, as my Master before me trod the troubled waves of Galilee, I shall go forth upon the shoreless, boundless sea, untroubled though alone." While, therefore, it is foolish, if not wicked, to seek to achieve fame and greatness for their own sakes, it cannot, on the other hand be doubted that an earnest and persistent effort to be useful will in the end be properly appreciated. The success which attends your labors produces gratitude in the hearts of those whom you have benefited—you gain influence in the community and are treated with proper respect—and at last grow happy in the consciousness, that your studies and efforts have not been in vain; that you are, in the best sense of the word, a successful man.

We propose to devote the present hour to the consideration of some of

THE CONDITIONS OF SUCCESS IN LIFE.

You will anticipate me in the reverent acknowledgment, that we can do nothing without the blessing of the Almighty; that success, like every other blessing, must find its ultimate source in God. As we journey on in life we feel more and more that we ourselves are nothing; that unless the Almighty has chosen us to be instruments in the accomplishment of His great purposes, "it is in vain to rise up early and to sit up late." Nevertheless, there are certain subordinate conditions of success, which in fact are nothing but the instrumentalities through

which our Heavenly Father carries out His wise and glorious designs.

1. The first of these is, of course, the possession of the necessary talents—the original aptitude of the man. Every man has his work to do, and when it is well done it is honorable. All may be useful in their sphere, and every well-meant effort in this direction is worthy of the highest respect. It were well if the dignity of labor were universally acknowledged; if it were felt, that to toil in forests, to delve in mines, and to work in factories is proper employment for men, and that no man loses one jot or tittle of respectability by laboring with his hands for his daily bread. So much of a radical am I in this matter, that I hope when the ideal republic becomes actualized in this country it will be the universal custom of those who have achieved success and command the respect of their fellow-citizens, to take off their hats to the honest laborer, however humble he may be, while they pass by the bar-room lounge and the gentlemanly loafer unnoticed as unworthy of the regard of honest men. While, therefore, we acknowledge, that every one who labors to be useful is worthy of respect, it is equally certain that not every man is suited to the highest order of usefulness. The cobbler in the Arabian tale made but a sorry Sultan. You may change the diamond into a piece of charcoal, but chemistry knows no process for turning charcoal into diamonds. There may, indeed, be occasional instances when men of very ordinary abilities may be said to have greatness *thrust upon them*. By some mysterious Providence they have been placed in a position where a single touch of the finger is enough to move a mighty lever. A feeble hand may thus become an instrument in the accomplishment of immense results; and the unreasoning multitude at once places the fortunate mortal by the side of those who have performed similar work by herculean labor.

Nevertheless, though such things occasionally happen, the man who is constantly expecting them to “turn up” in his own case, should be gifted with the patience and hopefulness of Wilkins Micawber. In all ordinary cases we look for the

greatest results where we find the greatest powers. Notwithstanding all that art can do, he who would be really successful must have a more than ordinary degree of talent. It is of the man whom God has gifted with a profound and comprehensive intellect that we may reasonably expect that he will discover hidden treasures of knowledge or systematize those that have been already gathered by his illustrious predecessors. It is the orator who is possessed of the inborn gift of eloquence—which, if it be genuine, must spring from an active brain and a tender heart—whom we expect to thrill and sway multitudes in the pulpit or at the bar. The man who is not gifted with that mysterious second-sight that beholds truth clad in beauty everywhere in God's creation, that finds "sermons in stones and good in everything," will never be a genuine poet, though he be thoroughly versed in all the minutiae of versification.

In short, though it would be impossible to say what talents are essential to success, on account of the infinite variety of labor which we may be called upon to perform, it is certain, that those to whom God has granted the largest number of talents are those whom we generally recognize as our leaders, and who are therefore enabled to achieve the highest order of usefulness.

The man who possesses such natural abilities has received a high trust, which it is his duty to use conscientiously in the service of God and for the welfare of his fellow-men; while he who is compelled to walk, with Bunyan's Shepherd Boy in the "Valley of Humility," may comfort himself, if he be wise enough to know his deficiencies, with the reflection that he has escaped great responsibilities and dangers, and may be as happy as the greatest in the land if he will but labor to make others happy.

2. Another condition of success in life is, that we be properly prepared for our work.

This is not the place to rehearse truisms about the importance of education. On this point, certainly, we are all agreed. If the old gentleman is still living, who, a few years ago, was represented by the lecturers as entirely opposed to education,

and was consequently shown to be entirely in the wrong, he must be very aged and feeble, and I am sure he is not here to-night.

But when we come to consider the kind of education which is requisite for success in life, we find a vast difference of opinion. Is education the "educing or unfolding of the soul," or is it a mere accumulation of facts which may possibly be useful in after life?

There can be no doubt but that the latter view is to an uneducated mind the most plausible, because it is most superficial. It is hard for the uneducated to value knowledge for its own sake, apart from any temporal advantage which it may bring its possessor; it is difficult to feel the importance of a mental discipline that will make a man strong to achieve success in the particular vocation to which he may afterwards devote his energies. Hence, it is not surprising to hear men ask, "Why should I permit my son to spend his time and money in the acquisition of knowledge which he will probably never find to be of practical value? Why not teach him *at once* those arts and sciences that will be of use to him in everyday life, without passing through a tedious intermediate process?" In deference to such prejudices we find Polytechnic Institutes and so-called Business Colleges springing up all around us; and, however useful these institutions may be in their sphere, it is rather humiliating to find them overcrowded with students, while some of our most ancient and well-established Colleges complain that their classic halls are empty and neglected. We cannot, however, be surprised that such sentiments should prevail in the community, when we reflect how little many of us appreciated the true ideal of liberal training even after we had completed our collegiate course. I remember that on the day of graduation, one of my classmates silyly whispered, "Chum, do you think these humanities will ever be of any use to us?"

It is really amusing to consider how little the young graduate knows of those things which are of daily use in practical life. He is probably unable to hold his own even in ordinary conversation, and is made to feel every day that he knows next

to nothing, so that he perhaps begins to consider himself—a big, overgrown booby. If he were to learn nothing after leaving College, if such a thing were possible, it is very probable that he would speedily become what he thinks himself; but fortunately our minds are so constituted that we must be constantly gathering information. Whether the man of liberal culture devote himself to a profession, or whether he be one of those fortunate (or unfortunate) mortals who are wealthy enough to remain on their ancestral acres, and enjoy at once their *otium cum dignitate*, (their "*opium cum digitalis*," as a druggist once called it, with involuntary appropriateness,) he cannot help becoming more or less acquainted with those things which it is necessary for a practical man to know. And now he begins to feel the immense value of his collegiate training. Every isolated fact, as it comes tumbling in on his consciousness, finds at once its proper relations; it does not become another fragment of a huge, unwieldy mass of information. He begins to feel that he has laid a foundation on which he may safely build; while the companions of his boyhood who, according to the prevailing spirit of the age, have slighted the College for the Polytechnic School, have probably gathered a vast amount of valuable materials, while they have not laid a proper foundation, and are even destitute of a plan for a future edifice. Moreover, as he passes on in life, and is brought into mental collision with persons whom he knows to be possessed of natural talents equal or superior to his own, he finds that his scholastic training has not been in vain; that it is better to be a practiced *athlete*, than to have a giant's strength without the skill necessary for rightly using it. It has been generally observed, that every good man of liberal culture commands an influential position in the community. Is it not evident, then, that such culture constitutes an important condition of success in life?

The fact that there are some "self-made men" who have achieved the highest order of usefulness, without having enjoyed the advantages of collegiate training, does not in the least militate against our statements. Noble fellows they are, and worthy of the highest respect. But the exceptions can

never disprove the rule. The fact, if fact it be, that one of the fastest horses in the country was for years employed in a common cart, certainly does not teach us to put our horses into carts in order to increase their fleetness.

Let me not be misunderstood. I do not oppose Polytechnic Schools and "Business Colleges," any more than I object to Theological Seminaries, Medical Colleges, and Law Schools. They may stand by the side of these, if you choose, and accomplish a noble work; but they must never try to usurp the place of the regular College. We hope to see the day when Franklin and Marshall College will have a Theological Seminary, a Medical Department, a Law School and Scientific Halls and Museums clustered around her and protected by her fond embrace. But we can never agree, that our Alma Mater should yield to the spirit of this utilitarian age, and become a mere school of industrial and useful arts.

Ah! if our dream could be realized—if we could here behold a complete University, pervaded by that Christological philosophy which has made this institution so famous, what a wonderful influence would it exert on our nation and the world. For only in so far as an institution is pervaded by a true philosophy can it be really permanent and influential. Some one has said: "Let me write the songs of a nation, and I do not care who makes the laws." No doubt the sentiment is to a certain extent correct; we cannot refuse to acknowledge the tremendous power of national songs. Louis XVI. lost his head in response to the wild strains of the Marseillaise, and a century earlier James II. was *sung* out of his three kingdoms. Do we not remember how the people of Cornwall rescued their beloved Bishop from the hands of the infuriated tyrant, by singing:

"And must Trelawney die?
And must Trelawney die?
Then thirty thousand Cornish boys
Will know the reason why!"

It is not difficult to understand why popular songs should be possessed of immense influence, for they speak *from* and *to* the heart; but the heart of the people is not always aware that,

whether willingly or unwillingly, it beats responsively to the philosophy of the age, whether it be good or evil. The empire of thought, after all, rules the world. The man who teaches a nation how to think, exerts a greater influence than he who holds the reins of power. According to his ideas of right, the statesman frames the laws; according to the canons which he lays down concerning the true, the beautiful, and the good, the poet moulds his poetic conceptions, and the artist paints "books for those who know not how to read." And thus the rich fountain of thought which God has given to the philosopher trickles through myriads of brains until at last the whole world is pervaded by its silent, but irresistible influence. Men talk about the greatness of Cæsar, Charlemagne, Frederick Barbarossa, and the first Napoleon; but what *direct* influence can they be said to have exerted even on the generation that immediately succeeded them? Where Alexander ruled for a decade Plato ruled for a thousand years and more. The influence of Pythagoras and Aristotle, of Duns Scotus and Thomas Aquinas, of Kant and Hegel—not to speak of others, more modern and nearer home—is greater to-day than that of the most illustrious conquerors.

How important it is, then, that our educational institutions should be influenced by a philosophy that is catholic and true, and accordingly harmonizes properly with a course of liberal training. To have been placed under such influences must indeed be an important condition of success in life; and this advantage, we rejoice to say, the *alumni* of Franklin and Marshall College have abundantly enjoyed. The philosophy that prevails in this institution is no new thing—it is "the philosophy of the ages," developed according to the requirements of the times in which we live. It was adumbrated by Plato and Aristotle, and found in CHRIST its proper principle. The writings of St. Paul, especially, are full of it, and I cannot see how any one can properly appreciate his wonderfully profound doctrines with reference to the organic unity of Christ's kingdom, without having, at least to some degree, caught its spirit. It was the Christian philosophy that ruled the Middle Ages;

that gave the church and the world those great doctors, whose gigantic powers we are again beginning to appreciate after a season of forgetfulness. Nay, even the majority of the Reformers clung to it, amid all the storms of that fearful epoch, with unswerving tenacity.

Of course, there was at all times a philosophy so called, which claimed to rival that which was truly Christological. A philosophy of little things, that could appreciate no unity either in nature or grace but that which is visible and sensual. But such a philosophy can never be satisfactory to a thinking mind. As the universe in early ages appeared to be "confusion worse confounded" until Copernicus discovered that the sun was its centre, so it is with all our thinking until we discover that Christ is its centre and principle. All honor, then, to this institution for having done so much to bring these ancient and vital truths to light again. Though it has always been poor in this world's goods, it has exerted an influence which no language can express. What though "our college" does not always receive the credit which is its due, it matters not; so long as Franklin and Marshall College is true to its mission, it has a right to live—it is achieving the highest order of success, for it exerts the greatest degree of usefulness.

As for ourselves, fellow alumni, the reigning philosophy of this institution has become for us *a life*. Strangers insist, that we bear a strong family resemblance to each other. Whatever may be our profession—whether we write on law, medicine, or theology, the attentive reader can always discover the influence of our peculiar training. It is well that it is so. Though our thinking may appear obscure and uninteresting to those who delight only in that which is bizarre and sensational, if our Alma Mater has but induced us to have a more profound faith in our incarnate Lord, and to realize that we are *really* and not only figuratively "one body in Him," she has surely supplied us with one of the most important conditions of usefulness to our fellow-men.

3. A third important condition of success in life, is to find a sphere of usefulness that is in harmony with our tastes and

talents. While it is, no doubt, true, that there is no place on earth where a good man may not be useful, yet it matters not how great may be his natural gifts, or how anxious he may be to use them for the welfare of others, you can expect no decisive result from his labors if his way be hedged up by insurmountable difficulties; whereas, on the other hand, if his sphere be one in which he can feel at home—in which he works with alacrity and energy—there can be no doubt but that monuments of his usefulness will rise up on every side.

How important, then, it is, that we should have chosen that profession, or calling in life, for which we feel within us the capacities of success, together with that glorious enthusiasm that will bear us safely over unnumbered difficulties. As, however, I presume we have all made our choice, I will not enlarge upon this matter; and would merely venture to warn those young men who are about to enter our brotherhood, not to suffer themselves to be influenced by mercenary motives or the over-persuasion of friends to embrace a calling that is contrary to the bent of their genius, or their impressions of duty; for it will prove a curse instead of a blessing, a galling chain which only death can break.

When the decisive step is taken, and we have entered on the duties of active life, it is, of course, highly important, that we should make our residence at the place where our labors are most needed, or where it is probable that we can prosecute them to the best advantage.

Everywhere we find men residing in localities and occupying positions to which they are utterly unsuited, and where their best talents remain unappreciated; while in other communities and under other circumstances they might, with half their present labor, easily achieve the highest order of eminence and usefulness. That was a quaint conceit of the German poet Heine, in which he compares *life* with a certain game in which the art of the player consists in throwing balls and cubes respectively into round and square openings in a board. "Alas!" he adds plaintively, "there are *round* men and *square* men, and the world is full of *round* positions and *square* posi-

tions; but unfortunately men are not satisfied with places that suit them, but must needs try to creep into holes that do not fit their shape, and so the game is lost."

It is a common error to imagine that extraordinary talents are needed only in those positions which the world calls great, while men who have little talent and less culture can succeed better in an humble position, than those who possess these gifts in the highest degree. The contrary of this is often true. In the ministry, for instance, it requires a rare talent to "condescend to men of low estate." No one would probably venture to affirm, that John Frederick Oberlin required a lower order of talent to civilize and Christianize the Ban de la Roche, than his brother Jeremiah needed to fill acceptably the professorship of Logic in the University of Strasburg. Though the elder brother achieved eminence in his vocation, does not the world agree that he who became pastor of a miserable semi-barbarous Alsatian valley, and by sixty years of enlightened and self-denying labor caused the wilderness to "bud and blossom as the rose," was really the more talented as well as the more successful? And yet if the positions of the brothers had been reversed, is it not probable, from what we know of them, that neither would have achieved success?

It is evident, then, that there must be a natural adaptation for the work in which we are engaged, and that where this is wanting, the highest order of talent, or even genius itself, is not a certain surety of success. Of course, this is a faculty that may be cultivated; and he who would succeed must make up his mind, at the very outset, to take kindly to his work, whatever it may be, and to learn to sympathize with the people among whom his lot may be cast. It is, however, no slight disappointment for a young minister, for instance, to discover after preaching for months in stilted language to a rural parish, that all his fine periods have been worse than lost upon his audience. What a shock it must be to find, that though his people can appreciate sound doctrine as well as many a city congregation when presented to them in the language of the Bible and Catechism, there are innumerable words and phrases which

to their pastor are as simple as the alphabet itself, but which to them are utterly unintelligible. Moreover, as it is not in human nature to confess ignorance on such a subject, the pastor may for a long time remain unconscious of the true state of affairs, until the veil is lifted by some fortunate accident.

A country minister who lived in a foreign country—or, at least, I *hope* he did—once invited a theological student, who was his guest, to preach to his congregation. The next morning, as the friends were taking a walk together along the highway, the student, with perhaps a touch of vanity, inquired of his clerical host, what he thought of his sermon. "Oh, it was all very well," replied the latter, "but the people did not understand it." "Not understand it," repeated his guest in great surprise, "I am sure I carefully selected language that must have been plain to the meanest capacity." "Well! to make the matter short," responded the minister, "I remember you spoke several times of drawing *inferences* from your text. Here comes our neighbor Giles with his team; he is a good specimen of the average intelligence of the parish; let us see whether he can possibly have understood what you meant. Ho! Giles, Can you draw an inference?" "A what?" exclaimed the rustic, evidently greatly astonished. "An inference," repeated the minister. "Can you draw an inference?" There was an interval of silence, during which Giles vainly sought to understand the question. Suddenly, however, a bright idea flashed upon his mind and he exclaimed, "Look here, parson! you know this team as well as I do. If there is a pair of horses in the county strong enough to *draw* such a thing as an *inference*, I am sure mine can do it."

It is no doubt true, that the ranter and the charlatan often seek to hide their ignorance among those who are even more ignorant than themselves; but will you, on this account, refuse the meed of praise to those men of ability who are content to labor in obscurity, for the purpose of advancing the best interests of the poor and the neglected? Ought we not, for instance, to entertain the highest respect for those intelligent Christian physicians—of whom there are many—whose names

are but little known beyond their immediate practice, but who keep up a constant warfare with impurity and superstition, and who at last, by the undeniable success which they achieve, break the power of the quack and the sorcerer, and win the people to a mode of life that robs the sick bed of half its terrors? And can we refuse to honor the learned and talented Christian ministers who labor in rural parishes; who love their work, and by entering with their whole heart into the thoughts and feelings of the people, are able to clothe profound truths in simple language, and thus expand the intellect and warm the heart? Such men alone are able to achieve real success even among the lowly, and it is invidious to depreciate their abilities because they are not famous. Their work, indeed, requires a peculiar order of talent, but they are not less worthy of respect than their more eminent brethren. The man who can reach the mind and touch the heart of the people, and thus teach them to love the true, the beautiful, and the good, possesses one of the rarest and most glorious of gifts—a gift, which if properly used will insure the highest order of usefulness, and the approbation of our Father in Heaven.

4. The final, and perhaps the most important condition of success in life is earnest and persevering labor. "The destinies of the world," says the celebrated Bishop Dupanloup, "are in the hands of those who know how to work." Though this may appear to be a mere truism, it is probably after all the main condition of genuine success. Have we not often seen the ancient fable of the tortoise and hare exemplified in the history of our personal acquaintances? How many young men of brilliant abilities fail to be permanently successful because they depend solely on those natural gifts that enabled them to achieve their earliest triumphs. May not this be the reason why many of our college meteors are so speedily extinguished? They go forth in the full consciousness of their powers, expecting the world to bow to their transcendent genius. Rushing boldly into the tournament of life, they smite right and left as valiantly as did Roland at the route of Roncesvalles. But, alas! they do not wield the magic sword Durandal, with which the ancient

paladin is said to have cleft mountains at a single stroke. The world is large, and they will have no difficulty in finding foes worthy of their steel, who will probably give them such a "trouncing" as will make them hide their diminished heads for very shame. The result is humiliation and perhaps despair.

Somehow or other we have no Admirable Crichtons in these latter days, who leap from the college into fame at a single bound. The man who would achieve success must not despise the day of small things; he dare not presume on his superior talents or knowledge. He must begin by performing what may be called the menial labors of his vocation; never fretting because the world fails to give him at once the position which is his due. Toiling intelligently and perseveringly, he will at last convince men that he can do more and better work than his fellows, and then, and then only, will they say to him "Come up higher!"

Moreover, such work when once commenced should be patiently continued until the end of life. It is a common error to imagine, that there is a certain point at which success may be said to have been attained in such a sense, that thenceforth labor is no longer necessary. Men who are still really in the prime of life, say to themselves: "I have worked long enough—I will now rest during the remainder of my days." So they call themselves superannuated at fifty, and are in their dotage at sixty when they might have been hale and hearty at eighty. Surely such persons are committing a grievous mistake. While they insure for themselves a dreary and infirm old age, they deprive the world of the richest and ripest results of their genius and labor. They should remember that the best fruits ripen slowly, and are thrown by Autumn into the lap of winter. It should not be forgotten that such men as Socrates and Plato, Michael Angelo and Titian, Dryden and Goethe, and hosts of others hardly less illustrious, not only showed no signs of decay, but labored incessantly and successfully when they had nearly or quite attained to fourscore years.

In short, it is better to *wear* out than to *rust* out, and he who would do his duty must make full use of the talents which

God has given him, and continue to exercise them so long as they remain in his possession. This is an indispensable condition of all genuine success.

Nevertheless, such success is relative only—it cannot be absolute. Nothing is an end in itself—it is at best a stepping-stone to something better that lies beyond it. The logician tells us that as every premise is itself a conclusion, so every conclusion may and should be made a premise for further reasoning. In the same way, success in life, if rightly understood, is itself a condition of absolute success in a higher state of existence. Our Saviour's parable of the talents contains the conclusion of the whole matter. Some of us have received five talents, others two, while still others possess but one. Let us conscientiously use them for the glory of God and the welfare of our brethren, so that when the Lord comes to the reckoning, He may receive His own with usury. We may rest assured that we will never achieve absolute success until we hear with astonishment and delight—but also with a profound sense of our own unworthiness—the Master's declaration, "Well done, thou good and faithful servant, thou hast been faithful over a few things, I will make thee ruler over many things; enter thou into the joy of thy Lord."

ART. VIII.—PENNSYLVANIA GERMAN.*

BY PROF. J. S. STAHR, A.M., OF FRANKLIN AND MARSHALL COLLEGE.

THE language spoken by the descendants of the first German settlers of this State, has so frequently, indeed so generally been called Dutch, that it might almost seem arrogant and presumptuous to call it by any other name. And yet there seems to be no good reason why a Pennsylvanian must needs be a Dutchman, or why his language must needs be misnamed and misunderstood. This is done, however, so persistently that we are in danger of breaking the links which bind us to the Fatherland, thus striking in the very face of History, and committing a blunder for which there is no excuse whatever, except that Dutch sounds somewhat like *Deutsch*. New Englanders have been in the habit of ridiculing the Pennsylvania Germans as a class of people destitute of all intelligence—thick-headed, thick-skulled, without love of culture or a desire for anything but filthy lucre—people who take better care of their horses than of their children, who have no higher ambition at all than to possess fine farms, large barns, and sleek cattle. Their language has been looked down upon and sneered at as mere jargon, weak, impure, and harsh—a kind of hash, fit only for those who have too little intelligence or taste to appreciate anything better. Such harsh judgments have been passed mostly by those who had no opportunity of examining properly into the character and language of these people, by persons who looked at the Germans from a distance, occupied a different standpoint, knew nothing of their origin and history, and hence

* Delivered before the students of Franklin and Marshall College, at the opening of the Spring Term, 1870.

could not appreciate what they saw and heard. But this has been done also by persons who dwelt among the Germans and were favorably impressed and kindly disposed; who, because they were unacquainted both with High German and the Pennsylvania Dialect, and were unable to meet the Germans on their own ground, did them unintentional injustice. Of late these people and their language have received a great deal of attention, and some interesting magazine and newspaper articles have been written concerning them. But whilst these articles contain much valuable information, they are also full of inaccuracies, and contain some serious blunders, so that they will necessarily make a wrong impression upon those who have not knowledge enough of the subject to form an independent opinion. It is not our purpose here to defend the character of the Pennsylvania Germans, or to apologize for their customs. They need nothing of the kind at our hands. We might no doubt find some things to blame, but also many to praise and to admire. We propose merely in the interest of History and Literature to examine their language, and, as far as we are able in this connection, to determine whence and what it is.

The language commonly but improperly called "Pennsylvania Dutch" is a dialect of the High German Language, and therefore entirely distinct and different from Dutch, the literary language of Holland. In order to prove this we turn first to history.

Immediately after the first settlement of Pennsylvania by the Quakers under Penn, when the proprietary announced that he would grant freedom of conscience and toleration to all religious denominations, streams of German immigrants, induced by religious persecutions at home, and by the promises of agents from Pennsylvania, poured into the colony and founded settlements which grew slowly at first, but steadily and surely, so that in a short time they became very prosperous. These streams increased in size from year to year; new installments were added from the Palatinate, Baden, Wurtemberg, Bavaria, and other provinces of South Germany, Mennonites from Switzerland and different parts of Germany, Dunkards from

Krefeld and Wittgenstein (Cleves, Prussia), Moravians and Schwenkfelders from Saxony (Upper Lusatia), and others, so that they soon formed the mass of the population in the inland districts, and thus handed down their own language and customs from generation to generation. The immigrants from Upper or South Germany were mostly Lutherans and Reformed, and came in such numbers during the first half of the eighteenth century that they were scattered widely over the territory now occupied by Montgomery, Berks, Lehigh and Bucks Counties, and impressed the character of their dialect upon all the German settlers of this district. It was among these men that Muhlenberg and Schlatter labored, and their success is well known.

The first German settlement was made by Francis Daniel Pastorius at Germantown near Philadelphia, August 12th, 1683. This at once became the nucleus of a German community the limits of which widened rapidly. In its bosom was born the celebrated mathematician and astronomer Rittenhouse, and here also lived Thomas Godfrey, the inventor of the quadrant. The Mennonites came to this country as early as from 1698 to 1711, but the largest numbers arrived in 1717. Many of them settled in Bucks and Montgomery Counties, but Lancaster has always been their stronghold, and here their influence on the German dialect is most observable. The Schwenkfelders and Moravians (whom Count Von Zinzendorf had protected for some time in Europe) came to Pennsylvania at a somewhat later date. The former settled in Berks and Montgomery Counties at or near Goschenhoppen in the year 1734 (only one hundred in all); the latter, the Moravians, took possession of Lehigh Valley, where they soon made the wilderness blossom as the rose. They were received first by Whitefield at Nazareth in 1739; in 1740 they purchased the site of Bethlehem, and settled there after the arrival of Bishop Nitzschman with a company of brethren and sisters from Europe. They afterward bought the "Manor of Nazareth" from Mr. Whitefield, and labored there also. Count Zinzendorf himself came to America in 1741, visited Bethlehem in 1742, and in connection with the brethren

labored very successfully among the Indians. New settlements and missionary stations were commenced at different points, but it would lead us too far from our subject to trace them out. Thomas Penn purchased the lands on the Tulpehocken from the Indians in 1732—33. "The door of immigration being now open, * * * thousands of all ranks and sects, from the haughty baron to the poor redemptioner, arrived annually and settled in the German Counties, Berks receiving her full share." The settlers of this county were principally Lutheran and Reformed; at first they had no churches nearer than *the Swamp* (Hanover) Montgomery Co.; afterwards they established their own congregations and grew rapidly. In this community Conrad Weiser, the Indian interpreter, figured very conspicuously, and was of great use during the Indian troubles.

The German settlements thus commenced (we do not pretend to name them all) spread farther and farther until they constituted a chain or belt extending from the southern boundary of the state north-easterly to the Delaware river, including the counties of York and Lancaster, Berks, Montgomery, Lehigh and Bucks. (We use the names of the counties by which they are now known.) Here we find a singular fact in the history of our state. Inside of this belt of German settlements we find the English, and outside of it we find a similar belt of Scotch Irish settlements, including part of York, and the whole, or nearly the whole of Adams, Cumberland, Dauphin, Lebanon, and Northampton Counties. Within the limits of the German district, Welsh settlements were made in Montgomery Co. at Pennlyn, Wales, Gwynedd, &c., and Scotch Irish settlements in Lancaster Co., at Donegal, Little Britain, &c., but the rule is as above stated. It has been suggested that there was some design in this on the part of Penn, viz.: to keep the English Quakers as far as possible from the Indians, leaving the Scotch Irish and Germans to keep them at bay. But the order in which we find the settlements proceeding from Philadelphia is no doubt determined by the order of time in which the immigrants arrived, and after settlements were commenced the different nationalities would naturally flock to their respective

centers of population. Certain it is, however, that for a number of years the brave, hardy Scotch Irish bore the brunt of the Indian attacks, and served as a bulwark to the settlers farther east. In course of time, however, the Germans pressed upon their neighbors, and gradually obtained possession of the whole, or at least the greater part of the fertile lands of Adams, Cumberland, Dauphin, Lebanon, and Northampton Counties, where their descendants are still found as lords of the rich soil, possessing the finest farming lands in the state, and so far as this goes we must acknowledge that they do like to live "upon the fat of the land."

These Germans brought their language and literature with them from the old country. They worshiped God in High German; their Bibles and Hymn Books were in this language, and they are so to-day. Whilst therefore in their daily intercourse with one another they used the particular dialect or dialects which they were accustomed to speak in the Fatherland, or such a modification of these dialects as was naturally brought about by their circumstances, they always retained a knowledge of the High German, and they have preserved it to the present day. There has been a falling away from the German ranks no doubt; in English communities Germans have been Anglicized. Their names even have frequently been changed, some by Penn when the settlers arrived and were *naturalized*, others by the persons themselves, so that we now find *Carpenter* for *Zimmerman*, *Hunter* for *Jaeger*, *High* for *Hoch*, &c. Still there is preserved in our midst not only the Pennsylvania dialect, but also the German Language. Among the early Lutheran and Reformed clergymen there were men of great learning, good classical scholars, and even some accomplished poets, as for instance *Pastorius*, *Helmuth*, some of the Protestant monks at *Ephrata*, &c. These were succeeded by others worthy to wear their mantles; if they were their inferiors in classical learning, they were still well educated—at all events able to speak pure German. Thus a knowledge of High German has been perpetuated, and if there are at the present day Germans(?) who cannot understand a High German sermon com-

posed of pure and simple words, it is because they have learned to undervalue and despise the language of their fathers, and have neglected to learn to read it, or they have become altogether faithless to the church, and have been carried away by the stream of worldliness in which so many perish.

In this brief historical survey we have not been able to discover anything that looked like Dutch. There are only two points where the history of Pennsylvania comes at all in contact with the Dutch, and neither of these could have any bearing on the language spoken here. In the first place it is well known that the Dutch Reformed Church, acting through the classis of Amsterdam, sent Reformed ministers to the Germans in this state. But these ministers were Germans, and spoke the German language to a German people. Secondly, there were several Dutch settlements in Delaware County, and at Minisink, now Monroe County, perhaps even before the arrival of Penn; but these settlements were small, unimportant, and were either abandoned entirely, or merged into later English settlements.

It might naturally be supposed that the Pennsylvania dialect would undergo important changes during the lapse of so many years, so as to vary considerably from its original form or forms. Dialects change rapidly, particularly where there is no written language to keep them in proper bounds. Two families of the same barbarous tribe may separate, and, after the lapse of one or two generations, find themselves using two different dialects, neither of which is intelligible to those who speak the other. The case becomes different however when there is a written language around which the dialects cluster, and where the district is small, and communication so frequent as in Pennsylvania, no great variation would be likely to occur. There are a number of sub-dialects, however (of which we shall take due notice at the proper place), which betray the influence of the original dialects spoken by the first settlers. We may mention here the influence of the Moravians, who taught pure High German in their schools, and hence spoke very correctly, and that of the Mennonites, who spoke a broader dialect than

the others. But that the type of Pennsylvania German is South German, and that no changes of any importance, except the introduction of English words, have taken place, is put beyond all doubt by the fact that there are now dialects spoken in South Germany which not only bear a striking resemblance to Pennsylvania German, but are really almost identically the same, particularly the Pfälzer dialect. Change a few vowel sounds, especially those of the modified vowels or *Umlaute* ö and ü, which are wanting in Pennsylvania German, eliminate English words and one or two English idioms, and you make our dialect perfectly intelligible to the *Pfälzers*, whilst no Pennsylvania German has any difficulty in understanding them.

Pennsylvania German is a *dialect* of the German language. Hence many persons look upon it as an inferior, degenerate language, a falling away from pure German—the base daughter of a noble mother. But the relation which a dialect sustains to its literary language is not of this kind. If language in some form or other is a necessity for the reason, as all must admit, there can be nothing artificial or mechanical in its origin and growth. It is not the gift of God in such a sense that man is furnished with words for which he finds the proper ideas, and puts proper thoughts into them. Words and ideas cannot be joined in any such mechanical way. Nor does man *invent* language, so that he first has the thoughts or ideas, and then fixes upon certain sounds or words to express these ideas—sounds or words adopted by universal consent for certain specific purposes; for how could there be such a thing as consent or agreement without language as a means of communication between men? The human mind is so constituted that it cannot develop without thinking, nor can it think to any purpose without spontaneously producing words as a form wherein thought is to be enshrined. Language is therefore in one sense the gift of God. The *power* or *faculty* of language is from God; but language itself, or the expression of thought, is the spontaneous product, not the invention of the mind. Language develops with the mind; it grows with its growth and strengthens with its strength. It is modified and moulded

by surrounding influences, just as the mind itself is affected in this way. Hence we find endless varieties and changes in language giving rise to different dialects, yea, even to languages which seem to be entirely different, so that many are ready to deny that they could possibly have a common origin. But the most eminent comparative philologists of our day, like Max Muller, are ready to affirm that affinities can be discovered in all languages, affinities which become more striking and significant in proportion as the field of research is enlarged. We need not hesitate therefore to claim a common origin for all languages. Taking now any particular language or class of languages, it is undoubtedly necessary to assume a starting point where the growth of language commences, and from which it branches out in different directions. But it is not to be supposed that this starting point exhibits the highest excellence that can be attained. If humanity is historical, so also is language, for the latter gives expression to the character of the former in all stages of its development. Language therefore grows, and changes its form according to the nature and character of the people whose historical life it represents. It has to do not only with individuals, but also with communities and nations, and bears the impress of the latter no less than of the former. We can easily see how tribes and families coming from the same general stock may become separate communities, develop certain peculiarities, and yet retain common traits of character which serve as the basis again for union in a higher form as a nation. Now whilst the general is the basis or ground of the particular, we nevertheless learn to know the former through the latter. Individual tribes or families, in the history of nations, awake to self-consciousness first, and afterward they become conscious of a broader life which they possess in common with a whole nation; and it is the province of history to develop this consciousness in particular cases, binding family to family and tribe to tribe, just as it is the province of education to enlarge a man's idea of existence, and make him a citizen of the world—to break down the barriers which hedge him in at first, and make him truly *cosmopolitan*. Dialects

therefore which give expression to particular phases of national life, to the peculiar life of tribes and families, precede in the order of time and the order of their development the cultivated literary languages under which they are included, just as spoken language precedes written language. It has been truly said that in every literary production we have the expression of a threefold life; national life, expressed in the general language, the life of a particular district, expressed in the dialect, and finally individual life, expressed in the peculiar style of the author. The fixed, cultivated, written language of a people binds the hearts of all together no matter how they may be divided geographically or politically, and it becomes necessary or possible only when a nation, be its limits wide or narrow, becomes fully conscious of itself, so that all the individuals included can meet upon a common basis. In the various dialects we have not so many vitiated forms of an original language, but the first, simplest, truest expression of all the elements of a nation's strength, and from them (the dialects) the literary language is formed. We find these different dialects throughout the entire history of the German nation, from the earliest period down to the present time. At the time of the Reformation, Latin was generally used as the written language of the Germans, although many different dialects were spoken. These dialects were divided into two general classes: High German, spoken in the elevated, mountainous regions of South Germany, and Low German spoken in the low, level portions of North Germany. Two dialects of the latter class have been developed into written languages, one into the English (based on Anglo-Saxon), and another into the Dutch. Luther fixed the character of modern High German by his translation of the Bible. He took the dialect of Saxony as spoken at the court of the Elector, as a standard, and through the labors of himself and his coadjutors the Bible was made to embody a language which at once rallied all the High German dialects around itself and found its way into thousands of hearts and homes.

Pennsylvania German, as a High German dialect, having its origin and history altogether separate from the Dutch, gives

expression to a particular phase of German life, moulded by the plastic hand of culture, customs, soil, climate, &c. As such it has perhaps elements of strength, advantages and excellencies not now found in the literary High German, whilst it is no doubt also deficient in many of the best traits of the cultivated High German.

It is of course impossible in our present limits to specify all the peculiarities of Pennsylvania German, so as to give an adequate idea of its form to those who are not familiar with it. We may however state a few general principles which will enable any one conversant with High German to read and understand the dialect without difficulty. In the first place, it must be borne in mind that the letters have the *South German* sound; *a* has the broad sound like the English *aw*; *st*, and *sp* wherever they occur sound broad like *sch*t and *sch*p, &c. Secondly, letters are commuted or changed. Instead of the proper sound of the modified vowel or *Umlaut* *ö*, we find the sound of the German *ē*, or the English *ā*, and instead of *ü* we find *ie* or *i* equivalent to the English *i* in *machine*, or the same shortened as in *pin*. Instead of the proper sound of *eu*, we have the Ger. *ei* or the Eng. *i*. Instead of *au*, particularly when it undergoes modification in inflections, we have broad *a* or *aa* in the unmodified, and *ä* or *ää* in the modified form. Thus we have *Baam* for *Baum*, and *Bääm'* for *Bäume*, *laafe'* for *laufen*, and *laaft* or *lääft* for *läuft*. The diphthong *ei* is often changed into long *e* or *ee*; thus for *Stein* we have *Stee'*; for *Bein*, *Bee'*; for *Eid* we have *Eed*, for *Leid*, *Leed*. *A* is often changed into *o*, as *Johr* for *Jahr*, *Hoor* for *Haar*; *i* is changed into *e* as *werd* for *wird*, *Hert* for *Hirt*, &c. Consonants are also frequently changed; *b* into *w*, *p* into *b*, *t* into *d*, &c. Thirdly, words are shortened by dropping the terminations, especially *n* of the infinitive, or generally after *e*. Prefixes are frequently contracted, so also compounded words. Thus instead of *werden*, *folgen*, *fangen*, we have *werre'*, *folge'*, *fange'*; *einmal* becomes *emöl*, *nicht mehr*, *nimme*, &c. Fourthly, the Pennsylvania dialect uses H. G. words in a different sense. Thus for *Pferd*, horse, we have *Gaul*, which in H. G. means a heavy farm-horse

or an old horse; *gleiche'* from the H. G. *gleichen*, to resemble, to be like, means in the Pennsylvania dialect to like, to be pleased with; *gucke'* from H. G. *gucken*, to peep, to pry, means to look. Finally, we find English words introduced in their full form, either with or without German prefixes and modifications; e. g. *Store, Rules, Claspers, Circumstances; trüvele, stürte, fixe, fighte*. This is an element of weakness in the dialect, or in those who use it, but it also helps to bring prominently into view the flexibility of the German language.

If we examine the inflections of words in this dialect, we find them much simpler and less complete than in High German. Nouns have scarcely any changes of form except to distinguish singular and plural; these, wherever they exist, are the same as in H. G. One of the most striking peculiarities of the dialect is this: The genitive case is never used. To denote the idea of possession, the dative is used in connection with a possessive pronoun. Thus instead of High German *der Hut des Mannes*, we find *dem Mann sei' Hut*; instead of *das Licht der Sonne*, *der Sunn' thr Licht*. To denote other relations, prepositions are used. The definite article is the same as in High German except that some of the sounds become so obscure as to be scarcely heard. The indefinite article is the same in the three genders nominative, *en* for *ein, eine, ein*; where it changes in the other cases, it follows the analogy of High German. Demonstratives and other adjectives are regularly declined except in the genitive; the neuter terminations are frequently dropped. The definite article is used for *dieser, diese, dieses*, and *seller, selle, sell*, for *jener, jene, jenes*. The adverb *wo*, is used instead of the relatives *welcher, welche, welches*. Another peculiarity of this dialect is that all these words have no separate form for the accusative masculine as in High German; the nominative form is used. In the inflection of pronouns we find for the nominative plural, first person singular, *mir*, instead of *wir*. The verb has no imperfect tense. Wherever we find either the imperfect or perfect in High German, we always have the perfect in Pennsylvania German. In other respects the verb is like the High German, except that some of the terminations are

dropped. Some auxiliaries take *tt* in the second singular instead of *ist*. Thus from *wollen* we have; *Ich will, du witt, er will, mir wolle', ihr wolle', sie wolle'*. *Haben* changes *a* into *o* in the second and third singular present; *Ich hab, du hoseht, er hot*; *pl. mir hen* (from *han, haben*), *ihr hen, sie hen*.

It may not be amiss to quote the opening stanza of Dr. Harbaugh's "Heemweh" in this connection, giving it first in Pennsylvania German and afterwards in High German.

PENNSYLVANIA DIALECT.

Ich wees net was die Ursach is',
Wees net warum ich's dhu;
'N jedes Jahr mach ich der Weg
Der alte, Heemet zu.
Hab weiters nix zu suche' dort,
Kee' Erbschaft un kee' Geld;
Un doch treibt mich des Heemgefehl
So stark wie alle Welt;
Nor'd stärt ich ewe ab un' geh,
Wie owe schun gemeldt

HIGH GERMAN.

Ich weiss nicht was die Ursach' ist,
Weiss nicht warum ich's thu';
Ein jedes Jahr mach ich den Weg
Der alten Heimath zu.
Hab' weiter nichts zu suchen dort,
Kein Erbschaft und kein Geld;
Und doch treibt mich das Heimgefühl
So stark wie alle Welt.
Dann reis ich eben ab und geh,
Wie oben schon gemeld't.

Here the expression "wie alle Welt" is peculiar; the other deviations from High German are all in accordance with the principles laid down above,

There are variations in the Pennsylvania dialect as spoken in different parts of the state. "Joseph Henry" in the "Guardian" (March No. 1868) says: "It (Pennsylvania German) may now be said to consist of at least three plainly marked sub-dialects. One of these is principally spoken in Eastern Pennsylvania; the second, west of the Schuylkill; and the third among the lesser German sects in Lancaster County and elsewhere. The last mentioned sub-dialect is most unlike the others, and may at once be distinguished by its peculiar drawl." The idiom of Eastern Pennsylvania is purest and comes nearest to High German, whilst that of Lancaster County is broader and deviates most. Here no doubt the native dialects of the first immigrants make themselves felt so as to produce these variations although the mode of life, and the surroundings of the people also have a tendency to influence their language.

There are two ways of writing Pennsylvania German. Some scholars maintain that the orthography ought to conform as

nearly as possible to the High German, whilst others aim only at representing the sounds of words, and hence incline to the English sounds of letters. The former of course is preferable so long as we pretend to write German.

If we ask now, What is the literary value of Pennsylvania German? it is not difficult to find an answer. As its construction is simpler and less involved, and its words shorter, it is, of course, more fluent than High German. It flows easily and naturally, so that it seems to be the easiest thing in the world to talk, on the part of Pennsylvania Germans, whilst High German is rather precise and cumbrous. The vocabulary is full so far as the ordinary topics of every day life are concerned, as one would naturally expect in a dialect. Our Pennsylvania Germans are mostly farmers, or thrifty, well-to-do people in the common walks of life. Here their dialect answers every purpose, and they have probably preserved words and constructions not now known in High German, so that it is natural even for educated men who are conversant with High German or English, to adopt this dialect in familiar intercourse when they wish to lay aside formality and restraint. But on the other hand, when the topic is literary or religious, High German answers the purpose better; for the words and terms relating to these topics have not been cultivated to the same extent. Besides this, the want of cases, and the poverty of inflections in the dialect, make High German preferable. The German is well known as one of the clearest and most precise languages in existence, capable of giving expression to every shade of meaning, and therefore unsurpassed in philosophy and theology. Here the Pennsylvania dialect is far inferior. High German may be compared to a well-trained horse, saddled and bridled, moving regularly according to the most approved principles of horsemanship; whilst Pennsylvania German reminds us of an unbridled steed careering over the fields for his own gratification in joyous freedom. High German bears us along with the stately step of the soldier in close ranks according to the *drill* of some famous sergeant, whilst Pennsylvania German allows the freedom of the *route step*, and thus puts us more at

ease. The straightforwardness of the Pennsylvania Germans, their honesty and want of ceremony are all expressed in their dialect; *must* be expressed there if the principles laid down above are correct. Let it be borne in mind that these people are Germans, among whom "vows bind less than clasped hands;" people who hate hypocrisy, deceit, and pride of every kind. (If some of them have degenerated, the more's the pity.) You meet no kinder people in the world—open-hearted, cordial, hospitable—suspicious of innovations, probably too much so, but firm and true when they are won for any cause. You cannot fail to admire their character. But you must not expect great professions, ceremony, or an array of compliments; their dialect is not rich in these. You may enter their homes as they sit down to their meals, or when they are seated. You do not disturb them; they will say: "*Kumm setz' dich bei, un nimm's mit uns so gut as mer's hen;*" and if you sit down, you are welcome. Meet them at home, and you find them easy and graceful if you approach them properly; take them away from home, or try to make fine gentlemen of them all at once, to make them formally polite, and you will see as fine specimens of blundering awkwardness as you can desire. If they can overcome this *awkward* tendency, and become polished gentlemen by proper training—as they undoubtedly can—so much the better for their universality, their ability to adapt themselves to time, place, and circumstances; you could perhaps not turn so easily into their mode of life. Now, just as we find the people, so we find their language, and neither can be understood without understanding the other.

Pennsylvania German is undoubtedly also inferior to High German as regards the richness and purity of vowel and consonant sounds. If modern High German is inferior to the German of the first classical period, so far as fullness of sound and purity and distinctness of utterance are concerned, a cultivated ear very readily detects a still farther falling away in Pennsylvania German. In consequence of the vowel changes to which we have already referred, some of the best sounds of the language have been lost, and there is too little variety in

those that remain. Many consonants have also lost their sharpness and distinctness, so that words no longer stand out free and clear, like coins fresh from the mint. Whatever strength there may be in the dialect, this is undoubtedly an element of weakness.

But is Pennsylvania German adapted or qualified, if we may use that word, to become a cultivated literary language? We do not hesitate to answer in the negative, and yet we do wish not to be classed with those who sneer at Pennsylvania German poems, and call them mere jargon. The dialect has now its literary language—High German—and this answers every purpose, as fully as if Pennsylvania German itself were developed and exalted so as to become a literary language. It must therefore remain a dialect, but as such it is not excluded from the domain of literature. It has its office as a dialect, a work, a mission to which we have already referred. It is to give expression to a particular phase of German life, to serve as the organ or mouth-piece of feelings and states of mind which lie deeper, become more special than those expressed by High German. Philosophy, theology, and the loftier themes of poetry lie beyond its domain; but it claims, and has a right to claim, a domain of its own within which *popular songs, lyric poetry* in different forms may appear from time to time, manifesting a poetical power in the bosom of a single community which sings what is peculiar to it in strains as sweet as those in which Goethe expressed the consciousness of the whole German nation. It has always been thus. Popular songs and popular poetry are made not for the people, but by the people; whether this be done by the whole community so that poetry grows insensibly, as was the case in the first classical period of German literature, or whether one individual becomes the organ of the rest, and thus expresses what all feel. It is true, the most profound work of genius, that which is most universal, is also the most special, embodies the deepest experience of the individual. But universalities may be broader or narrower; there are elements of feeling, phases of life, which appear only in a certain sphere, and these can best be expressed in particu-

lar dialects. Thus we find Scotch poetry, than which none can have charms more sweet to the native of fair Caledonia, or him who has learned to understand and appreciate this dialect. We find in German literature a Hebel and a Claudius, who labored in similar fields; and we have to-day Fritz Reuter and others who make use of particular dialects, and carry the hearts of the people with them, as they could in no other way. It is not surprising therefore that the attempt should be made here in America. Indeed the only wonder is that it was not made much earlier than has really been the case. Rev. Mr. Rondthaler of the Moravian Church led the way by writing an Evening Hymn: "*Margets scheint die Sunn so schee,*" published in Schaff's *Kirchenfreund* in August, 1849. At the suggestion of Dr. Schaff, Dr. Harbaugh next made the attempt, and produced "*Das Schul Haus an der Krick.*" These poems soon became exceedingly popular, so that Dr. Harbaugh was encouraged to continue his labors, perhaps rather recreations, in this sphere, the result of which will probably soon be in our hands in a neat little volume.* Since the way has been opened, others have tried to court the muse with considerable success; among these we may name Revs. Keller, Dubbs, Weiser, etc.

If any one is disposed to ridicule Pennsylvania German, to call it weak and incapable of giving expression to definite ideas, let him study Dr. Harbaugh's "*Schul Haus an der Krick*;" he will perhaps find more descriptive power, and greater beauty of expression than he expects. Or take the poem called *Heemweh*, which we consider equal if not superior to the former. There are few descriptions in any language so touchingly beautiful, and so simple withal, as the stanzas in which Dr. Harbaugh describes his father and mother, the former sitting on the porch meditating, the latter as she stood at the railing looking after him with tears when he first left home. And how could he better have described his own feelings when, after his parents were dead and buried, he came back to visit

* Harbaugh's "*Harfe*" has made its appearance since the above was written, and we are not disappointed in it. It is a *HARFE* indeed.

the old homestead, and stood before the house hesitating whether to go in or not, than in lines like the following:

Ich wees net, soll ich' nei' in's Haus,
Ich sitter an der Dheer!
Es is wol alles voll inleid,
Un doch is alles leer!
'S is net mei Heemet wie's mol war,
Un kann's ah nimme sei';
Was 'naus mit unsere Eltere geht
Kommt ewig nimme nei'!
Die Freide hot der Dod geernt,
Das Trauerdheel is mei'!

So geht's in dere rauhe Welt,
Wo alles muss vergeh!
Ja, in der alte Heemet gar,
Fiehit mer sich all allee'!
O, wann's net for der Himmel wär,
Mit seiner scheene Ruh,
Dann wär mer's do schon lang verleedt,
Ich wisst net was zu dhu,
Doch Hoffnung leuchtet meinen Weg
Der ew'gen Heemet zu.

If Josh Billings and Hans Breitman with their corrupt and mongrel English serve to amuse, and are said to be not without merit by persons who ought to be critics—if these productions, the language and orthography of which are very often *made up* to serve a purpose, may exhibit certain phases of American life, and thus have some literary value, how much more is this the case with our Pennsylvania German poems? Here every word, to Pennsylvania Germans, is a “sound from home,” every description a vivid picture, every expression strikes a chord in the soul that thrills every nerve, and the echoes of which haunt the spirit long after the sound itself had died away. But here the mission of Pennsylvania German comes to an end. Let it be content in its own sphere, proud of its relation to High German, modestly directing to *that* domain, where German genius has been active for so many centuries, all who wish to become acquainted with German life, German culture and German literature.

ART IX.—CUSTOMS IN THE REFORMED CHURCH
OF HESSE.

BY REV. E.W. REINECKE, NAZARETH, PA.

IN following the discussions with regard to doctrines and customs which have taken place, of late years, in the Reformed Church, we have often thought that too much account has been made of her Palatinate origin. We are not disposed to deny that the original main stock of Reformed settlers in the United States may have been immigrants from the Palatinate. The sad condition of this country about the beginning of the last century, seems to have made emigration on the part of its citizens a relief, if not a necessity. They consequently came over to America in such numbers as almost to appear like a migration of the entire people. But from the very extent in which this migration took place, it soon exhausted itself; so that, even before our Revolutionary troubles, it had become annually less, and soon ceased altogether.

But granting that among the original Reformed settlers of our country the Palatinate element may have preponderated, there seems, nevertheless, to have been among them a considerable admixture of other Reformed nationalities. If we look at our earliest Reformed Ministry, the preponderance is decidedly against the Palatines. Turning to Harbaugh's "Fathers of the Reformed Church," we find that among the fifty-two ministers of whom biographies are given, *only nine* are traced with certainty to the Palatinate; the remainder being divided among Switzerland, Nassau, Hessen, and other countries of Germany. Now, although we would not maintain that the nationalities of the Reformed laity were in the same ratio as that of the clergy, yet it seems highly probable that the latter had some influence on the sources of immigration; so far, at least, as influencing their friends to follow them. Exceptionally, at least, some en-

tire settlements seem to have been other than Palatines. Thus, according to Harbaugh, the Reformed settlers of Lehigh County in Pennsylvania, were Swiss and Huguenots. And, if we were to consult the Church Records of our older congregations, we would, perhaps, find few of them where the French, or Huguenot element, was not to some extent, perhaps largely represented.

However this may be, it seems undeniable that after our Revolutionary struggle the Reformed immigration from Germany assumed a new complexion. The English Government, in bringing over soldiers from Hesse and other Reformed countries, assisted in producing this change. After the close of the war, many of the Hessian soldiers preferred to remain in America, and thus helped to increase the numerical strength of the Reformed Church. Others, after having remained a considerable time, returned to their native land, to spread there glowing accounts of the wealth, prosperity, and liberty of the new country. In this way, perhaps, was inaugurated that second Reformed immigration, which has also assumed such large proportions. Nor must we, if we would form a correct estimate of the constituency of the Reformed Church in America, forget the immigration from Switzerland, and from Lippe and other small Reformed counties of Germany, which has been going on for many years, and is still annually bringing over to us large accessions of strength and numbers.

Such being the constituency of the Reformed Church in America, it has seemed to us utterly unhistorical, unphilosophical, and impolitic, to try to model it in all its parts according to the Palatinate order. As regards doctrinal standard, we are willing to admit for the Heidelberg Catechism a kind of Reformed Ecumenical character, but even this not in an absolute sense. For, although this catechism was highly honored in all parts of the Reformed Church, it was by no means universally adopted, even by the Reformed German nationality, as the text-book of religious instruction. But as regards the Palatinate Liturgy, this has never received universal recognition in the Reformed Churches of Germany. It seems to be an undeniable fact that

these Reformed Churches, although there was a fundamental doctrinal animus which formed a bond of union between them, nevertheless constituted themselves freely as regards external organizations, customs and cultus or worship. Hence we find among them great divergencies in respect to these points; nor was the bond of fraternity broken on this account. Every separate nation and people was allowed to form its church observances and liturgical customs freely, without interference from others. And this freedom went so far that Calvin himself gave his endorsement to the Anglican ritual.

The evident historical duty and present policy of the Reformed Church in America would therefore seem to be, not to reprintinate and force into general use the obsolete liturgy of one portion of it; and that a portion of it, which has no longer an independent, much less a national existence. The Church of which we speak is not a simple, but a complex body. Its constituency consists not of one, but of many German nationalities, among whom, according to the inherent principle of the Reformed Church, liturgical customs were allowed to constitute themselves freely. Evidently, the part which we have to perform, is, to mould these various tendencies into one: not by ignoring all the rest in favor of one of them, but by uniting all into one organic whole, and thus to establish in our land the one and united Catholic Reformed Church.

We think that in constituting this One Catholic Reformed Church in America, the Reformed Church of Hesse has a right to be heard. She formed no inconsiderable portion of this Church in Germany; and at present her children form no inconsiderable portion of it in America. We wish to lay before the readers of the "*Review*" some of her Church customs, *written out from memory*, in order to show which way her influence would tend, and what her voice would be in the final settlement of our theological discussions and controversies.

The Church year was strictly observed. We mean by this not merely that certain Sundays were called by certain names; and that certain high festivals were called by certain other names; and that on these certain Sundays and festivals certain

prescribed portions of the Scriptures, called Gospels and Epistles, were invariably read. Of course, all this was the case in fact; but it included, moreover, that this Church or sacred year had thoroughly entered into the consciousness of the people: so that time was measured by it, rather than by the civil year. The high festivals, Christmas, Easter and Whitsunday, had invariably three days allotted to them. On the first day of each of them the Lord's Supper was administered, with divine services both forenoon and afternoon. On the second day there were again two services. On the third day, there was generally only a forenoon service, whilst the afternoon was devoted to visiting and recreation. As might be expected, Christmas was the most joyful festival. From the very beginning of Advent the mind assumed a festal tone, which rose higher and higher, until it reached its climax and completion in the festival which commemorates the miracle of all miracles, the Son of God manifested in the flesh. The Epiphany season seems to have been a gradual letting down of the mind from its joyful, festal tone to the sadder season of Lent; which latter was again a gradual preparation for the saddest of all the days in the year, the day of the crucifixion of our Lord. Passion week was observed with a peculiar strictness; for, although there was not an entire cessation from secular employments, yet the mind, from the peculiar discipline it had received during the preceding Lenten season, was generally in a tone of quiet sadness and deep earnestness. On Maundy Thursday the children of the parish were generally gathered together in the Church. Good Friday was observed with the most religious earnestness. There was an utter cessation on it of all secular labors throughout the entire parish, and the hum of business was completely hushed. Nothing was heard but the tread of the passer proceeding solemnly to the Church. But in the Church also the worshiper was at once reminded of the great fact of the occasion, the crucifixion: for on the altar, which occupied the most prominent place in the Church, and which was draped in mourning, was placed a small Mt. Calvary with three crucifixes upon it. Of Easter and Whitsunday, nothing more need be stated, besides what has

been already stated, except that on the latter, the Church, with every house in the parish, was decorated with a profusion of green boughs.

But whilst we are in the Church, we may as well take a closer view of it. It will be seen at once that it is mainly divided into two parts, the chancel and the nave. The former is somewhat narrower than the latter; but the Church being large and capable of accommodating several thousand worshippers, its proportions are not at all mean. It is also raised several steps above the nave. The small Gothic pulpit stands at the projecting angle, where the chancel and nave meet; and below it is the seat of the minister, who is never visible to the congregation, except when at the altar or on the pulpit. The central and prominent object of the chancel is the altar; a real altar, not a mere communion table. We have been informed by one who had seen it, that the altar originally had been built up of dressed stones: that when rationalism had achieved its triumph in the Churches, this altar had been removed and a mere table placed in its stead: and that after the revival of positive Christianity began to be felt, this table had been in turn removed, and a wooden altar put up, with various vestments of cloth and linen to suit the different occasions.

And whilst we are upon this part of our subject, we may as well take a view of the congregation and the services. The women have their pews in the nave; and as they quietly take their seats, they bow their heads forward in silent prayer. The men ascend the galleries, and before they take their seats, they place their hats before their eyes, and also engage in silent devotion. A procession now enters the Church. It consists of the school-boys, headed by their teacher, who conducts them to seats especially reserved for them in the rear of the Church, whilst the larger of them ascend to the organ-loft to act somewhat in the capacity of a choir. All these boys have their hymn-books in their hands; for they come from the school-house, where they have been for an hour practicing the hymns to be sung on that day. Now comes the officiating minister, preceded by the acolyth, who opens the door of his pew before

him, and again closes it after him. The minister is not robed in the clerical gown; but he is distinguished by the peculiar clerical scarf hanging down over his back, and by the clerical cravat, the name of which we cannot now recall. And now the entire congregation chant, unaccompanied by the organ, the German plain prose translation of the *Veni, Sancte, Spiritus*, or *Komm Heiliger Geist*. But here we regret that our memory fails us in several small particulars. We know that the congregation, with the accompaniment of the organ, sang several hymns before the sermon; we know also that the minister read the Gospels and Epistles, and invariably the liturgical prayers at the altar; and that each time he issued from his pew, the acolyth opened and closed the door before and after him. But whether the reading of the Gospels and Epistles formed one distinct act, and the reading of the liturgical prayers another, the two being separated by a hymn on the part of the congregation; of this we are uncertain, although we are inclined to think that the two acts were separate and distinct. So also at a certain stage of the worship of the congregation the acolyth filled a burnished censer with live coals and poured incense upon them. Then he slowly proceeded along one aisle, swinging the censer, up to the altar, where he stopped and swung it several times, and then down the other aisle. Though not quite certain, we presume that this act took place just before the offering of the liturgical prayer, in order to represent and symbolize the prayers of the people. On certain solemn occasions this act was performed several times. After another hymn, the minister ascended the pulpit to preach the sermon, which was preceded and followed by a short free prayer. A closing hymn and the benediction ended the worship.

In the belfry of the church were several grand old bells. This, of course, was nothing extraordinary. But these bells were used not merely to call the congregation to church on Sunday and the festivals. Besides this use, they were heard every day in the style and character of the *bet-glocke*, the prayer-bell. They were not rung in the manner of the noisy jarring fire and alarm bells; they were struck and made to

chime in true canonical order. To the best of our recollection they were heard three times daily, thus calling the parishioners from their secular toils to remember their spiritual duties.

Baptism was always administered in the presence of *sponsors*. What the Reformed Church of Hessen believed and taught with regard to this sacrament, we will show by a few extracts from its Liturgy. This book we obtained from the library of the late Dr. Hoffeditz, himself a native of Hessen, and who very probably used it in the administration of clerical acts. The form of Baptism proceeds as follows :

1. Address of the pastor, and prayer.

"Beloved in the Lord; since we are here assembled in the name of our God for the purpose of administering, according to the command and institution of Jesus Christ, Holy Baptism to this Christian child, and thereby to assure unto it the washing away of its sins by the blood of Christ as also regeneration by the Holy Spirit, let us therefore heartily, and with true faith pray as follows."

Of the prayer we give merely the following: "And this child, which is now to be incorporated with Thy church, receive it among Thy holy people and into the communion of Thy dear Son; and work within us all according to Thy gracious promise that we may with true faith and hearty giving of thanks accept Thy great mercy unto this child, which Thou in Holy Baptism, which we now according to Thy command do purpose to administer unto it, wilt Thyself baptize, and regenerate from its sinful and damnable nature; that so all may henceforth hold this child as Thy child and heir; and thus assist it, that it may be trained to sanctify Thy name, and enlarge Thy kingdom."

In a foot note to the above rubric, an extract is given from the Liturgy of 1657; a time when, according to Dr. Sudhof (See Art. *Hessen*, in *Herzog's Encyclopedia*) the Heidelberg Catechism was used as text book, not only in the High schools, but also almost universally in the parochial schools of Hesse. We allow ourselves a short extract from it.

"Beloved in the Lord. Since we are here gathered to admin-

ister Holy Baptism, it is proper first of all to consider the mystery of Baptism, its true signification and purport.

"Holy Baptism is the first sacrament, in which the redemption of our Lord Jesus Christ is imparted to us, and our sins pardoned and washed away.

"It therefore becometh us well to consider the three following points. First, That we are entirely corrupt by reason of original sin, and are born with such a nature and kind, which is at enmity with God our Creator and with all good, and is therefore with all its wisdom and righteousness damned forever. Secondly, that no one can help us and deliver us from such in-born corruption, except our Lord Jesus Christ, who alone restores and makes right again that which had been ruined and corrupted by our first parents. Thirdly, that the same our Lord Jesus Christ will in Holy Baptism wash away all our sins, regenerate us, incorporate us with Himself, clothe us with Himself, impart unto us His Holy Spirit, and make us His children and heirs of eternal life."

But we return to the Liturgy of 1842. Here follows:

c. The Confession of Faith by the Sponsors, which consists of answering to three questions and the Apostles' Creed. The third question proposes: "Do you renounce Satan, with all his works and ways, and the world with all its malice?"

d. The act of baptism.

e. The blessing of the baptized, which is as follows: "Almighty God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who has regenerated thee by water and the Holy Ghost, and has through Christ Jesus forgiven thee all thy sins, anoint and strengthen thee with His saving grace, unto life everlasting. Amen."

f. *Returning of thanks*, which is throughout in the spirit of the preceding.

g. The Benediction.

It would be interesting to give other extracts from this baptismal form, but our space admonishes us to desist. We would yet state, however, that the Form of Confirmation contains the same renunciation as the one already given.

But before leaving this liturgy, we must yet be allowed a

brief reference to the Form of Preparation for the Holy Communion. This consists of three parts. The first proposes three questions to the candidates for communion, which they are required to answer with an audible *yea*. The second is a penitential prayer, or confession of sins. The third is the absolution, followed by a short thanksgiving. The absolution is as follows: "All ye who have truly confessed your sins, and have heartily and with sincere faith cried unto God for mercy and forgiveness, be ye comforted and assured that the Almighty Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is gracious and merciful unto you, and pardons all your sins for the sake of the sufferings and death of His beloved Son, Jesus Christ; and in the name of the same, our Lord Jesus Christ, according to His commandment, and by authority of His word, when He says, '*Whosoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whosoever sins ye retain they are retained,*' I do, as a regular and ordained minister of the Church of Jesus Christ, pronounce you that repent and believe to be fully acquitted, and absolved of all sins, that they all be as fully and perfectly pardoned unto you, as Jesus Christ has remitted the same by His sufferings and death, and has commanded to preach it through His gospel in all the world. This comfortable assurance, which I have now in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ made unto you accept ye with a joyful heart, therewith contenting your conscience, and firmly believing, that your sins are assuredly forgiven you, in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost."

Before we close this rapid and imperfect sketch, we would yet advert to some customs which were observed in connection with the burial of the dead. Funeral sermons were, to the best of our recollection, never preached. Perhaps there was a short exhortation at the house or at the grave. But what was peculiar and calculated to lend a deep solemnity to the occasion was the fact that the scholars of the parochial school were required to attend these funerals, to head the procession, and at intervals during the progress to the cemetery to sing solemn funeral hymns. In advance of the coffin also marched in single

file three men clothed in long, black mantles, kept for the purpose by the parish, and bearing each a cross from which a streamer of black crape floated on the air.

But why do we make these statements? Certainly not because we think that the Reformed Church in America should be constructed exclusively on the model of the Reformed Church in Hesse. But we do think that in laying the foundations of the Reformed Church in our land, which we are really doing now, we ought to be guided by a broad and Catholic spirit. If we would act historically, and lay a foundation for which the Reformed Church of the future will bless us after we have gone home to our fathers, we must gather up both the evangelical and Catholic elements, which are furnished us by the different provincial branches of the Reformed Church, and thus build a beautiful temple unto the Lord, complete and harmonious in all its parts.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

LIGHT-HOUSES AND LIGHT-SHIPS: *A descriptive and historical account of their mode of construction and organization.* By W. H. Davenport Adams. With illustrations from photographs and other sources. New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 1870.

Another volume of the Illustrated Library of Wonders. It comes in the usual excellent dress, and is full of valuable information, conveyed in the most entertaining style. We have before spoken of these books as valuable for the young. They will lead the young to form a taste for solid reading over against novel reading, to which they sometimes give themselves up just for the want of something of this kind suited to their capacity and years.

THE EARLY YEARS OF CHRISTIANITY. By E. De Pressensac, D.D., author of "*Jesus Christ: His times, life and work.*" Translated by Annie Harwood. *The Apostolic Era.* New York: Charles Scribner & Co., 654 Broadway. 1870.

We have not yet had time to examine this work, as it has just come into our hands. From what we have read we are impressed with the vigor, freshness, and originality of the author's style, even though it comes through a translation. This volume is one of four—viz. I. *The Apostolic Era.* II. *Martyrs and Apologists.* III. *Doctrine and Heresies.* IV. *The Church Worship and Christian Life.*

AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY: *including strictures on the Management of the Currency and the Finances since 1861, with a chart showing the fluctuations in the price of Gold.* By Francis Bowen, Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity in Harvard College. New York: Charles Scribner & Co. 1870.

A volume of about 500 pages, neatly and substantially published by Scribner & Co. It is not only by an American author, but, as its title imports, on American affairs. The author takes the position, that while the general principles of Political Economy are the same everywhere, yet the science is modified by different nationalities. Hitherto we have been much dependent on foreign works, such as those of Ricardo, Malthus, McCulloch, J. S. Mill, Say, and others. They, too, have treated the subject deductively, while Prof. Bowen regards it as especially an inductive science. The main body of the work is occupied with a discussion of our finances, especially with reference to the necessities created by the late war. On the subject of Protection he takes a position, different from Political Economists generally, in favor of Protection. The work has received favorable notices from the press generally. As a practical work, adapted to the particular circumstances of this country at the present time, it will be read and studied with interest.

Line

